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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the use of regional organizations and soft balancing by 
great and middle powers in the Indo-Asia-Pacific vis-à-vis hegemonic or rising 
powers perceived as threatening, at the global and regional levels. The prime 
focus of this work is on collaboration within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) since 2001. It is contended that although the SCO was not 
established to confront directly the U.S.-dominated international system, Russia 
and China have coordinated their activities within this multilateral framework to 
balance the continuous U.S. presence in Central Asia, and hinder the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s eastward expansion. Their actions underscore the 
importance of non-interference and state sovereignty as fundamental principles of 
the international system. The concept of soft balancing remains under-developed 
in this context. The thesis reviews the existing literature on soft balancing and 
comes to the conclusion that it deserves to be ranked among the main alignment 
strategies. Soft balancing is a safer, more subtle, and an indirect alternative to hard 
balancing, minimizing the possibility of counter-reaction from the state against 
which it has been mobilized.  
To test the validity of soft-balancing behavior, the case of the SCO is compared to 
the soft-balancing cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) when dealing with a re-emerging China of the early 1990s. China‟s 
regional policies with respect to disputed claims in the South China Sea alarmed 
the ASEAN member states and prompted fears about potential Chinese aggression. 
It is argued that soft balancing in the form of ASEAN-led government-to-
 Page | 3  
 
government (Track I) and non-official (Track II) multilateral structures has begun 
to „socialize‟ China towards regionally responsible behavior and a commitment to 
shared norms. This thesis finds that soft balancing has thus been a strategy of 
critical significance for both ASEAN and SCO, deserving an enhanced level of 
recognition for its role in coordinating regional relations.   
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Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious, 
even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of the 
opponent's fate.
1
  
Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Chapter 6: “Emptiness and Fullness” in The Art of War: complete texts and commentaries, translated by 
Thomas Cleary, Boston, MA: Shambala Publications, Inc., 2003, p.108. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Soft Balancing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
 
This thesis argues that the great and middle powers of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region 
conduct soft balancing as they build, expand and adjust the scope of regional 
organizations and cooperative security arrangements.
2
 „Soft balancing‟ refers to a 
subtle and indirect form of balancing, where second-ranking powers rationally 
employ non-military tools (such as international and regional institutions, 
economic statecraft, and the strict interpretation of neutrality) to constrain the 
power of a hegemonic state, rising power, or emerging inter-state tensions.
3
 Any 
state with a preponderance of power, even if a friendly ally, still represents a 
potential constraint – and therefore a possible threat – to the interests of great and 
middle powers within their own region. The quest for a new equilibrium serves the 
„weaker‟ rather than the „stronger‟ in this asymmetric relationship:  the latter would 
hardly wish to compromise its primacy, but the former would have improved the 
prospects of its freedom for strategic and diplomatic manoeuvre without needing to 
„bandwagon‟ with or „hedge‟ against the more powerful party.  
The role of soft balancing in countering the primacy of the Unites States of 
America (hereafter, the United States or the U.S.) and the rising power of the 
People‟s Republic of China (PRC or China) is a significant phenomenon in 
international relations at both systemic (global) and subsystemic (regional) levels. 
This thesis examines the increasing interest in regional organizations by second-
                                                 
2 Key terms and concepts – including „Indo-Asia-Pacific‟, „great powers‟, „middle powers‟, „regional 
organizations‟ and „soft balancing‟ – are defined more fully below. 
3 For a systematic approach to “rising power” dynamics, see Andrew Hart and Bruce Jones, “How Do Rising 
Powers Rise”, Survival, vol.52, no.6, December 2010, pp.45-62. 
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ranking powers or major powers as they could be termed in this context, and in the 
managing of security issues in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region since the end of the 
Cold War. The major powers, including China and Russia, have attempted to use 
the strategy of soft-balancing through their multilateral institutions to limit the 
ability of the United States to impose its preferences upon them. The main driver 
for these discussions has predominantly been the rejection of the aggressive 
elements of the Bush Doctrine: the proactive use of force, unilateral military 
interventions in sovereign states, and the insistence on building a national missile 
defense system. These elements have diminished the reputation of the U.S. as a 
benign hegemon and given other major powers reasons to fear its policies. The 
power preponderance of the United States has become increasingly undesirable 
because of its engagement in behavior that does not bring about predictable 
patterns of change. Additionally, second-ranking states, such as Russia, China, 
France and Germany, have raised concerns that the U.S. is rewriting long-
established rules of conduct without considering the interests of other state actors 
in the international system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
States displeased with these changes in the U.S. national security strategy have 
consequently chosen to resist specific U.S. policies regarding its military 
enhancement and have engaged in a vocal attack against unilateralism by calling 
for a “predictable and stable” multipolar world, 4 in which global power is 
distributed into three or more great-power centres, with other states allied with one 
of the rivals.
5
   
                                                 
4 Vladimir Putin interview by France 3 Television, Embassy of the Russian Federation in Australia, 9 February 
2003, [http://www.australia.mid.ru/press2003/05.html].  
5 Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformation, 10th ed., Belmont, 
CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 107. See further Jenny Clegg, China‟s Global Strategy: Towards a 
Multipolar World, London: Pluto, 2009; Susan Turner, “Russia, China and the Multipolar World Order: The 
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China manifested its discontent through military display when it shot down its own 
Feng Yun IC weather satellite, in its “satellite killer” (anti-satellite ASAT) test on 
11 January 2007.
6
 While this action could have been viewed as irresponsible,
7
 in 
terms of regional norms and socialized behavior, shortly after the event the then 
Russian President Vladimir Putin attacked not China, but instead the United States, 
by stating: “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any 
problems”. He spoke of “an almost uncontained hyper use of force” and stressed 
that “the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a 
last resort is the Charter of the United Nations”.8  
The most persuasive argument against U.S. unilateralism has come from structural 
realists such as Kenneth N. Waltz and Christopher Layne, who argue that 
counterbalancing by other major powers was likely to happen if U.S. power 
became too threatening.
9
 This argument is derived from „balance of power‟ theory, 
which posits that because states have an interest in maximizing their long-term 
                                                                                                                                       
Danger in the Undefined”, Asian Perspective, vol. 33, no. 1, 2009, pp.159-184, 
[http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n1-f.pdf]. From 2000, for diplomatic reasons, PRC began to favor 
a stronger emphasis on „multilaterialism‟ as a less threatening term than „multipolarity‟, see Leif-Eric Easley 
“Multilateralism, Not Multipolarity Should be Goal”, The China Post, 29 March 2008, 
[http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/leif-eric-easley/2008/03/29/149402/Multilateralism-
not.htm]. For interaction of regional, multilateral and global policies, see Sohn Injoo “After Renaissance: 
China‟s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 18, 
no. 1, May 2011, pp.77-101. 
6 The Chinese political elite included the U.S. presence and consolidation of military alliances in the Asia-
Pacific among factors of uncertainty in their 2008 Defense White Paper. They argued that states needed to 
enhance processes for coordinated approaches to dealing with such uncertainties. “The Security Situation”, 
China‟s National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People‟s Republic of China, 
Beijing, January 2009, [http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_3.htm]; For the Chinese 
test as part of an emerging „asymmetric power‟ strategy, see Anne E. Robertson, Militarization of Space, New 
York: Facts on File, 2011, p.94.  
7 Joan Johnson-Freese, “America‟s China Worries – Part I”, YaleGlobal,  6 February 2007, 
[http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=8714].  
8 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 10 February 2007, 
[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.s
html]. 
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, International Security, vol.25, Summer 2000, 
pp.5-41; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International 
Security, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5–51. 
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odds of survival, they will coordinate to check dangerous concentrations of 
power.
10
  
For the structural realists, it is only a matter of time before these changes emerge 
since hegemony
11
 can never be permanent. Between 2001 and 2009, the U.S. not 
only overstretched its power (due to long-term as well as new global and regional 
commitments) and overspent on its military enhancements, it also suffered 
opposition from its own citizenry who demanded a greater focus on domestic 
issues, rather than prolonged engagement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
12
  
On the one hand, unipolarity is hailed as a force for stability because “second-class 
powers cannot directly balance against the U.S. superiority, either individually or 
collectively”;13 U.S. military power is so overwhelming and its role as a benevolent 
superpower is so certain that other states have no reason to challenge it.
14
  On the 
                                                 
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.  
11 „Hegemony‟ is the preponderant military and economic power of a single state in the international system. If 
a state gains a complete hegemony, then the system becomes hierarchic and no longer anarchic. The hegemon 
dictates the outcomes and no other state has enough concentrated power resources to challenge its hegemonic 
power. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001, p. 34 and 
p. 40. The hegemonic projection of power goes beyond the military and economic sphere. There are also 
ideological and cultural elements involved.  
The U.S. gained a complete hegemony after World World II; however, currently it faces limitations to its 
hegemonic power, especially in its soft power, which will be discussed in chapter three in reference to China‟s 
soft balancing efforts in areas of oil equity and politics of aid around the world and in chapter five when 
assessing soft balancing efforts of the SCO towards the U.S.   
12  The Bush Presidency has been viewed negatively by the public, both in the U.S. and worldwide. A 
December 2008 Pew Research Centre Survey revealed that only 11% of the American public would remember 
President Bush as an outstanding or above average President; the lowest positive score amongst the last four 
presidents. The American public was aware of extensive anti-American sentiment in the world, which it 
attributed to some foreign policy choices of the Bush Administration. See full report at [http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/478.pdf]; Lack of confidence in American leadership due to its foreign policy was shared 
among a majority of those 47 nations which participated in a 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Distrust was 
expressed even in countries that would usually be considered as strong American allies. The Czech Republic, 
for example, showed 71% support in 2002; this dropped to 45% in 2007. Indonesia favored the U.S. with 61% 
in 2002; this number declined to 29% in 2007. Turkey‟s support landed at 9% in the same year. The complete 
report is available at [http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256].The U.S. role in world affairs 
was viewed negatively in a January 2007 survey of more than 26 000 people from 25 countries conducted for 
the BBC World Service by GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, 
[http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/incl/bbcpoll.pdf].The poll explored six foreign policy areas and 
established that three in four (73%) of correspondents disagreed with U.S. handling of the Iraq war.  
13 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, vol.24, no.1, Summer 
1999, pp.7-8.  
14 Stephen C. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, 
no.4, July/August 2002, pp.20-33. 
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other hand, “the twilight of the unipolar world”15 has been proclaimed and in its 
place would emerge system similar to “the 19th century multipolar system.”16 Both 
positions simplify emerging trends in the international arena, driven in part by 
ideological commitments to either the status quo or a desire for moderated change 
that might allow a more peaceful transition to a multipolar order. 
Beyond Unipolarity 
In the two decades after the end of the Cold War, the international system remained 
if not strictly unipolar, then at least uni-multipolar,
17
 with one superpower and 
several strong great powers. There has been no clear evidence that these great 
powers have committed themselves to hard balancing against the United States in 
the form of alliances, transfers of technology to opponents of the U.S., or military 
build-ups. Christopher Layne attributes the absence of traditional hard balancing to 
three elements: pressures on second-tier powers to both bandwagon with the U.S. 
and to balance against it; inability of the major powers to challenge the U.S. 
                                                 
15 Coral Bell, “The Twilight of the Unipolar World”, The American Interest, vol. I, no. 2, Winter 2005, pp.18-
29. 
16 This was stated by Dr Bell during an interview with the author, Australian National University, Canberra, 6 
December 2006. In her view, unipolarity lasted from the beginning of 1992 until 2001, which surprised Dr Bell 
as she had believed it to have lasted for 30 years. Dr Bell acknowledged that there would be “sort of a 
transitional period” but did not have a specific term for it. See: Coral Bell, World Out Of Balance: American 
Ascendancy and International Politics in the 21st Century, Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Books, 2004; Coral 
Bell, The End of the Vasco de Gama Era, Lowy Institute, 15 November 2007, 
[http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/end-vasco-da-gama-era].  
17 Barry Buzan suggests that in the first decade after the Cold War, the global power structure shifted to 1+4, 
with only the U.S. remaining as a superpower, and China, the EU, Japan and Russia as great powers. Such a 
complicated system certainly cannot be adequately captured within the simple designation as either unipolar or 
multipolar. Buzan refers to Huntington‟s concept of uni-multipolarity - “a strange hybrid . . . with one 
superpower and several major powers”. Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics 
in the Twenty-First Century, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004, p.74. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely 
Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, March/April 1999, p. 36. Also Samuel P. Huntington, “The Great 
American Myth”, Speech at the Grano Series – The American Empire, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 10 February 2005, [http://www.aims.ca/site/media/aims/huntington.pdf].  
One must acknowledge that the current world order is neither purely unipolar nor multipolar (Huntington‟s 
idea of uni-multipolarity “goes in the right direction, but fails to specify criteria for classification and locks 
itself into a single, static formulation” [Buzan, 2004, p.74]). Richard N. Haass proposed a term „Nonpolarity‟ in 
his The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, Foreign Affairs 3, May/June 2008, vol. 87, pp. 
44-56. How change and transition across systems occurs needs further serious analysis.  
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leadership due to various internal problems; and underestimation of the power of 
the existing hegemon.
18
 
None of the major states appears entirely satisfied with the status quo. Indeed, 
Russia, China and India have represented part of their foreign policy posture in 
terms of desiring a multipolar system. Yet in the medium term they have often 
acknowledged the reality of U.S. strategic power, especially bearing in mind efforts 
by these „rising powers‟ to reposition themselves as global players.19 In turn, critics 
within the Bush Administration had acknowledged Washington‟s failure to achieve 
dominance in all categories of power.
20
  
With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, the U.S. started to be viewed 
more favorably internationally.
21
In order to achieve its goals, the U.S. 
administration was advised to employ the use of „smart power‟, which is a 
combination of hard and soft power. Joseph S. Nye in his book, The Future of 
Power, suggested that a smart strategy was not aimed to “maximize power or 
                                                 
18 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States‟ Unipolar 
Moment”, International Security, vol.31, no.2, Autumn 2006, p.10; The widening BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa) Summit process has not yet demonstrated either hard balancing or formal alliance 
structures, but has shown some soft balancing behaviors (see further below). For a recent critique, see Ruchir 
Sharma “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 6, November/December 
2012, pp.2-7.  
19 C Raja Mohan, “Managing Multipolarity: India's Security Strategy in a Changing World”, in  India‟s 
security challenges at home and abroad, C Raja Mohan and Ajai Sahni, , NBR Special Report No.39, The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, May 2012, 
[http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR39_India_Security_Challenges.pdf]; G. John Ikenberry 
"The Future of the Liberal World Order", Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3, May/June 2011, pp.56-68. 
20 The term “power” is “easier to experience than to define or measure”, Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means 
to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p. 1. Nye suggests that “power is the ability to 
influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are several ways to affect the 
behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract 
and co-opt them to want what you want”. For Nye “soft power” – getting others to want the outcomes that you 
want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. See Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990, Chapter 2. Nye built his idea on Peter Bachrach and Morton 
Baratz‟s “second face of power” in their “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework”, American 
Political Science Review, September 1963, pp. 632-42. 
21 In 2010 The Russians viewed the U.S. more favorably than in 2009, there was an increase from 44% to 57%, 
and President Obama was viewed more favorably abroad than at home. See: “Obama More Popular Abroad 
Than At Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit”, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research 
Center, 17 June 2010,[http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-
foreign-policy-3/]. 
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preserve hegemony” but “to find ways to combine resources into successful 
strategies in the new context of power diffusion and the „rise of the rest‟.”22 In contrast 
with the Bush Administration, the Obama leadership has been trying to recover declining 
American leadership in the world while taking the newly rising powers into consideration. 
However, the Obama administration, largely staffed by veterans of the Clinton 
Administration,
23
has been just as equally wedded to preserving U.S. hegemony through its 
key foreign policy positions.
24
 President Obama argued in his State of the Union Address 
that the United States needed to “out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the 
world” and used the example of China building the world‟s largest private solar research 
facility and the fastest computer.
25
 In his re-election speech on 7 November 2012, 
President Obama revisited these sentiments on education and global leadership.
26
 He spoke 
about the attraction of U.S. culture and the power of the U.S. military. The latter, in 
particular, has remained an area of contention. The Pew Research Center‟s Global 
Attitudes Project highlighted in 2012 the issue of continued use of drone strikes, which 
was viewed negatively by many nations. The U.S. has been widely perceived, especially 
by Islamic communities, as retaining unilateral foreign policy that excludes consideration 
of the interests of other nations.
27
 President Obama‟s ambitious speeches that offered new 
partnerships with the Muslim World and progressive policies towards the Middle East 
                                                 
22 Joseph S. Nye, The Future Of Power, New York, NY: Public Affairs, February 2011, pp.207-208. 
23 President Clinton referred to the U.S. as „the world‟s indispensable nation‟ in his second inaugural address 
on 20 January 1997. See: Inaugural addresses of the presidents of the United States: from George Washington 
to George W. Bush, United States Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, 
Washington, DC, 2001, [http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres65.html].  
24 Christopher Layne, the Waning of U.S. Hegemony – Myth or Reality? A Review Essay, International 
Security 34, no. 1, Summer 2009, pp.147-172; Daniel Dombey, “Clinton aims for pragmatic diplomacy”, 
Financial Times, 14 January 2009, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1a00534-e1db-11dd-afa0-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2C21ra1KE].  
25 Barack Obama, State of the Union 2011: Winning the Future, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 25 
January 2011, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address] 
26 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Election Night, McCormick Place, Chicago, Illinois, The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 November 2012, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/11/07/remarks-president-election-night].  
27“Drone Strikes Widely Opposed Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted”, Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, 13 June 2012, [http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-
of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/].  
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have not yet changed these global orientations.
28
 Consequently, a declining acceptance of 
U.S. primacy among the major players coupled with a desire to influence regional affairs 
provides an opportunity for great and middle power soft balancing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.  
This thesis, then, examines the „soft balancing strategy‟ of middle and great powers 
in regional settings. It does so by conducting a study of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dealing with a re-emerging China during the 
early 1990s and with Russia‟s and China‟s coordinated activities within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after 2001 to balance the continuous 
U.S. presence in Central Asia. 
Terminology  
Soft balancing is defined here as subtle, indirect and informal balancing. It is 
driven by medium and great powers regarding a hegemonic or rising power as 
posing a threat or potential threat to their interests and can manifest in a number of 
ways. These include the medium and great powers using their territory to create 
logistical problems for the preponderant or rising power; using regional trade or 
use of local currencies to weaken its relative economic power of the hegemonic or 
perceived as threatening state; and promoting norms and rules of conduct that are 
intended to diminish its influence.
29
 Soft balancing often involves collaboration in 
regional or international institutions and its success lies in the states‟ use of soft 
power resources – institutions, policies, values or culture – to attract other 
governments into the organization of a soft balancing coalition.  
                                                 
28 See for example President Obama “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning”, Cairo University, The 
White House Press Office, 4 June 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09]; Fouad Ajami “The Arab Spring at One”, Foreign Affairs, vol.91, issue 
2, Mar/Apr2012, pp.56-65; Daniel Byman “Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and 
Prospects”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 127, issue 1, Spring 2012, pp.25-46. 
29 T. V. Paul, “The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory,“ in Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and 
Practice in the Twenty-first  Century, ed. T.V.Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 46-71; Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States”, 
International Security, vol. 30, issue 1, 2005, pp. 7-45. 
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This thesis operationally re-defines middle powers
30
 as states or international actors 
aiming for growing regional influence (though in some cases they already exert 
strong regional presence) and argues that these middle and great powers tend to use 
soft balancing.
31
 Great powers possess a substantial degree of political, military 
and economic power
32
 which can only be defeated by another great power.
33
 Great 
powers in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are China, Russia – as members of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) – and Japan, an economic and political great 
power. The U.S. can be viewed as a declining superpower, in spite of the „Asian 
Pivot‟ policy of 2012. To test its soft balancing hypothesis, this thesis examines 
ASEAN‟s relations with China in the 1990s and the SCO‟s responses to the U.S. 
presence in Central Asia post-2001. ASEAN and the SCO, taken collectively, are 
considered to be „diplomatic middle powers.‟ This is driven by partial policy 
convergence (via intergovernmental dialogue) and to a lesser extent by shared 
treaties and deepening economic interaction.  Thus a regional organization can 
function like a middle power when it behaves as a unified actor in the international 
arena on specific issues. The SCO and ASEAN, though not as supranationally 
integrated as the European Union, have sought to deepen their control over their 
immediate membership areas, as well as gain greater influence in their wider, 
proximate regions (Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific respectively). This level of „power 
                                                 
30 While there is no single definition of middle power, this thesis identifies two approaches in establishing 
which countries are considered middle powers. From the perspective of „statistical definition‟, the method used 
by Jonathan Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005, pp.103-104, five out 
six members of ASEAN6 are middle powers (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), 
while Brunei is a small power. Based on his findings, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan are small powers. This thesis argues that according to the second perspective of a „geographical 
definition‟, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan exert levels of influence in Central Asia that rank them as middle 
powers. India and Iran, the SCO observer states, are also considered as middle powers.  
31 Further discussion on the concept of middle power activism can be found in John Ravenhill, “Cycles of 
middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies”, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, vol.52, issue 3, November 1998, pp.309-327. 
32 KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.131. 
33 Based on Jack S. Levy‟s criterion of powers, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1945-1975, Kentucky, 
1983, cited in International Relations: 2006-2007 edition, ed. Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, New 
York: Longman, 2007, p.78. 
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projection‟, however, can only be sustained when inter-governmental cooperation 
remains high. This re-formulation is necessary when studying middle power 
activism regionally, as well as wider middle power groupings in the international 
system.
34
 
There is no generally agreed narrow definition of regional organizations in 
international relations literature. The UN Charter provides no clear definition of 
regional arrangements, instead focuses on how they contribute to the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts, rather than what they are empirically.
35
 The definition of 
„regional organizations‟ and „multilateral frameworks‟ used here is based on 
numerous quantitative and qualitative definitions which suggest that these concepts 
refer to “cooperation among governments or non-governmental organizations in 
three or more geographically proximate and interdependent countries for the 
pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue-areas”36 led by “specific generalized 
principles of conduct”.37 
Network
38
 based regionalism is regarded as a central aspect of soft balancing in this 
thesis, because the member states of ASEAN and the SCO use these international 
                                                 
34 For some of the benefits and dangers of running diplomacy through middle power conceptualizations, see 
Mark Beeson “Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power 
Diplomacy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, issue 5, November 2011, pp.563-577; 
Matthew Sussex “The Impotence of Being Earnest? Avoiding the Pitfalls of „Creative Middle Power 
Diplomacy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, issue 5, November 2011, pp.545-562. 
35 The UN Charter, Chapter III: Regional Arrangements, Articles 52-54, 
[http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml]. 
36 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regional institutions, the UN and international security: a framework for analysis”, 
Third World Quarterly, vol.18, no. 3, 1997, p.423. 
37 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organization 46, no.3, 
Summer 1992, p.567; Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research”, International Journal 
XLV, Autumn 1990, p.731; Samuel S. Kim, “Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia”, Journal of East 
Asian Studies 4, 2004, pp.39-67. Also see: John Duffield, “What Are International Institutions? International 
Studies Review 9, 2007, pp.1-22. 
38 Network is understood as a “form of multilateral governance structure in which linked agents act and interact 
loosely within its realm and openly outside its realm”, Katsuhiko Mori, “Institutionalizing, Marketizing and 
Networking Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”, International University of Japan Research Institute 
Working Paper, Asia Pacific Series no. 10, April 1999, 
[http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/workingpapers/PIRS_1999_04.pdf]; Shun Cao, “Networks of Intergovernmental 
Organizations and Convergence in Domestic Economic Policies”, International Studies Quarterly, vol.53, 
2009, pp.1095-1130. 
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policy networks to socialize and converge in shared norms. This networking 
process facilitates open discussions and coordination of responses vis-à-vis external 
threats. This approach has been pioneered by ASEAN which always had to 
consider stronger external players in the region. The consultative nature of this 
framework and experience in working in a “world of fluid, shifting coalitions”39 
has provided a more flexible approach to responding to common threats. ASEAN 
and the SCO have been proactive in voicing their norms; both frameworks support 
non-interference in domestic affairs, and provide region-specific suggestions for 
resolving issues.  
ASEAN‟s and the SCO‟s soft balancing occurs in the context of evolving 
multilateral (Appendix One)
40
 and bilateral engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 
The diagram (Figure 1, p.29) does not represent the totality of interactions, rather it 
schematically portrays the complexity of overlapping relationships between states 
and among regional groupings within international diplomatic environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The characteristics of networked regionalism in Asia and a comparison with „institutional regionalism‟ in 
Europe, where supranational institutions shape policies of member states, are described in Yeo Lay Hwee, 
“Institutional regionalism versus networked regionalism: Europe and Asia compared”, International Politics, 
vol. 47, 2010, pp. 324-337. 
40 Appendix One demonstrates an example of overlapping engagements between Track I and Track II (CSCAP) 
frameworks from the CSCAP perspective. Both ASEAN and the SCO are part of this illustration and should be 
understood in the context of these overlapping relationships. 
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Figure 1: Indo-Asian Core of Network Dialogue 
 
The primary focus area is the relationship among SCO, ASEAN, and the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This emerging Indo-Asian 
“Core” of Network Dialogue is viewed as an area of protection from (and 
moderation of) external influences. This core is driven by ASEAN, with an 
increased involvement from the SCO and a partial engagement from SAARC, 
which has not been fully engaged (See Figure 1, dotted line). Although notable 
states such as the U.S. or Japan are important, they have yet to demonstrate a level 
of comprehensive engagement in these subregional frameworks in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, in spite of their involvement with groupings such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the East Asian Summit (EAS) process.  
In contrast, the U.S. has shown the best capacity to connect with other players in 
the international system, which can be viewed as a “networked world” on specific 
issues.
41
 This has been exemplified by counterterrorism policies creating a “dense 
                                                 
41  Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America‟s edge: power in the networked century”, Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1, 
January-February 2009, pp. 94-113, [http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/AmericasEdgeFA.txt].  
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global network of law enforcement officers, counterterrorism officials, and 
intelligence agencies”.42 In Southeast Asia, U.S. centrality has been challenged by 
ASEAN-led network regionalism, which has provided an attractive alternative for 
weaker or rising states. Track I diplomacy (government-to-government) has been 
supported by Track II frameworks (non-official) that are complementary and 
provide valuable policy proposals.
43
 ASEAN member states reacted to market 
forces from Europe and Northern America by promoting an East Asian community 
based on network collaboration with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
Japan within the ASEAN+3 format. Furthermore, ASEAN „soft balances‟ great 
powers, prime examples being China and Japan, by playing them off against one 
another through negotiating different free trade agreements (FTA) for each. The 
ASEAN-China FTA encouraged Japan to engage in discussions on a similar 
agreement, a “Comprehensive Economic Partnership”, when previously Japan had 
been overly hesitant to conclude an ASEAN-Japan FTA.
44
 It remains to be seen 
whether a wider ASEAN-centred free trade agreement can be negotiated in the 
future (the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership).
45
 
It should be noted that the visual illustration (Figure 1) employed here does not 
constitute a new regional architecture; rather, it has an explanatory value for this 
thesis. Two segments within this diagram will be discussed in a great detail in 
chapters four and five: the ASEAN-China relationship and Russia-China-SCO 
interactions vis-à-vis the U.S. 
                                                 
42  Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America‟s edge: power in the networked century”, Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1, 
January-February 2009, pp. 94-113, [http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/AmericasEdgeFA.txt]. 
43 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “Unofficial Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Role of ASEAN-ISIS”, Canadian 
Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, Paper no. 22, March 2000. 
44 Yeo Lay Hwee, “Realism and Reactive Regionalism: Where is East Asian Regionalism Heading?” Research 
Unit on International Security and Cooperation, Discussion Paper, Madrid, May 2005.  
45 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations were launched by Leaders from 
ASEAN and ASEAN‟s FTA partners at the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 20 November 
2012, [http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/].  
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Thesis Contribution and Argument  
By examining in greater depth the subtle, indirect and non-military security 
behavior of great and middle powers in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
46
 region, this thesis 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of contemporary balancing behavior, 
which is broadened to explain numerous strategies that states use to limit the power 
of a hegemonic actor or a state perceived as threatening, at global, regional, and 
organizational levels. In this new context, power is increasingly channelled by non-
hegemonic states through regional organizations. Particular focus is directed at 
collaboration within the SCO.
47
 To test the validity of the interpretations of soft-
balancing behavior, the case of the SCO is compared to the soft-balancing 
cooperation observed in the Southeast Asian member nations of ASEAN
48
 when 
dealing with a re-emerging China in the post-Cold War period. 
By drawing on structural realist and constructivist theories, the current work 
derives hypotheses about the extent to which the engagement of regional powers, 
China and Russia in particular, is based on multilateral regional frameworks even 
when dealing with American predominance in the region. The key hypothesis 
argues that both great and middle powers in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region build, 
expand and adjust the scope of regional organizations and cooperative security 
arrangements in response to new challenges, and use soft balancing at both 
                                                 
46 This term was used by the then Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in his speech “Australia, 
Asia and Global Drivers for Change” during the Future Summit, Brisbane, 12 May 2006. 
The concept of „Indo-Asia-Pacific‟ employed in this thesis encompasses Northeast Asia (China, Japan, the 
Korean Peninsula and Mongolia), Southeast Asia (the ten ASEAN members), Southern Asia (Afghanistan, 
India, Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and the Southwest Pacific (Australia in particular). The thesis incorporates 
references to Russian, U.S., Kazakh and Uzbek policies where appropriate.  
47 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental regional organization established in 
Shanghai in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. References will be 
made to observer states: Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan and dialogue partners: Belarus, Sri 
Lanka and Turkey. 
48  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an intergovernmental regional organization 
founded in Bangkok by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1967. The 
organization enlarged incrementally by admitting Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to its 
membership. The majority of the assessment covers ASEAN6 – the founding members and Brunei.  
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government-to-government (Track I) and non-official (Track II) levels. This 
approach links state security directly to region-building and views the two, in so far 
as a core of convergent interests is sustained by the key actors, as mutually 
constructive and not mutually competitive. These trends are noted to have become 
more common since the early 1990s for ASEAN, and to have emerged as crucial 
strategies – especially since 2001 – for the SCO. 
The selected multilateral regional frameworks have begun to „socialize‟ states 
towards regionally acceptable behavior and a commitment to shared norms. The 
case of China‟s change of policy from bilateral to multilateral involvement and 
engagement of the “ASEAN Way”,49 as a distinctive set of norms upon which 
decision-making and consensus building are based, is striking. It demonstrates an 
altered approach in Beijing‟s interactions in forums where it is active. 50  Both 
Russia and China have enhanced their image within the region by adopting policies 
of cooperative engagement through their participation in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the SCO.
51
 Regional cooperative arrangements can successfully 
coexist in an environment characterized by the presence of several alliances, 
though this has sometimes been a sensitive issue within the ARF. In China‟s case, 
it is evident that in terms of privileging one over the other, multilateral cooperation 
and bilateral partnerships are complementary activities for a great power rather 
                                                 
49 “Asean Way”, a style of diplomacy or code of conduct evolved in intra-ASEAN, see David Capie and Paul 
Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp. 14- 27. 
The „ASEAN way‟ is characterised by soft institutionalisation, with six norms: sovereign equality, the non-
recourse to use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, the non-
involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy, mutual 
respect and tolerance, see Michael K. Connors, Remy Davidson and Jörn Dosch, The New Global Politics of 
the Asia Pacific, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 81. 
50 For China, the most important forums are the meetings of ASEAN+3 and those under the umbrella of the 
ARF and the SCO.  
51 Conflict prevention by promoting security cooperation and an overview of conflict prevention capacities can 
be found at Craig Collins, Erik Friberg and John Packer, Overview of Conflict Prevention Capacities in 
Regional, Sub-regional and Other Inter-governmental Organisations, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 
Amsterdam, October 2006, [http://www.conflict-
prevention.net/uploads/File/ECCP%20Publications/Overview%20of%20Conflict%20prevention%20capacities
%20in%20RIGOs.pdf]. 
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than competing ones. China holds a „comprehensive strategic partnership‟ with 
Russia that has opened up a wider engagement across Eurasia. These two great 
powers, in turn, have become sensitive to Washington‟s punitive interventions 
abroad and the resurgence of terrorist activities. These have been key post-9/11 
issues for the SCO which comprises of China and Russia, the great power members.  
The thesis does not aim to establish a blueprint for a well-functioning system of 
security cooperation in the wider Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The varying 
memberships, mandates and scope of selected Track I and Track II multilateral 
frameworks makes this development a gradual process. The nature of the regional 
security cooperation is in many cases inter-governmental, “a hostage to the national 
foreign policies of their respective members”.52 This contrasts with the nature of 
the European Union (EU) processes based in large part on supranationalism. 
Therefore, the conclusions drawn here are not the result of a comparison of diverse 
regional environments. Rather, an explanation is sought as to how the prevailing 
(early 21
st
 century) use of regional organizations and soft balancing functions 
within the confines of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have emerged. This thesis 
offers an important answer to those who deny that soft balancing has taken place 
and to those who claim that soft balancing was an isolated response to the Bush 
Administration‟s unilateralist policies after 9/11.  
 
 
                                                 
52  Jürgen Haacke, “Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN, ARF, SCO and KEDO”, in Asian Security 
Reassessed, ed. Stephen Hoadley and Jürgen Rüland, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, p. 
129. 
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Overview of Thesis 
This thesis explores the theoretical underpinnings of the soft balancing concept as 
well as the practical application on two major case studies. The introduction 
outlines the theoretical issues facing the concept of balancing. It argues the 
classical realist view of balancing is insufficient in explaining contemporary 
balancing behavior, where more indirect, non-military and subtle strategies by 
great and middle powers are used to limit the influence of a dominant or 
threatening state. It also highlights the role of regional organizations and non-
official multilateral frameworks in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. This chapter explores the 
complex relationships between selected regional organizations and state actors, 
providing the background within which soft-balancing has evolved. 
Chapter Two focuses on theoretical perspectives – realism, liberalism and social 
constructivism – and their views on the importance of regional organizations. It is 
argued that the Western-driven structural realism and social constructivism are the 
most suitable approaches for theoretical assessment as long as they include the 
influence of charismatic leaders or their enabling institutions (such as the military 
or a powerful political party) in driving policy within this specific region.  The 
second chapter further discusses methodology and case selection. The limitations 
of this thesis are also discussed, based on the strategic culture of the main state 
actors and organizations. These include limited transparency in reporting of their 
joint activities, and the youthfulness of the SCO as an organization. It should be 
noted that over recent years all parties have improved their disclosure of foreign 
policy priorities and have consolidated coordinated approaches within the SCO vis-
à-vis common threats.  
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Chapter Three explores the concept of “soft balancing” in the context of the main 
alignment strategies. It provides a comparative analysis of alternative state 
strategies: soft bandwagoning and hedging, which float between two extreme 
alignment strategies: bandwagoning and balancing. A diagram is used to explain 
the dichotomy between these concepts. This chapter provides examples of 
historical cases and 21
st
 century soft balancing behaviors as well as defining the 
concept of soft balancing in the context of existing literature. It also outlines the 
key variables before a detailed analysis of practical case studies is undertaken in 
chapters four and five.  
In Chapter Four, the strategic environment of the post-Cold-War Southeast Asia, 
and the response of the ASEAN member states towards the „China Threat‟ is 
described. It analyzes ASEAN-China relations and ASEAN‟s use of soft balancing 
when countering China‟s re-emergence in the region. For example, China‟s role 
has been welcomed in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) and the ARF perhaps with the aim of socializing Beijing towards gradual 
internalization of shared norms. This strategy, however, is limited, due to China‟s 
unwillingness to compromise its national interests, especially in spheres where its 
territorial integrity is threatened. In relation to this, China‟s approach to resolving 
the South China Sea dispute is assessed. 
In Chapter Five, the thesis focuses on the SCO‟s soft balancing strategy vis-à-vis 
the U.S. after 11 September 2001. It delineates the strategic environment in Central 
Asia and analyzes regional policies of major state actors: Russia, China and the 
United States and their relations with the „Stans‟ (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). This chapter explores confidence building within the 
Shanghai Five processes and the establishment of the SCO. It argues that the SCO 
 Page | 36  
 
was not created with the idea of constraining an external state actor; however, the 
SCO has contributed to undermining U.S. operability in Central Asia and reducing 
the spread of Western-style democracy among the SCO member states. The SCO 
soft-balancing strategy is tested through the case of „territorial denial‟ to the U.S. 
and allied military forces at a military base in Uzbekistan. The second test is related 
to the SCO‟s normative power and how applying the “Shanghai Spirit” challenges 
Western democratic concepts and contributes to regime preservation in the SCO 
member states. 
Chapter Six analyzes limits to the SCO‟s soft balancing strategy. This is conducted 
through an investigation of how the SCO responded to the Russia-Georgia War of 
2008. Russia engaged in a conflict that contradicted the SCO principle on 
combating separatism. The SCO member states restated their commitment to 
preventive diplomacy and the role of the UN in conflict prevention and resolution, 
but this did not change Russia‟s position, nor alter later conditions „on the ground‟.   
Drawing together the insights from these six chapters, Chapter Seven presents 
conclusions about great and middle powers‟ use of the regional organizations 
(ASEAN and the SCO) and soft balancing in order to constrain a dominant state or 
one perceived as threatening. It is argued that the soft balancing strategy was used 
apropos a re-emerging China of the 1990s and as a means of constraining U.S. 
policies viewed as threatening, especially after the start of military operations in 
Iraq. States, however, tend to shift their strategies when core  national interests are 
compromised, and consequently, they often use soft balancing on their own 
narrower terms, at times undermining regional consensus.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Structures 
 
State behavior in regional organizations is examined in this thesis through 
theoretical approaches that have been selected for their explanatory value.  
Although none of the main international relations theoretical approaches has 
origins in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, they provide valuable tools for assessing the 
interactions of selected states, especially when paying attention to their historical, 
societal, political, economic and other relevant features. A single theoretical 
approach is insufficient to capture the complexities of the SCO and ASEAN 
member states and the interplay between these states. A combination of neorealist 
structuralism and constructivism is used here to explain the great and middle power 
responses to the increased presence of the United States and China in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific. This chapter begins with a discussion of how major theoretical 
approaches represent the role of regional organizations. Special attention is given 
to historical variables and the deeply engraved sense of mistrust among the states in 
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. These countries, historically, have promoted realist concepts 
of nationalism, sovereignty and territoriality, with a special focus on the doctrine of 
non-interference. However, they have begun to call for regional solutions by 
promoting a constructivist approach to decision-making, which supports a 
consensual means of reaching a mutual agreement in an informal setting.  
The chapter concludes by outlining the methodology and the case studies employed. 
The cases to be evaluated are contemporary and constantly evolving. However, the 
focus will be on ASEAN‟s use of soft balancing vis-à-vis China in the 1990s and 
the SCO‟s use of soft balancing vis-à-vis the U.S. in the first decade of the 21st 
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century. Both cases resulted in constraining the influence of China and the U.S., 
whose behavior was viewed as „threatening‟ in specific regional settings.  
Continuity, Cooperation and ‘What States Make of It’  
Three theoretical perspectives dominate discussions of the role and relevance of 
regional structures – realism, liberalism and constructivism. Before assessing their 
main theoretic perspectives on regional organizations, and their application to the 
selected region, it is beneficial to provide the view of the United Nations (UN) on 
the role of regional processes.  
It is argued here that as long as a core of convergent interests is sustained by the 
key actors, state security can be linked to region-building with the view toward 
them being mutually constructive rather than mutually competitive.
53
 On this basis, 
selected multilateral frameworks lead their member states towards regionally 
responsible behavior and a commitment to shared norms. The UN has recognized 
the task-sharing role of regional arrangements (agencies) in the UN Charter 
(Chapter VIII, articles 52-54).
54
Although the UN views the Security Council as the 
main bearer of responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, 
increasing attention is given to regional frameworks. In the words of former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the Security Council members “in many 
cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in 
this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict 
                                                 
53 If fully developed, this could lead towards a pattern of cooperative security. See: William Tow, Tangled 
webs: Security Architectures in Asia, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2008,  
[http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=174&pubtype=5]; Paul M. Evans  
“Cooperative Security and Its Discontents in Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Connection”, American Asia Review 
19, issue 2, Summer 2001, pp.99-120; Arlene B. Ticker and Ann C. Mason, "Mapping transregional security 
structures in the Andean region", Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28, no.3, June-July 2003, pp.359-393. 
54 Article 52 in particular invites”regional action” as long as these” activities are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations”. The UN also encourages “the development of pacific settlement of local 
disputes through such regional arrangements”. See: UN Charter, Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements 
(Articles 52-54), [http://un.by/en/documents/ustav/ustavgl8text.html].  
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peace-building”.55 Both ASEAN and the SCO have collaborated with the UN and 
have signed Memoranda of Understanding to strengthen their cooperation. The UN 
has officially acknowledged the SCO as “an essential forum for addressing security 
in Eurasia in all its dimensions – political, economic, military, and 
environmental”.56 Likewise, ASEAN has seen cooperation with the UN as a key 
regional strategy. The organizations, which signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on 27 September 2007,
57
established a Comprehensive Partnership 
during the 4
th
 Summit in Bali on 19 November 2011. This collaboration contributes 
to maintaining regional peace and stability.  
ASEAN hoped to use UN assistance in cases of the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.
58
 Resolving the South China Sea dispute is of a particular interest. 
ASEAN nations encourage the disputing parties to deal with their differences by 
observing international law – specifically, the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).
59
 China is a signatory to this agreement, which limits the area of 
„territorial waters‟ and „exclusive economic zones‟; however, it prefers a resolution 
on a bilateral basis, rather than regionally through ASEAN or internationally via 
the UN, in spite of multilateral dialogue on other issues such as free trade 
agreements.
60
 This dispute thus demonstrates a mixture of hard power and norms-
                                                 
55 Boutros-Boutros Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”, 
Report on the Secretary-General‟s statement at the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 
1992, 17 June 1992, [http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf]. 
56 Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General‟s Message to the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), delivered by B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 
Yekaterinburg, Russia, 16 June 2009, [http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3926#] 
57 Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
United Nations (UN) on ASEAN and UN cooperation, New York, 27 September 2007, 
[http://www.aseansec.org/21918.pdf].  
58 The Annex to the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (UN) stipulates in point A „Political and Security Cooperation‟ 
in section 2.3 to “Promote peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, 
the ASEAN Charter, and international law”,[http://www.aseansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/UN-JD.pdf]  
59 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,  United Nations Official Website, 
[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm].  
60 “ASEAN wants UN law to settle South China Sea row”, Manila Times, AFP, 11 July 2012, 
[http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/headlines-mt/26619-asean-wants-un-law-to-settle-sea-dispute].  
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based elements, with only a partial shift towards multilateral solutions (see further 
below). 
Consistent with the theme of this thesis, this chapter utilizes theoretical 
perspectives to analyze the role of regional organizations in order to determine 
whether they are useful in facilitating soft balancing. The three theories assessed in 
this section display different views as to how important regional organizations are 
within the international system. It should be noted that International Relations 
theories have undergone several revisions and there exist variations of perspectives 
within each. Their theoretical application is even more complex in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, where the underlying Western concepts are applied to societies of non-
Western heritage. The following analysis will briefly highlight the main tenets of 
each theory, focusing on their view of power in relation to balancing and 
cooperation between states.  
The most distinct categories of realism are: traditional or classical realism as 
represented by Hans Morgenthau;
61
 and neorealism, or structural realism, under the 
seminal influence of Kenneth Waltz.
62
 The structural realists are further classified 
into „offensive realists‟ – John Mearsheimer63 is one such who believes that states 
maximize their power and hegemony is the primary goal – and „defensive realists‟ 
– exemplified by Robert Jervis,64 who claims that states support the status quo as 
long as their security in preserved. All realists believe that sovereign states are the 
main actors in international politics and are forced to pursue power politics in 
                                                 
61 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948. 
62 KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; Waltz restated his 
argument after the end of the Cold War in “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, International Security 25, 
Summer 2000, pp. 5-41. 
63 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton and Co., 2001. 
64 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, vol.30, no.2, 1978, pp.167-214. 
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support of national interests.
65
 All hold that the international system is „anarchic‟ 
but each has different views on states‟ autonomy within this system: classical 
realists see states acting upon and shaping the international system, while 
neorealists suggest that states are somewhat constrained by the system‟s structure.66  
In general, classical realists are sceptical about the efficacy of regional 
intergovernmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While 
they do not completely disregard them, they do emphasize their youth and 
weaknesses.
67
 States are seen to comply with norms not because they are virtuous 
but because it is in the state‟s best interest to do so. Thus, Track II organizations 
are seen as mere „talk shops‟ relying on leading states to give them some authority. 
The belief that the strongest states in the system shape these organizations to 
increase their relative power
68
 is often exemplified by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). NATO is a product of the power distribution that prevailed 
during the Cold War and it is argued that it has been a tool for the U.S. to deal with 
the Soviet threat during the Cold War and subsequently with the threat of terrorism, 
especially after 9/11.
69
 While realism adequately explains several important aspects 
of the international system – anarchy, state-centric behavior and the distribution of 
capabilities – it is less than satisfactory regarding a range of other variables. It 
downplays, for example, the importance of norms, institutions and identities, and 
                                                 
65 Jack Donnelly, “Realism”, in Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed., ed. Burchill, Scott et al 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmilllan, 2005, p.30. 
66 Karen A.  Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, 3rd ed., New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2004, p.86; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977.   
67 Michael Leifer, “ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?”, in ASEAN in a Changed Regional and 
International Political Economy, ed. Hadi Soesatro, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
1995, pp.129-42. 
68  Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, “Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A 
Comparison, “Millennium Journal of International Studies, vol. 21, no.3, Winter 1992, p.330. 
69 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, vol.19, no.3, 
Winter 1994/95, pp.13-14. 
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does not provide sufficient explanation of the issue of rapid change in international 
relations.   
The liberal view of IGOs and NGOs lies opposed to realism, seeing these 
organizations as playing independent roles which enhance regional cooperation 
among member states in the international system and reduce their transaction costs. 
Organizations are understood to provide information which can help states to avoid 
worst-case scenarios by raising awareness of each other‟s intentions.70  Liberals 
believe that collective action and collective security are needed in dealings with 
violators of international law. The autonomous exercise of power available to a 
single state is rather ineffective, and for liberals, unofficial channels (Track II) play 
increasingly important roles in facilitating collective action in highly strategic or 
political issues; issues too sensitive to be dealt with directly by governments. In 
such cases, they complement the work of governments.
71
  
An alternative approach to traditional international relations theories is 
constructivism, outlined primarily in the works of Alexander Wendt and John 
Ruggie.
72
 Constructivism goes beyond the material, economic and military power, 
and can be measured socially by indicators. Wendt holds that although state leaders 
                                                 
70 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory”, in Theories of War and 
Peace, ed. Michael Brown et al., Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1998, pp.390-391; Shah M. Tarzi, 
“International Regimes and International Relations Theory: Search for Synthesis”, International Studies 40, 
February 2003, pp. 23-39. 
71 Brian Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order”, in Asian 
Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003, p.247. 
72Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 
John Gerard Ruggie “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order”, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 1982, pp.379-415; John Gerard Ruggie 
“What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, 
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, Autumn, 1998, pp.855-885. 
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are the principal actors in international politics, their political decisions are 
influenced by many variables, including cultural norms, values, identities and 
socialization. How states perceive each other matters and this is affected by shared 
knowledge. The anarchy of friends differs from that of enemies and self-help from 
collective security.
73
 John Ruggie suggests that „social constructivism‟ holds up 
wider possibilities for system-transformation within international affairs, a stronger 
role for „ideational factors‟, and a greater number of actors operating at different 
levels than those of the state.
74
  
For constructivists, Track I and II organizations provide useful spaces where state 
elites and academics may share ideas and socialize collective norms through their 
interactions. These experiences allow them to define their interests, to build social 
identity, and even to reassess their images of the world.
75
 Security issues result 
from inter-subjective interactions. Historical legacies and cultural traditions, role 
perceptions of self and others are deeply ingrained in the collective memory of a 
nation and society, and these guide decision-makers in their actions. 
Constructivism promotes ideas and norms circulated and propagated by regional 
and international institutions, which its proponents believe, are the main elements 
of “a socially constructed concept of security”.76 
 
                                                 
73 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing international politics”, in Theories of War and Peace, ed. Michael Brown et 
al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, pp.418-423. 
74  John Gerard Ruggie “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge”, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, Autumn, 1998, pp.855-885. 
75 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 
Emanuel Adler et al., Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
76 Stephen Hoadley, “The Evolution of Security Thinking: Overview”, in Hoadley and Rüland, p.9. 
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Historical variables, such as long-held animosities and mistrust, play a crucial role 
when testing theories in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region,
77
 with India-China relations 
being a particular case in point. Their mutual suspicion dates back to disagreements 
over border demarcations and China‟s rule in Tibet. Tensions peaked during the 
Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the ensuing mistrust was reinforced by China‟s 
support of Pakistan during the Cold War.
78
 Beneath this, however, a deeper debate 
about leadership in the developing world and relative influence in Asia heightened 
sensitivities further. John W. Garver argues that the 1962 war between India and 
China “finally destroyed Nehru‟s vision of pan-Asian unity to create a new, post-
colonial order”;79 instead leading to the emergence of “asymmetric perceptions of 
mutual threat” between Delhi and Beijing – that is, China does not perceive India 
as a serious threat, but India finds China and its actions threatening.
80
 
Historical legacy can be so deeply embedded that it prevents countries from 
cooperating even when they share common interests. Jihwan Hwang uses the 
example of Japan and South Korea to demonstrate this point by asking why Tokyo 
and Seoul did not choose a bilateral security alliance after World War II, since each 
entered into one with the United States. His answer sees an entrenched historical 
                                                 
77 Thomas, J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, 
International Security 23, no.4, 1999. 
78 See John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2001 for an analysis of the Sino-Indian relations during the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
79 John W. Garver, “India, China, the United States, Tibet, and the Origins of the 1962 War”, India Review, 
vol.3, no.2, April 2004, p.171. 
80 John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
vol.25, no.4, December 2002, p.109; Currently Beijing focuses on India‟s naval advancements, while Delhi is 
preoccupied with China‟s military modernization. They hold similar interest in the other‟s nuclear strategy, 
aerospace and aviation programs. See: Lora Saalman, “Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian 
Threat Perceptions”, Journal of International Affairs, vol.64, no.2, Spring/Summer 2011. 
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antagonism passing from generation to generation in South Korean society, 
preventing them from pursuing stronger security cooperation.
81
 
Scholars have questioned whether such Western international relations theories are 
adequate in the analysis of the contemporary Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
82
 William T. 
Tow argues that Asia-Pacific policy makers, having only recently been “liberated 
from the vestiges of colonialism”, equate their own political survival with national 
security. He claims that “traditional state-centric policy relations are paramount in 
the region and an integrated realist-liberalist framework remains the most relevant 
approach to discussion of the Asia-Pacific region”. According to Tow, 
constructivism was created by European and American theorists and is not „mature‟ 
enough to be applied to Asia.
83
 In contrast, Amitav Acharya points out that norms 
and identity in Southeast Asian regional order are central to regional politics. In his 
view, regionalism in this part of the world cannot be explained simply by the great 
power balance, as argued by realists such as Michael Leifer,
84
 but is also shaped by 
ideational forces, including norms and the politics of identity building.
85
  
In 2007, the journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
86
 asked: “Why is 
there no non-Western international relations theory?” Acharya and Buzan noted 
that there are various ways to answer such a question: 1) that Western international 
                                                 
81 Jihwan Hwang, Rethinking the East Asian balance of power: historical antagonism, internal balancing, and 
the Korean-Japanese security relationship, World Affairs, vol. 166, no. 2, Fall 2003. 
82 “Introduction”, in International Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003, p.2. 
83 William Tow, “Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN”, in Broadening Asia‟s Security 
Discourse and Agenda, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman, Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2004; A 
stronger role for multilaterialism is suggested in William Tow Tangled webs: Security Architectures in Asia, 
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2008, 
[http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=174&pubtype=5] 
84 Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper no. 302, London: International Institute for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1996. 
85 Amitav Acharya, “Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia‟s regional order”, 
The Pacific Review, vol.18, no.1, March 2005, pp.97-98; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community 
in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed., New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. 
86 International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 7, 2007. 
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relations theories are universal in all cultural contexts; 2) that these schools have 
dominated the intellectual world for quite some time, and therefore are 
subconsciously accepted regardless of how true they are; 3) that there are indeed 
non-Western international relations theories; however, they are hidden due to 
language barriers and the consequent difficulties of non-Western scholars in 
accessing English language-dominant A+ journals; 4) that there are diverse 
developmental and local conditions outside the West and less developed countries 
are more concerned with their domestic problems or regional issues than with the 
overarching international system; and 5) that there is a wide gap between the 
Western and non-Western developments of international relations theories.
87
  
In addition to these points, there arises another question: In order to have an Asian 
international relations theory, we must ask „who proposes it?‟ The possibilities that 
arise are: only people who were born, raised and educated in the region; Asian 
scholars who have Western citizenship and are based in Asia; or contributions 
come from Westerners who live in the West but possess a great knowledge of 
Asia?
88
 Although strategic culture may be informed by past political systems, 
modern Asian international relations discussions remain engaged with Western 
models, even if these are interpreted through particular linguistic and translational 
formula.
89
 
                                                 
87  Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An 
introduction”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol.7, 2007, pp. 287-301. 
88  Ibid., p.301. See also Tu Wei-ming‟s Tu three symbolic universes of „Cultural China‟ in which the 
intellectual enterprise of China as an ideational construct includes cultural and ethnic Chinese in their 
homeland, the Chinese diaspora around the world, and non-Chinese people such as Western scholars and 
business people who influence the discourse on China. Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the 
Centre”, Daedalus, vol. 120, no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 1-32. While not directly relevant to International Relations 
theory, it does provide a parallel for who is „eligible‟.  
89 See for example Yan Xuetong Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun 
Zhe, translated by Edmund Ryden, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
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No single answer to these dilemmas has been forthcoming to date. Southeast Asian 
leaders had to accept Western concepts if they wanted to gain legitimacy and 
maintain the leadership of their respective countries. Influential views on world 
order came from the leaders themselves, rather than directly from scholars. Such is 
the case with India‟s Jawaharlal Nehru India or Sukarno in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
in the West, it was not unusual, for academics that theorize to hold strategic 
positions within government. This can be seen in the U.S., where theorists such as 
Joseph Nye, the co-founder of complex interdependence and the pioneer of the 
concept „soft power‟, became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs in the Clinton Administration.
90
 Nye argues that you can influence 
others through culture and values rather than coercing through threats.   
Thus, it is this minimalist or „soft‟ form of realism that is mobilized in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific at present. This is the case especially in Southeast Asia where 
countries balance against threats rather than power. Incorporating threat 
perceptions, which are shaped by other non-realist variables, conforms to „balance 
of threat‟ theory rather than to „balance of power‟. The notion of balance of threat 
was introduced by Stephen Walt, and argues that states balance against threats, 
rather than against external capabilities. Threats, as such, are defined as perceived 
intentions, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities.
91
 While the importance 
of power as a factor in inducing balancing behavior should not be downplayed, it 
should not be the only factor under consideration. J. David Singer‟s 1958 formulaic 
                                                 
90 Henry Kissinger is a prominent example. Kissinger was National Security Advisor and Secretary of State 
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations and is a big proponent of Realpolitik. His views on U.S. Diplomatic 
approaches are widely discussed in his Diplomacy, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994. His support for 
power politics is analyzed in Hans Kung, Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press, 1988. See further Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy”, 
in American Diplomacy, Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 20 January 
2012. Likewise, Zbigniew Brezezinski has been a scholar, statesman and media commentator. Others, such as 
Hans Morgenthau, were variously consultants to, or critics of, government policy. 
91 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, p.5. 
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expression of „Threat Perception = Estimated Capability x Estimated Intent‟92 is 
still relevant in capturing the notion that power as represented by capabilities is not 
enough. Intentions, which are much more difficult to ascertain, are crucial in 
assessing threat.  
These considerations assign only a limited role to hard power when balancing 
threats, and have led to a growing appreciation of soft power diplomacy in the 21
st
 
century (Appendix Two).
93
 A clear case lies in China‟s effort to use the 
attractiveness of its culture throughout the region, and promote higher education of 
foreigners in Chinese universities in order to fill the ranks of future generations of 
elites with individuals more sympathetic of, and accommodating, to Chinese 
interests.
94
 Chinese scholars promote defensive rather than offensive realism, and 
are guided in this by China‟s policy of „peaceful development‟ (heping fazhan).95 
This formulation, which superseded „peaceful rise‟, was introduced in 2004 in 
partial response to concerns over U.S. threat perceptions of China, and draws its 
non-offensive policy lineage from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
(mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and 
peaceful coexistence) that were first articulated in 1953 and incorporated in the 
                                                 
92  J. David Singer, “Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol.2, no. 1, March 1958, pp. 90-105. Another pioneering work in the „threat perception‟ literature is Thomas C. 
Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1960. 
93 Appendix Two illustrates an example of mapping the world‟s soft power index and highlights the growing 
interest in providing more detailed and comparative assessments of national soft power resources. The results, 
as shown in Appendix Two, clearly demonstrate that both, Russia and China, are still not serious competitors to 
the U.S. and other middle and great powers in categories such as „diplomacy‟, „business‟ and „government‟, 
however, they are ranked among top ten countries in „culture‟ (Russia and China) and „education‟ (China). 
Further explanation of the index and results can be found in Jonathan McClory, “The New Persuaders II: a 
2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power”, Institute for Government, 1 December 2011, 
[http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf] 
94 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”, International Security, vol.29, 
no.3, Winter 2004/05, pp.77-78.; various aspects of China‟s soft power, including multilateralism, the good-
neighbor policy and cultural diplomacy is in China‟s Soft Power and International Relations, ed. Hongyi Lai 
and Yiyi Lu, London: Routledge, 2012. 
95 Two government white papers were produced on „peaceful development‟: State Council Information Office 
of the PRC, China‟s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing, December 2005; and China‟s Peaceful Development, 
September 2011. 
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Constitution.
96
 While China is greatly concerned about the U.S. hegemony, its 
concern is also directed towards the use of the word „hegemony‟ in relation to itself, 
since officially China does not support policies that allow the use of force or 
interference in the domestic affairs of another country, as indicated in its above-
mentioned Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
97
  
Indo-Asia-Pacific states have shown themselves to be selective in their choice of 
concepts upon which to base state policy. Western ideas such as territoriality, 
nationalism and sovereignty were expanded into „the doctrine of non-intervention‟, 
which has become a core norm within ASEAN and the SCO.
98
 There is evidence 
that liberal thinking has had some influence in the form of a majority of ASEAN 
members viewing China as an economic opportunity rather than a major security 
threat, as demonstrated by the consequent signing of the China-ASEAN free trade 
agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 2010.
99
 Neoliberal institutionalism 
thus has some relevance in explaining economic cooperation in the region, though 
                                                 
96 For more detailed studies, see Rosita Dellios and R. James Ferguson, China‟s Quest for Global Order: From 
Peaceful Rise to Harmonious World, Lanham Md,: Lexington Books, 2013, Chapter 4; and Bonnie S. Glaser, 
and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and 
Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise””, The China Quarterly, vol. 190, June 2007, pp. 291-310. 
97 China equates „hegemony‟ with containing countries by force. This view is linked to China‟s Century of 
Humiliation and the imposition of unequal treaties by Western powers. Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of 
Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats, The Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007, p.28, 
[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub765.pdf]; Resistance to outside influence and 
aggression are incorporated in China‟s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, “Carrying Forward the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development”, Speech by Wen Jiabao 
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China At Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary 
of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 28 June 2004, 
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/t140777.htm#].  
98 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976,  Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations official website,[http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm]; Declaration on Establishment of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, China,15 June 2001, Official Website of SCO Summit 
2012,[http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/documents.htm].  
99 This agreement generated some loud opposition in Indonesia, where the people were worried about a 50% 
drop in the domestic market share of the textile industry when China entered the market. See: “China-Asean 
Trade Deal Begins Today”, Jakarta Globe, 1 January 2010, [http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/china-
asean-trade-deal-begins-today/350274]. 
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it has failed to account adequately for ASEAN‟s successes or failures in the 
political and security sphere.
100
  
Constructivism has become rather more popular among researchers of the Indo-
Asia-Pacific. This post-Cold War theory considers the role of norms and ideational 
forces in forming a common identity among Asian regional nations which seek 
regional autonomy based on the „ASEAN Way‟ or the „Shanghai Spirit‟. 
Constructivism argues that rather than judging the informal and consensual way of 
decision-making in Asia as inefficient, it should be observed as an attribute of a 
political culture that incorporates respect for diversity of member states. 
Comparison should not be made with the EU institutions, for example, where 
decisions are made in a much more formal and bureaucratic setting.
101
 
It would appear that constructivism and structural realism are particularly 
promising theoretical approaches in understanding state strategies and behavior 
within the Indo-Asia-Pacific. However, in order to adequately capture the essence 
of international relations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, any theoretical assessment 
should include an ideational filter to account for the attitudes and institutional 
interests of military and political leaders from within the region, since these 
individuals greatly influence the way their countries perceive themselves and 
others. Deng Xiaoping, China‟s paramount leader until his death in 1997, is a 
notable example of leadership influence. He is remembered for his low-profile 
approach to global politics through his „hide and bide‟ strategy (also known as the 
24-character strategy) which he announced to his fellow leaders in August 1991 in 
                                                 
100 Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p.7. 
101 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective”, in Crafting Cooperation: 
Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, ed. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnson, 
Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: University Press, 2007. 
 Page | 52  
 
response to the Soviet Union‟s inevitable collapse: “Observe the development 
soberly, maintain our position, meet the challenge calmly, hide our capacities and 
bide our time, remain free of ambitions, never claim leadership.” 102 Later, “make 
some contributions” was added. Other influential leaders that stand out in the 
region‟s history are Malaysia‟s longest serving prime minister (1981-2003), 
Mahathir bin Mohamad, and his powerful UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) party; his Singaporean counterpart Lee Kuan Yew; and Indonesia‟s 
former president, Suharto, who privileged the military as a domestic institution.  
Likewise, Central Asian states (with some exceptions as in Kyrgyzstan) have 
experienced a long-term continuity of dominant leaders in spite of having 
„procedurally‟ democratic political systems. As such, their international relations 
have favoured a mix of post-Cold War multilateral engagement combined with 
strong efforts to resist deeper liberal reform or externally supported regime change 
(see further below). 
Methodological Approach  
This thesis employs the terminology of Stephen van Evera in speaking of a blend 
of theory testing, policy evaluative and historical evaluative methods.
103
 Theory 
testing uses empirical evidence to evaluate existing theories; evidence which takes 
the form of case studies that are (1) interaction-specific, for example the 
engagement of China and Russia in the SCO, and (2) issue-specific, such as those 
dealing with possible areas of conflict, territorial and sovereignty issues (inclusive 
of border disputes and competing claims over islands in the South China Sea).  
                                                 
102Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People‟s Republic 
of China, 2005, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005, p. 11. 
103 This terminology has been drawn from Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political 
Science, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
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State behavior is explored here using structural realist and constructivist theories. 
While realists explain state behavior mainly in terms of a country‟s relative 
position within the international distribution of power, constructivists seek to 
understand country‟s identity through “the inter-subjective understandings and 
expectations that constitute [a state‟s] conception of self and other”.104 Variables 
from each perspective are examined together. On its own, the constructivist 
approach could, for example, focus on arms control dialogues and tend to overlook 
links with any parallel dialogues that may be intensifying arms races.
105
 Alastair 
Johnston provides the example of Chinese defense officials, in their concern over 
relative military balances, arguing for higher arms expenditures – in contrast to the 
voice of moderation from Chinese negotiators participating in ARF.
106
 
The policy evaluative method examines public policies and their implications on 
the engagement of key powers in multilateral frameworks over the period 1990-
2012. Finally, the historical evaluative method examines those empirically-based 
and theoretical beliefs that guide official or unofficial policy actors and the 
consequences of the policies thus pursued. (This can be deduced from the various 
positions of the relevant leaders and their doctrines – for example, in the 
generational change of Chinese leadership).   
Decisions in foreign policy involve complex sets of actors, data and perceptions. 
Power assessments are complicated constructs and are often targeted towards 
specific audiences. It is within this context that a range of indicators and statements 
must be explored in order to draw credible conclusions. Thus, a range of behaviors, 
                                                 
104 Alexander Wendt, p.397. Cited in Henry R. Nau, “Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia”, in John G. 
Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, p. 213. 
105 Henry R. Nau, “Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia”, in John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 
p. 229. 
106 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International 
Relations Theory”, in John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, pp. 107-162. 
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formal statements (treaties, declarations and agreements) and policy statements 
(white papers, press releases, interviews with key leaders) are assessed here. 
Selection of Case Studies  
The research presented in this thesis has been organized around two case studies. 
Each case is presented as an example of soft balancing involving a regional 
organization. The primary focus of the first case study is ASEAN‟s soft balancing 
strategy towards China. While ASEAN may be characterized as a well-established, 
widely recognized and examined, multilateral framework with the prospect of 
creating an ASEAN Community by 2020,
107
 it is analyzed here mainly as the 
ASEAN6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and 
Thailand). The period of this case study is the 1990s; however, reference is made to 
ASEAN-China relations post 2001 in relation to the South China Sea dispute. This 
allows one to trace the behavior of the ASEAN member states from the end of the 
Cold War, when the organization became more proactive in increasing its role in 
managing regional security and alleviating the possibility of a major conflict with 
China in the South China Sea.  
The ASEAN case study provides an opportunity to test the regional response of a 
„diplomatic‟ middle power towards a rising power perceived as a possible threat, in 
this case the re-emerging
108
 great power, China. On the other hand, the second case 
study tests the response from the SCO, which is driven by two great powers, Russia 
and China, vis-à-vis the prevailing superpower, the U.S. These two case studies 
present the transitional strategic use of soft balancing in two distinct regional 
                                                 
107 This pledge was made in the Bali Accord II in October 2003. 
108 Historically, imperial China was the largest and most powerful polity in East Asia. 
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environments under different strategic conditions. However, both cases explore 
changes in power distribution in the post-Cold War era. In ASEAN‟s case, the 
systematic evolution of Southeast Asia has accompanied China‟s growth. In the 
SCO‟s case, greater Central Asia has experienced a prolonged presence of foreign 
troops, due to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the later not being strictly a Central 
Asian state but in a contiguous region and also subject to American military 
intervention). Subsequently, this has led to a competition over influence in newly 
established Central Asian republics, which are logistically vital with regards to 
basing and transit rights and the overall development of Eurasia.  
Another merit of the SCO case is the fact that it is an emerging and often 
misunderstood regional organization, which has not been examined adequately in 
the context of internal dynamics within its own regional context. This study 
considers member states‟ perspectives and SCO‟s policy options with regards to 
external players.  
Lastly, an application of the soft balancing concept can help in the study of 
strategic use of soft power. Failure to understand complexities of these evolving 
regional engagements and contemporary balancing behavior, when power is 
channelled through regional organizations, could lead to ill-informed foreign policy 
choices, especially when dealing with such important relationships as ASEAN-
China relations and the Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership vis-à-vis 
the U.S. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed some of the strengths and limitations of existing 
theoretical approaches as applied to great and middle power behavior in regional 
organizations. Most theoretical approaches have some relevance with regards to 
regional cooperation; however, they promote different concepts and levels of 
identification with the regional diplomatic community. The combination of two 
theoretical perspectives, neorealist structuralism and constructivism, offers a viable 
assessment of the interplay of state relations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Structuralists 
stress the importance of respecting territorial sovereignty and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of another state. This means that ASEAN and the SCO member 
states do not publicly criticize the development and governance of another state. 
The constructivist approach to decision-making, by comparison, is based on 
consultation which contributes to building an environment where regional solutions 
to regional problems are prioritized over external norms or models of intervention. 
Finally, the domestic actor variable of an influential leader (as was the case with 
China‟s Deng Xiaoping) or competing domestic voices (such as the Chinese 
military and foreign policy communities) needs to be considered as a moderating 
factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 57  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 58  
 
CHAPTER THREE: Explaining Soft Balancing Behavior 
 
Soft balancing has only recently emerged as a research field in International 
Relations. Therefore, the existing literature on this subject is limited.
109
 There are 
some inconsistencies in defining the concept and explaining its long-term relevance 
in International Relations theory. It is subject to continuing debate and a few early 
proponents who initially saw the applicability of soft balancing in their scholarly 
work, especially in the case of Chinese equity oil investment, but later decided to 
move beyond the soft balancing strategy and lean towards strategic hedging 
concepts.
110
 This thesis aims to revive discussion and advance understanding of 
soft balancing to new levels by means of the following: 1) examining mechanisms 
employed by ASEAN to constrain the ascent of China; and 2) identifying those 
mechanisms which the second-tier powers, China and Russia, adopted when 
dealing with the aftermath of the Cold War and the preponderant power of the 
United States. Through an analysis of the central works in this sphere of 
International Relations, theory, it becomes clear that some attention to the soft 
balancing argument has been generated. Although it might not be a broadly 
supported alignment theory, it certainly occupies a pivotal point along the 
continuum between two extremes of the spectrum of alignment strategies: 
balancing and bandwagoning. The works of the main proponents soft balancing 
and of its critics are introduced below.  
                                                 
109 Chaka Ferguson, “Soft Power as the New Norm: How the Chinese-Russian Strategic Partnership (Soft) 
Balances American Hegemony in an Era of Unipolarity”. Florida International University Electronic Theses 
and Dissertations. Paper 358, 28 March 2011, is a recent study which explains Sino-Russian determination to 
soft balance when dealing with U.S. hegemony.  
110 This can be viewed in works of Brock F. Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe, participants of the Annual Meetings 
of the International Studies Association. Their co-authored conference papers from 2008 “Chinese Energy 
Agreements: Soft Balancing against the United States?” presented at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association – San Francisco, California, 26-29 March 2008, and 2010 “From Soft Balancing to 
Strategic Hedging,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association – New Orleans, 
Louisiana, 17-21 February 2010, show a shift from the soft balancing approach to strategic hedging. 
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Soft Balancing in the context of main alignment strategies 
The soft balancing argument gained in popularity in the 1990s when scholars 
embraced discussions about limiting the unilateral exercise of U.S. power by the 
more subtle, indirect and non-military security behavior of other states. The 
proponents of this strategy build on Kenneth Waltz‟s „balance of power‟ realism 
and Stephen W. Walt‟s „balance of threat‟ realism by claiming the emergence of a 
new variant of soft balancing; one that would not challenge the status quo of the 
U.S. primacy yet would restrain its actions in a more peaceful manner. Stephen M. 
Walt
111
 accepts, supported by Josef Joffe,
112
 that while there is an unbalanced 
power distribution in the international system, the tendencies to balance U.S. 
preponderance have been mild.
113
  There are various strategies which can be 
employed to deal with a dominant state or one perceived as threatening.
114
 
Macfarlane succinctly captures the behavioral tendencies of the spectrum of powers, 
though a distinct bias in favor of realism is evident in the quip denigrating „middle 
powers‟: “…small states generally bandwagon with threats, great powers tend to 
balance against them, „middle powers‟ float in a postmodern universe that is 
largely irrelevant, and hegemonic powers seek to control”.115 This view of middle 
power behavior needs to be extended to allow for the wider range of options 
available to such states, including soft alignment, soft balancing and hedging.  
                                                 
111Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy”, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government Working Paper 00-013, October 2000, 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=253799].  
112  Josef Joffe, “Defying History and Theory: The United States as the „Last Superpower‟”, in America 
Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2002. 
113 Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy”, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government Working Paper 00-013, October 2000, p.10, 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=253799]. 
114 Jack Snyder analyzes the importance of explaining the forms of alignment in “The Security Dilemma in 
Alliance Politics”, World Politics 36:4, 1994, pp. 125-129.  
115 S. Neil Macfarlane, “The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an emerging power?” International Affairs 1, vol. 82, 
January 2006, p.42. 
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The figure below portrays the dichotomy between bandwagoning and balancing, 
the two extreme alignment strategies.  
 
Figure 2: Soft Balancing in the Context of Main Alignment Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditionally, internal balancing is used against powerful states by mobilizing 
military capabilities and conducting arms buildups; or less powerful or threatened 
states will balance externally by forming military alliances against another state. 
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By so doing, they hope to establish a balance of power.
116
 Despite being one of the 
most frequently used concepts in International Relations, the term balance of power 
is rather problematic. Ernst B. Haas laments that “the term is defined differently by 
different writers; it is used in varying senses, even if not defined exactly at all.”117 
Haas himself identified eight verbal differences in meaning and four applied 
meanings of the term „balance of power‟, each based on the intentions of its user.  
In essence though, balance of power can be seen to manifest itself in two ways. 
Hans Morgenthau, the classical realist, refers to these as 1) “any actual state of 
affairs in international politics” with an (approximately) equal distribution of 
power between two or more states, or 2) a “policy” of balancing pursued by states 
to prevent one state from gaining a preponderant power.
118
 There is no single, 
accepted, quantitative method for measuring the existence of a balance of power in 
a particular international order. Hedley Bull claims that such balance exists if there 
is a “general belief” among the states that no single state is in a position of 
preponderance of power.
119
 Moreover, the attributes and dimensions of power at 
the national level remain one of the most problematic areas in foreign policy and 
international relations.
120
 The measurement of power is further complicated by a 
unique Chinese index of „Comprehensive National Power‟, which includes as many 
                                                 
116 KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; Waltz restated his 
argument after the end of the Cold War in “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, International Security 25, 
Summer 2000, pp. 5-41. 
117 Ernst B. Haas, “The Balance of power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?” World Politics 5, no.4, July 
1953, p.442. 
118 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., New York, NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p.173. 
119 Hedley Bull, “The Balance of Power and International Order”, in The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order 
in World Politics, 2n ed., London: Macmillan, 1995, pp.97-121, here, p.98. 
120  See for example John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary 
International System, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993; Robert L. Dilenschneider, On Power, New 
York, NY: Harper Business, 1994; Ralph Pettman, International Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991. 
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as 64 indicators of power (including economic, historical, military, political, 
scientific, and societal and their subsets). The Chinese military uses this concept to 
assess countries‟ strategic outlook and their potential combat effectiveness. 121  
One strand of realist thought argues that an equal balance of power does not 
guarantee stability in the world system, but rather it is ensured by the hegemony of 
one dominant state. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, it is this 
preponderant power which provides peace and stability. This can be seen in U.S. 
leadership post-World War Two, which favored active leadership in the world in its 
fight against the spread of Soviet and Chinese forms of communism. In addition, it 
installed military bases and formed alliances in Europe and Asia. In various 
instances, the U.S. pressured less powerful states to accept its ideals of democracy 
and free trade. Hegemonic stability theory then extends to cover the decline in 
power of the hegemonic state, due to overextended military commitments, enabling 
another great power or an alliance of states to challenge the hegemon, which can 
lead to war.
122
 The processes involved in leading to such conflict are commonly 
identified as „hegemonic transition theory‟ or „power transition theory‟.123 
China, in particular, suffered from U.S.-imposed economic sanctions for two 
decades. During the Cold War, it criticized the global role of the “big hegemons”: 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, who in the words of Deng Xiaoping were “vainly 
seeking world hegemony. The two superpowers are the biggest international 
                                                 
121 See: Mark Leonard, Chapter 3: National Comprehensive Power, in What Does China Think? London: 
Fourth Estate, 2008, pp. 83-114. A more detailed explanation can be found in Michael Pillsbury, Chapter 5: 
Geopolitical Power Calculations, in China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, January 2000. 
122 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
123 The theory was developed by A. F. K. Organski and first published in 1958 in his textbook, World Politics, 
New York: Knopf, 1958. A more recent text is Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 
21st Century, New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000. See further: John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
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exploiters and oppressors of today. They are the source of a new world war.”124 
Overall, however, it is argued that China is not opposed to a particular country, but 
against hegemonic policies, which are a sign of improper and failed leadership. 
Beijing voiced its opposition against “small” regional hegemons on several 
occasions. Vietnam was accused of seeking hegemony in Southeast Asia after 
invading Cambodia in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and India was condemned 
for “seeking hegemony in South Asia” after its nuclear tests in May 1998.125 China 
has continued to eschew the use of the term hegemony and discussions about the 
hegemonic stability theory, though it appears to have accommodated the formula of 
yi chao duo qiang - „one superpower among many big players‟.126 
Walt modifies this argument by suggesting that second-ranking powers balance 
against a potentially greater risk rather than a third party‟s possession of military 
capabilities. He argues that, in some instances, they may choose to bandwagon with 
the opponent, particularly when they are weak and need protection from other 
regional powers.
127
 Alternatively, they may opt for this strategy for profit in terms 
of aid, trade and investment benefits.
128
 In his work, Walt identifies four major 
sources of threats: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities 
and aggressive intentions.
129
 This thesis argues that states tend to use soft balancing 
to deal with a state that is perceived as threatening. Walt‟s work is therefore useful 
in providing variables with which to assess patterns of state strategies. The diagram 
                                                 
124 Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Speech to a special session of the U.N. General Assembly on 10 
April 1974, Peking Review, 19 April 1974, p. 7. 
125 “Multipolarity versus hegemonism: Chinese views of international politics”, School of International Studies, 
Peking University, [http://www.sis.pku.edu.cn/faculty/blue/article.aspx?userid=12&classid=4&id=282].  
126 Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and Power”, China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, vol. IX, issue 14, 9 July 2009, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_009_21.pdf].  
127 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 29-30. 
128 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back”, International Security 
19:1, pp. 72-87 and 99-104. 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 21-26. 
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(Figure 2, p. 60) illustrates that with an increased threat, states have a tendency to 
opt for the soft balancing strategy. In the case of balancing against the U.S., states 
are not worried about a moderate increase in U.S. power; but rather about its 
intentions. The more aggressive U.S. policies become, the greater the fear it 
generates in the perception of lesser powers, especially when the superpower 
operates in their close proximity.  
These concepts have been developed and have been tested on cases of both the 
bipolar and multipolar world order.
130
 However, since the end of the Cold War, 
states have not visibly committed to either extreme position, hard balancing or 
bandwagoning, as both strategies incur considerable diplomatic and financial costs. 
Such positions also entail a high degree of risk with regard to the opposing powers, 
which could opt for a harsh response. Therefore, states that wish to avoid an 
obvious choice are left with more covert strategies located close to the middle of 
the alignment spectrum.  
The Alternatives: Soft Bandwagoning and Hedging 
A number of scholars propose alternative state strategies that lie between the poles 
of bandwagoning and balancing. Rosemary Foot used the term „soft 
bandwagoning‟ 131  to describe the Chinese strategy of dealing with the United 
States in the post-Cold War era. Foot argues that China views the U.S. as vital to 
China‟s efforts to fulfil its national interests. The U.S. has been the main source of 
China‟s foreign direct investment, aimed primarily at the manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, the U.S had absorbed approximately 40% of Chinese exports, with 
                                                 
130 Bipolar and multipolar balancing are discussed in Waltz‟s Theory of International Politics, 1979. 
131 Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global order: Accommodating and Hedging”, 
International Affairs, vol. 82, issue 1, 2006, p.88. 
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bilateral trade becoming „unbalanced‟ in China‟s favor.132 In this strategy China‟s 
posture is one of accommodation to the U.S.-dominated order. At the same time 
China engages with regional multilateral frameworks through ASEAN+1 and the 
SCO frameworks, where it promotes interests that might be viewed as 
contradictory to the U.S. norms.  
Evelyn Goh and John D. Ciorciari
133
 have used the term „hedging‟ to describe this 
middle strategy,
134
 which is used when states keep their  options open and do not 
commit to one particular alliance. They enjoy the flexibility of multi-vectoral 
relations with key regional players. It is a strategy particularly used by small and 
medium powers. These states generally engage with the threatening state politically 
and/or economically while simultaneously seeking security protection from a third 
party.
135
 Different writers position hedging on various sides of the spectrum of 
alignment strategies and they clearly provide varied definitions of this concept.  
Goh admits that “hedging is a difficult concept”,136 which is understandable in 
view of her broad conception of hedging. Although she argues that the main goal 
                                                 
132 Thomas Lum and Dick K. Nanto, “China‟s Trade with the United States and the World”, CRS Report for 
Congress, Updated 4 January 2007, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31403.pdf].  
133 John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975, Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, August 2010. 
134„Neutrality‟ or „non-alignment‟ is not included in Figure 2. Sometimes authors use the term „hiding‟ (Paul 
Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, International Security, vol.19, no.1, 1994, pp. 117-118). 
This strategy is very rare and it is quite difficult to maintain. Based on Robert Rothstein‟s definition this 
concept refers primarily to „small powers‟ (Robert Rothstein, Alliances and small powers, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 30-31). Although both selected frameworks, the SCO and ASEAN, 
include small powers, they are not examined individually but rather as part of these organizations. More 
attention is given to „middle powers‟. Middle powers prefer „hedging‟ to strict interpretations of neutrality. 
Additionally, it is believed that the „Stans‟ (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with the 
partial exception of Turkmenistan) and the members of ASEAN do not have a choice of opting for neutrality 
when they are surrounded by great regional powers which seek influence in the region.  
135 India has a history of partially engaging different sides. During the Cold War it chose „neutrality‟ within the 
Non-Aligned Movement and did not align with any major player. It, however, sought some military assistance 
from both the Soviet Union and the USA during the 1962 war with China and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. 
Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Union‟s Partnership with India”, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol.12, no.3, 
Summer 2010, pp.50-90, [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00006]; Shivaji Ganguly, 
U.S. Policy Toward South Asia, Boulder: Westview, 1990, p. 97. In present, India is balancing the U.S. and 
Russian interests in Central Asia. See: Shalini Sharan, “Central Asia: India‟s real strategic depth?” CSIS, 27 
February 2012, [http://csis.org/blog/central-asia-indias-real-strategic-depth]. 
136 Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China challenge: the US in Southeast Asian regional security strategies, Policy 
Studies 16, East-West Center, Washington DC, 2005, p.3. 
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for states is not to select “one side at the obvious expense of another”,137 in her 
assessment of Southeast Asian regional security strategies, states choose hedging as 
“a set of strategies” to deal with U.S.-China dynamics in the region. The way Goh 
defines the term holds implications for this thesis because her broadening of the 
definition to include soft balancing within hedging – for Goh hedging incorporates 
“indirect or soft balancing” – can lead to overall confusion. Besides the case of 
Southeast Asian nations counterbalancing with the U.S. against China, Goh adds 
that hedging includes a “complex engagement of China” by socializing it towards 
agreed norms and rules, and finally “enmeshing a number of regional great 
powers”. 138 Goh overstretches the concept by providing too wide a range of 
engagements, thereby weakening the hypothesis that middle and small states 
usually hedge.  
This thesis agrees with the proposition that the ASEAN members have engaged in 
hedging when dealing with the great powers in the region in the contemporary era. 
This was demonstrated during the CSCAP General Conference on the theme of 
„Great powers in the region‟, which the author attended, in Jakarta in December 
2007. One conclusion made by a representative from Southeast Asia was that the 
ASEAN member states tend to sit and wait for China and the U.S. to decide on 
major issues, and then the ASEAN members can act. Hedging is a safe strategy for 
weaker players, small and middle powers (but it is not necessarily supported by 
great powers),
139
 as the immediate post-Cold War strategic environment has shown. 
                                                 
137 Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China challenge: the US in Southeast Asian regional security strategies, Policy 
Studies 16, East-West Center, Washington DC, 2005, viii. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Discussion about ASEAN being tested by China, „emerging giant‟, and the U.S., „established‟ power, can be 
found in  
Yang Razali, “Will ASEAN‟s hedging strategy work?”, Malaysian Insider, 14 January 2012, 
[http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/will-aseans-hedging-strategy-work-yang-razali-kassim]; 
Robert Sutter, “U.S.-China Competition in Asia: Legacies Help America”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 147, East 
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The strategy of hedging comes from a background of indecision when, in the early 
1990s, ASEAN faced a dilemma of how to position itself in the region. The 
pressing concerns were the uncertainty of U.S. presence and future commitment to 
the region, and apprehension over a rising China. ASEAN was not fully 
accommodating to U.S. requests with regard to basing rights (as in the case of the 
Philippines not renewing the U.S. lease at Subic Bay in 1991), and it was not fully 
engaging China at that time within its frameworks. Likewise, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) was established in 1994, allowing another path to moderate great 
power interests, though both the United States and China were sceptical of it at the 
beginning.  
Compared to ASEAN‟s uncertainty of U.S. commitment and Chinese intentions in 
the early 1990s, the Central Asian states were in no doubt about their predicament. 
It was clear to them that their linkages with Washington and Beijing were too weak 
to provide viable alternatives to Russia‟s regional dominance. Understandably, they 
opted for soft bandwagoning in their strategy of dealing with Moscow in the 
immediate post-Cold War era. However, increasing levels of trade exchanges with 
China and foreign aid influx from the U.S. led to a shift to hedging, with the aim of 
not making an obvious choice, and therefore, gaining benefits from all great 
powers in the region. As exemplified below, gradual socialization within the SCO 
structure and acceptance of common norms and rules of conduct has facilitated the 
possibility of choosing the soft balancing strategy when there is an increased level 
of threat from outside players. 
                                                                                                                                       
West Center, 1 February 2012, [http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb147.pdf]; possible 
internal divisions in ASEAN are discussed here: Barbara Mae Dacanay, China, “US standoff to test Asean 
unity”, gulfnews.com, 3 December 2012, [http://gulfnews.com/news/world/philippines/china-us-standoff-to-
test-asean-unity-1.1113664].  
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Examples of Soft Balancing 
In order for this thesis to investigate the strategy of soft balancing since the Cold 
War, it has sought to examine the soft balancing behavior of middle and great 
powers through the use of regional institutions, and to provide case studies across 
two distinct regions and within different systems - multipolar, bipolar and unipolar. 
The soft balancing strategy has been used by each of the super, middle and great 
powers, with these states tending towards the use of institutions to consolidate this 
strategy. By indicating the strategy‟s history, the current work tackles some critics‟ 
arguments that soft balancing is limited to systems displaying unipolarity and is 
mainly a response to the Bush Doctrine.
140
 It also demonstrates that soft balancing 
can be used by states independently or via the use of multilateral frameworks. As 
such, the historical foundations of soft balancing need to be outlined before more 
current examples are examined.  
Historical Foundations 
It has been argued that soft balancing is mostly brought about within the unipolar 
system,
141
 yet there are numerous examples of soft balancing which predate the 
post-Cold War era. Robert A. Pape briefly discusses the period after the Franco-
Prussian war in 1870, in which the unified Germany feared that Austria, Britain 
and Russia would align against it with France. Otto von Bismark, in his efforts to 
win over France in the late 19
th
 century, formed a web of diplomatic alliances that 
excluded France. These, often contradictory, engagements counterbalanced the 
                                                 
140 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International Security, vol. 
30, no. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 72-108; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: 
International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2008; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing. Back”, 
International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, Summer 2005, p. 109. 
141 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States”, International Security, vol. 30, issue 1, 2005, p. 
37. 
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enemy without directly confronting it, and side-stepped the use of military 
persuasion.
142
 Josef Joffe believes that Bismarck balanced the French power “à la 
Britain, but in a totally un-British way”.143  Britain has historically favored the 
maintenance of a large army and navy, but also the use of indirect strategies. 
Bismarck‟s intention was not the aggregation of more power, but rather the 
isolation of France and therefore a devaluation of its power.  
Another example where soft balancing was used in Europe was in the aftermath of 
World War II, when the United States used its European Recovery Program (the 
Marshall Plan) to provide monetary assistance to those European countries that 
decided to accept it. The U.S. gained both economic and political advantages from 
the program and the aid created strong bonds between the U.S. and Western 
European economies, primarily through the latter‟s purchase of American goods. 
The fact that the Soviet Union and its allies rejected this form of assistance 
eventually reinforced the Marshall Plan‟s ability to restrain the spread of 
communism into Western Europe. Additionally the U.S. used a military strategy to 
contain the Soviet Union by providing a security umbrella for Europe under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
A more recent example can be found in the shifting dynamic of EU-U.S. relations. 
In an effort to adjust the EU‟s position in the transatlantic relationship towards a 
more symmetrical partnership, and advancement towards multipolarity, the 
European Union members shifted to „de facto soft balancing‟ in their economic and 
                                                 
142 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States”, International Security, vol. 30, issue 1, 2005, 
p.38. 
143 Josef Joffe, “„Bismarck‟ or „Britain‟? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity”, International 
Security, vol.19, no.4, Spring 1995, p.107. 
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security spheres from 1991, though this has been difficult to sustain.
144
 European 
integrationists have aimed for a redefining of the role of U.S. leadership in Europe. 
This has been accepted by the U.S., but only in so far as it improved burden-
sharing within the trans-Atlantic alliance. The development of the European 
Defense Initiative (EDI), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and 
the later European Defence Agency (from 2004) laid the groundwork to support 
European foreign policy initiatives, especially in extended peace-keeping roles (the 
so-called Petersberg tasks).
145
 Europe‟s changing security policies in the post-Cold-
War period reinvigorated the EU‟s efforts to achieve a military capacity partially 
independent of NATO,
146
 though this has not led to sustained defense budgets nor 
to a large European rapid reaction force. These trends have also had an impact on 
the politics of major defense contracts. As Oswald goes on to point out, the EU 
progressed in consolidating its defense planning and procurement with the defense 
supply companies BAE, EADS, and Thales.
147
 An effort to develop a “capacity-
driven”, “competitive” and “competent” „European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base‟148 has been partially successful. It struggles to achieve the same 
strength as the U.S. and the rising Asian market, due to an uneven spread of 
defense industry across the 27 EU member states containing redundant or non-
                                                 
144 Franz Oswald, “Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic Relations”, Debatte, vol. 14, 
no.2, August 2006, p.145. 
145 Angeliki, Mitropoulou,  “Does the European Union Have a Strategic Culture”, e-International Relations, 29 
March 2011 [http://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/29/does-the-european-union-have-a-strategic-culture-2/]. 
146 Myrto, Hatzigeorgopoulis, “The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges”, European Security Review, 
54, May 2012 [http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/esr54-EU-
NATOemergingchallenges-May%202012%20MH.pdf]; Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism”, Survival, 
vol.45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp.147-166; James B. Steinberg, “An Elective Partnership: Salvaging 
Transatlantic Relations”, Survival, vol.45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp.113-146. 
147 Franz Oswald 2006, p.155; Information about BAE [http://www.baesystems.com/home], EADS 
[http://www.eads.com/eads/int/en.html] and Thales Group [http://www.thalesgroup.com/]. 
148 “Opening address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
Annual Conference, Brussels, 31 January 2012”, 
[http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Varios/EDAAnnualConference.pdf]. 
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competitive facilities.
149
Competition from the U.S. comes from involving EU 
nations in programs which improve the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps 
warfighting capabilities, such as the F-35 Lightning II Program (also known as 
Joint Strike Fighter Program).
150
Currently, NATO member states clash over 
European arms sales to Russia (France, Germany, Italy) which the U.S. believe 
could undermine the transatlantic security.
151
   
21
st
 Century Soft Balancing Behaviors  
In South America, the use of soft balancing has been widespread.
152
 Brazil has long 
been engaged in a soft balancing strategy through multiple multilateral 
frameworks; the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum (the Troika) 
launched in June 2003 is an example. These emerging powers consolidated their 
co-operation because of their perceived sidelining by the international community 
and their view that the U.S., the sole superpower, is not representing them 
accordingly at the global level. The Troika lobbied for a stronger role for 
developing nations in the existing world system, calling for the reform of the 
United Nations Security Council.
153
 The IBSA countries promoted themselves as 
                                                 
149 “Development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base”, European Commission: 
Enterprise and Industries, 2009, [http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/edem_final_report_en.pdf] 
150 “The F-35 Lightning II Program”, [Access via http://www.jsf.mil/index.htm], Jeremiah Gertler, “F-35 Joint 
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Wilpert, Changing Venezuela: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government, London: Verso,  2007; 
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Balancing‟ Foreign Policy, “ in The Revolutions in Venezuela, ed. Jonathan Eastwood and Thomas Ponniah,  
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009; Javier Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: 
Venezuela‟s Foreign Policy”, The Washington Quarterly 32:4, October 2009, pp. 97-114. 
153 The Brasilia Declaration, 6 June 2003, [http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/temas-mais-
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multiethnic and multicultural democracies with the status of middle powers.
154
 It is 
argued that these powers would not choose to impose harsh measures on the U.S., 
but can engage in soft balancing strategies. Moreover, there is evidence of soft 
balancing through territorial denial in the case of Brazil, which refused a request 
from U.S. Secretary Madeleine Albright to utilize Brazilian aircraft bases in the 
Amazon region. Neither India nor South Africa allows the Pentagon to base its 
military on their soil.
155
 
Further, Brazil has also been active within the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) group (which became BRICS with the admission of South Africa in 2011). 
In a Joint statement of the BRIC countries‟ leaders at the first summit in 
Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009, the four BRIC nations called for a reformed 
economic and financial architecture and for a “more democratic and just multi-
polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, 
cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states”.156 
Andrew Hurrell suggests that these states have reacted to U.S. hegemony and have 
moved towards soft or constrained balancing. Critics should not underestimate the 
role of this strategy in shaping the individual policies of these countries as their 
common understanding and actions contribute to a shifting of power against the 
U.S.
157
 
                                                 
154  IBSA Trilateral Official Website, About IBSA, “The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum”, 
[http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/]. 
155 Daniel Flemes, “Emerging Middle Powers‟ Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum”, German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper, no.57, August 2007, 
[http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
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156 Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries‟ Leaders, Yekaterinburg, 16 June 2009, 
[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml].  
157 Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?” 
International Affairs 82:1, 2006, pp.1-19. Mette Skak has recently tested the BRICs soft balancing trend 
against Robert Pape‟s hypothesis and found that there are elements of soft balancing in the policy 
considerations of all four BRICs, and they are united in a common strategy of soft balancing. Mette Skak, “The 
BRIC Powers as Actors in World Affairs. Soft Balancing or…?” IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference: Whatever 
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Soft balancing can also be seen in the Asia-Pacific, where countries have long been 
dealing with the so-called “China factor”. William T. Tow explicitly names the 
triangular security politics of the U.S., Australia and Japan as “symbolic soft 
balancing”.158  It is a collaboration reflected in the Trilateral Security Dialogue 
(TSD) which began at the vice-ministerial level in 2002 and was eventually 
upgraded as a framework to the level of foreign ministers. From the outset, there 
was an emphasis on the „non-threat-centric‟ nature of the cooperation, though a 
more sceptical reading of the situation would suggest that this dialogue was a 
response to growing Chinese military power. In any case, the adoption by Japan 
and Australia of „The Joint Security Declaration‟ needs to be considered in light of 
Japan being restrained by Article 9 of its Constitution. This diminishes the impact 
of any joint security agreement that involves Japan. Consequently, the U.S. 
presence is vital in dealing with the growing influence of China. Before departing 
for the trilateral talks in 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: 
I think all of us in the region, particularly those who are longstanding allies, 
have a joint responsibility and obligation to try and produce conditions in 
which the rise of China will be a positive force in international politics, not 
a negative force.
159 
 
 
During a follow-up visit to Beijing, Australia‟s former Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer softened the message by reassuring his Chinese counterparts that the 
security co-operation with Japan was not directed against a third party. His 
statement, however, did not convince some Chinese analysts who referred to this 
trilateral cooperation as “a US-led NATO-like organization in Asia, which will 
                                                                                                                                       
happened to North-South? University of Sao Paulo, 16-19 February 2011, 
[http://www.saopaulo2011.ipsa.org/sites/default/files/papers/paper-528.pdf].  
158 William T. Tow, “Asia‟s Competitive “Strategic Geometries”: The Australian Perspective”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, vol.30, no.1, 2008, p.37. 
159 Jane Perlez, “China‟s Role Emerges as Major Issue for Southeast Asia”, New York Times, 14 March 2006, 
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clearly grow to be the biggest potential threat to China's regional security 
environment”.160Australia‟s Prime Minister Julia Gillard tried to reduce these threat 
perceptions by suggesting a boost in defense cooperation between Australia and 
China during her visit to North Asia in April 2011, though this reversal of 
perceptions was hard to sustain with the later agreement for the basing of U.S. 
marines in Darwin as part of a wider „Asian Pivot‟.161  
China is also pro-active in Australia‟s neighborhood, through increased economic 
and diplomatic presence in the South Pacific. It uses the „politics of aid‟ to sway 
local governments to strengthen their ties with Beijing rather than Taipei, through 
the commonly termed, „chequebook diplomacy‟.162 Additionally, China challenges 
the influence of traditional players, notably Australia and New Zealand. This soft 
balancing strategy is suitable for this area, due to the size of these countries, 
distances between them and the lack of a suitable regional framework which could 
facilitate „hard balancing‟ vis-à-vis external players.163  
Defining soft balancing in the context of existing theory 
Even among the key proponents of the concept of soft balancing, T.V. Paul, Robert 
A. Pape and Stephen Walt, there is no general consensus on a definition of the 
actual term and it is a concept which has been used rather loosely.  
                                                 
160 “Downer: Security pact does not target China”, People‟s Daily Online, 6 April 2007, 
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162 Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing‟s “Island Fever”, Asian Survey, 
vol. 47, no. 2 , 2002, pp. 307-326; Joel Atkinson, “Vanuatu in Australia−China−Taiwan Relations”, Australian 
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However, Paul captures the concept of soft balancing well when he defines it as 
involving: 
. . . tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states 
generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one 
another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft 
balancing is often based on a limited arms build-up, ad hoc cooperative 
exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these 
policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when 
security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes 
threatening.
164 
 
Paul insists that in order to gain better understanding of today‟s balancing 
strategies, it is important to describe various forms of balance of power behavior, 
not just military build-ups or alliance formation.
165
 In his definition, Paul goes 
beyond the traditional view of state balancing strategy to identify balancing 
behavior that takes place when hard balancing is too risky or costly. He believes 
that we need to look at alternative  categories of security behavior when states use 
tacit means and avoid an open build-up of arms, and sees occurrences of soft 
balancing at both systematic (global) and subsystematic (regional) levels. It is this 
latter level of analysis, and more specifically the soft balancing of states in the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, that is of interest to this thesis. The primary goal of such 
regional balancing is to make sure that the great powers involved in the region do 
not destabilize the status quo by undertaking revisionist or aggressive policies 
toward their neighbors.  
Another proponent of soft balancing, Robert A. Pape, explains four main non-
military mechanisms that enable the strategy of soft balancing: refusal to use 
territory that is vital for the operations of the superior state‟s ground, air or naval 
                                                 
164 T. V. Paul, “Introduction”, in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, 
James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 3. 
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forces; entangling diplomacy by which states undermine the plans and policies of 
the superior state, especially using international institutions; economic statecraft by 
strengthening the regional economic blocs and diverting trade from non-members; 
and finally, coordination of mutual commitment to resist policies of the superior or 
threatening state. What is, in effect, a collective disposition, is built over time 
through repeated participation in non-military mechanisms and increasing trust 
among the members of the soft-balancing coalition. The ambition of a coalition that 
resolves to soft balance is to attract more states so as to weaken the operational 
capability of the superior state.
166
 Pape also clarifies a crucial distinction between 
„soft power‟ and „soft balancing‟: while the general understanding is that soft 
power equals soft balancing, soft power is actually a soft-balancing asset. If a 
state‟s use of cultural, economic, political and social resources is viewed favorably 
by other governments and their public, then it might be in a particularly favorable 
position to advance a soft balancing coalition against a third party.
167
 
Walt expands on these defining attributes of soft balancing by applying the soft 
balancing strategy to the prevailing U.S.-dominated world order. He claims that 
this strategy is “the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain 
outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the 
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balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support”. 168  This is 
performed by opposing current policies in the hope of obtaining more plausible 
results in the future; and even preparing the conditions for a more ambitious 
counter-hegemonic coalition.  
Critics of soft balancing contend that broadening the definition of balancing leads 
to conceptual stretching, 
169
and that in fact the term is too similar to normal 
diplomatic friction. Soft balancing‟s proponents, they say, do not provide sufficient 
evidence that would distinguish these terms accordingly, thus any “discussion of 
soft balancing is much ado about nothing”.170 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. 
Wohlforth point out that the primary cases of soft balancing are relatively recent, 
and that therefore, it might be impossible to find enough evidence. Moreover, they 
stress that those countries which are supposedly soft balancing, such as China and 
Russia, are well known for being non-transparent and that their public opinion is 
almost non-existent – though admittedly their critique was before the Arab Spring 
which demonstrated the power of public opinion in authoritarian states through the 
social media. Brooks and Wohlforth further argue that soft balancing‟s proponents 
are so focused on future developments that they fail to explain the contemporary 
significance of the phenomena
171
 and suggest that alternative explanations should 
be assessed properly before one can convince the scholarly community that soft 
balancing is a coherent and established theoretical concept.
172
 It should be noted 
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that even Brooks and Wohlforth admit that of the primary cases of soft balancing 
against U.S. unilateral policies, opposition to the Iraq war is a plausible example. 
They acknowledge that U.S. unilateralism contributed to a soft balancing action 
when Germany, once the adamant ally of Washington, opposed the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq. This „pacifist‟ position influenced the resistance of the other states and the 
Germans received additional support from the French, who argued against the U.S. 
policy on procedural terms, by demanding a multilateral approach through the 
UNSC.
173
 
The issue of limited external validity has been addressed in Yuen Foong Khong‟s 
chapter, „Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: Institutions and Soft Balancing in 
ASEAN‟s Post-Cold War Strategy‟. 174  While primarily offering a narrative of 
security insecurities of ASEAN5 in the early 1990s, Khong puts forward two 
strategies of how the member states deal with these insecurities, including the fear 
of China revising regional rules of the game; institution-building and soft balancing. 
Notable is Khong‟s dismissal of the occurrence of a balancing strategy against the 
stronger power, the U.S., and that in this case, the weaker China is viewed as a 
threat. Although Malaysia and the Philippines share some ambivalence towards 
China‟s intentions with regard to territorial claims to the South China Sea, they 
encourage the use of multilateral frameworks to encourage China to behave more 
responsibly. Khong indicates some evidence of soft balancing, especially in the use 
of bilateral memorandums of understanding (MOU) and visiting forces agreements 
between the U.S. and individual states, such as the MOU between Singapore and 
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the U.S. from November 1990 which allowed the U.S. to use the facilities in the 
old British wharves at Sembawang. However, he provides no in-depth discussion 
of how much these agreements contribute to restraining China. It is unclear what 
definition of soft balancing Khong has in mind; for instance, he separates the use of 
institutions and soft balancing, despite the general agreement that institutions are 
one of the tools of soft balancing strategy.  
Moreover, the influence of an anti-China political culture under a generation of 
strong leaders in the ASEAN5 helps explain the uneasiness concerning the rise of 
China. Not only was China so recently an ideological opponent whose political 
influence among illegal local communist parties was feared politically, but the role 
of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia economies was also a source of 
apprehension.  On the other hand, ASEAN5 leaders had no interest in giving the 
United States a free hand in their region of vigorous nation-building. It will be 
recalled that before ASEAN was formed the U.S.-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) failed for this very reason.   
Kai He and Huiyun Feng address the methodological deficiencies of the soft 
balancing concept in „If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft 
Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China‟.175 They note that “the higher the power 
disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing 
to pursue its security”176 and assess the post-Cold War U.S. policy toward China. 
He and Feng redefine the concept of balancing by dividing it into military and non-
military hard balancing, in order to enhance a state‟s own power vis-à-vis the 
opponents; and military and non-military soft balancing, to weaken the opponent‟s 
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relative power and gain security. Under the umbrella of military soft balancing, 
they name “arms sales to the „enemy of the enemy‟” and examples of the U.S.-
Taiwan policy. Although the U.S. declared in the 1982 Joint Communiqué it would 
not provide Taiwan with advanced fighter aircraft, it did in fact sell 150 of such 
aircraft, the F-16A/B, to Taiwan a decade later in 1992. China responded by 
terminating its participation in the Arms Control talks in the Middle East and by 
selling M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan in November 1992.
177
 In 
their conclusions, He and Feng acknowledge that although hard balancing against 
the U.S. has not taken place and that soft-balancing actions did not stop the U.S. 
from initiating war on Iraq, several states have been united in their refusal to follow 
the U.S. and have thus curtailed to an extent its freedom of action.  
He and Feng successfully enhance the understanding of soft balancing, and apply 
the concept in more detail to an example of U.S. policy toward China. Their 
typology of state balancing strategies needs more clarification, however. While 
strategic technology transfers and economic aid are part of their description of non-
military hard balancing, these can also be viewed as soft balancing tools. Economic 
sanctions and embargos can, on the other hand, be part of non-military hard 
balancing if conducted openly. Another significant element of soft balancing is 
access to energy resources. The pipeline politics in the Caucasus and wider Central 
Asia constitutes a „New Great Game‟ in which major actors (including Russia, 
China, India, the EU, Japan and the U.S.) seek to advance their geopolitical 
interests using a range of strategies including hedging, building regional 
cooperation frameworks, and investment flows in order secure early access to 
                                                 
177 Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., 
24 February 2011, p.20,[http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf]. 
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energy resources.
178
 As stated previously, Chinese oil equity investments have been 
part of China‟s soft balancing strategy. 
Kai He further redefines the concept of balancing in his book, Institutional 
Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China‟s Rise, where 
he critiques the ability of a single theory to explain the reality of security relations 
in the Asia Pacific and the functions of institutions there. He proposes a new 
institutional theory or institutional realism, by linking the neorealist balance of 
power with neoliberal interdependence,
179
 from which position he stipulates that 
the high level of economic interdependence between states leads to “institutional 
balancing” rather than the traditional hard balancing which occurs when states fear 
or feel pressure in the international system. This balancing takes place either via 
inclusive or exclusive balancing. In the former instance, the target state is bound by 
the norms of this institution, while in the latter case, the members of the institution 
aim to keep a target state out and resist the outsider by harmonizing their own 
policies in the economic and political spheres. When this theory is applied to the 
current U.S.-dominated system, He argues, the “only option for other states to 
counter the pressure from the hegemon is to conduct exclusive balancing through 
forming multilateral institutions without the hegemon”.180 
What He has done in his study is to focus on one soft balancing mechanism and 
name this balancing behavior „institutional balancing‟. It should be noted that Paul, 
                                                 
178 Lutz C. Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, New York and London: Atlantic 
Books, 2003; Matthew Edwards, “The New Great Game and the new great gamers: disciplines of Kipling and 
Mackinder”, Central Asian Survey 22:1, 2003, pp. 83-102; Brock F. Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe. From Soft 
Balancing to Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Equity Oil Investment. Paper presenter at the annual 
meeting of the “Theory vs. Policy Connecting Scholars and Practioners”, New Orleans: International Studies 
Association, 17 February 2010. 
[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/1/7/0/5/pages417059/p417059-1.php]; 
Richard Auty and Indra Soysa (ed.), Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
London: Routledge, 2005; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 
2nd ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. 
179 Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China‟s rise, London: 
Rutledge, 2009, pp. 8-9. 
180 Ibid., p.12. 
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in his soft balancing case studies, discusses cases of inclusive balancing: with the 
UN and the resistance to supporting the U.S.-backed resolution to authorize the use 
of force in Iraq in 2002. While this thesis acknowledges He‟s contribution to a 
broadening of the balancing concept – and his work on China and ASEAN‟s 
institutional balancing will be further analyzed in the thesis – this author remains 
committed to the soft balancing terminology and will derive the definition to be 
employed here from the works of T. V. Paul, Robert A. Pape and Stephen Walt. 
Conclusion 
The review of selected literature on soft balancing strategy reveals that it is a 
strategy mainly used in three international relations scenarios: inter-state relations 
(for example, the U.S. soft balancing towards China and vice versa); triangular 
partnerships (as in the U.S., Australia and Japan soft balancing towards China) and 
between regional organizations and states (exemplified by ASEAN soft balancing 
towards China, the European Union soft balancing towards the U.S. and BRICS 
soft balancing towards the U.S.). 
Second-ranking powers prefer coordination of activities and policies on a smaller 
scale and employ a less risky soft balancing strategy, often at the regional level. 
The primary driver behind soft balancing is the shared understanding of threats. 
These threats can come from cultural, economic, political or military presence, or 
influence or pressures from an external state or organization. Until now, the main 
studies discussing the use of the soft-balancing strategy focused on tacit balancing 
of individual states towards another state or a group of states towards a single state. 
Further research is required into soft balancing acts between two regional 
organizations. This thesis focuses on soft balancing from organizations towards 
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states in specific subregions (Central and Southeast Asia) of the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 
In both cases, the soft balancing coalition acts towards an external player, whose 
presence in the region is viewed as „threatening‟.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: ASEAN’s Soft Balancing Strategy  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter One that the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is posited as engaging in a „network regionalism‟ to the benefit 
of weaker or rising states. Thus in examining ASEAN as a case study for soft 
balancing, its activities should be viewed, in the first instance, in the context of an 
evolving network regionalism with long-term plans. The member states of both 
ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the other case study of soft 
balancing by a regional organization, examined in chapter five) participate in the 
Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), inaugurated in 2002, which is a continent-wide 
forum aiming to create „Asian Community‟, without duplicating existing 
structures.
181
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) referred to the ACD 
as a „bridge‟ between Asian organizations and associations, with the goal of 
creating multilateral dialogue partnerships in „the spirit of network diplomacy‟. 182  
Moreover, ASEAN has been driving the emerging Indo-Asian Core of Network 
Dialogue (Figure 1) by facilitating open discussions and coordinating responses 
towards external players and perceived threats. By contributing to the security 
dialogue, ASEAN-endorsed norms have proven to be relevant for the wider Indo-
Asia-Pacific and have attracted transregional (Central and South Asian) 
declarations of collaboration. With a greater engagement from India, the prospect 
of deeper discussions with the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
                                                 
181 The first ACD Summit took place in Kuwait on 15-17 October 2012. The official website of the ACD is 
[http://www.acddialogue.com/about/index.php]. 
182 See: “Comment of the Information and Press Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation in connection with the participation of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Igor V. 
Morgulov in the summit of member countries of Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Kuwait City, October 15-17, 
2012”, The MFA of the Russian Federation, 12 October 2012, 
[http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/121FDC61175CEC6544257AA100281F73].  
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(SAARC) is possible.
183
 This regional cooperative engagement allowed great 
powers, Russia and China, to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
and create partnerships by enhancing trust and confidence-building measures, with 
the goal of strengthening „conflict prevention‟.  
In the preceding chapters, this thesis has sought to examine suitable theoretical 
approaches for assessing the soft-balancing behavior of ASEAN member states, 
and determined that special attention had to be made to historical variables such as 
mutual mistrust between ASEAN member states and the re-emerging China. These 
factors have reinforced perceptions of China as a threat, and contributed to soft 
balancing in Southeast Asia. ASEAN responded to the reduction of U.S. forces in 
the region by a proactive strategy of creating and collaborating with various Track I 
and Track II multilateral frameworks, which they have used to constrain and 
moderate the influence of China. 
The Association has functioned in its current format (as the ASEAN 10) since the 
admission of its last full member, Cambodia, in 1999.
184
 The acceptance of less 
developed states in ASEAN has led to a discussion about a „two-tier ASEAN‟, with 
the superior position held by the older, more developed ASEAN6.
185
This 
comprises the five founding member states of ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand - and Brunei, which joined the grouping in 1984. 
ASEAN6 itself reveals wealth division, with Singapore‟s per capita GDP much 
                                                 
183 Currently mainly China cooperates with the SAARC, as an observer. The Chinese envoy to Nepal has been 
designated to become China‟s ambassador to SAARC, which has its headquarters in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
“Chinese envoy to Nepal designated ambassador to SAARC”, Xinhua, 10 August 2012, 
[http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/726231.shtml].  
184 Vietnam (1995), Laos and Burma (1997) and Cambodia (1999), collectively in this thesis refer to as 
„ASEAN4‟. 
185 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN 
Secretary-General, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006, p. 67. Rodolfo C. Severino believes that a „two-tier Southeast 
Asia‟ with countries outside of ASEAN would be worse off, with divisions and competition being formed 
between ASEAN6 and ASEAN4; views voiced during a personal discussion at the ISEAS in Singapore on 5 
December 2007. 
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higher when compared to Indonesia or the Philippines.
186
 This work recognizes 
internal divisions that at times have split ASEAN and have made progress in some 
areas slow and protracted, e.g. slow evolution of the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community with the ASEAN Concord II system since 2003 and the later, tentative 
development of the ASEAN Charter.
187
 However, as will be seen below, areas of 
convergence have allowed ASEAN to „soft balance‟ a rising China in the post-Cold 
War era. As this chapter will demonstrate, ASEAN employed soft balancing to 
institutionalize its relations with Beijing in order to constrain the ascent of China. 
This was achieved through China‟s participation in ASEAN-led multilateral 
frameworks and by Beijing‟s acceptance of ASEAN‟s norms of behavior via the 
signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and other declarations (see below). 
„Non-interference in the internal affairs‟ and „non-use of force‟ in particular stand 
out as mutually shared principles. China agreed to these norms as they are in line 
with China‟s „Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence‟, noted in Chapter Two. 
This chapter, whose purpose is to explain the dynamics of regional cooperation 
between the ASEAN6 and China, is divided into four main parts. The first part 
introduces the strategic architecture of post-Cold War Southeast Asia. This 
discussion should be viewed in the context of the heightened level of insecurity 
among ASEAN6, which was influenced by an announced phased reduction of 
American forces in the region. The second part discusses relations between 
ASEAN6 and China, with the main focus on the so-called „China threat theory‟. In 
                                                 
186GDP per capita figures 1990-2007 available in „Table M: Economy and inequality‟, Human Development 
Report 2009: Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development, United Nations Development Program, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 195-198, 
[http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf]. 
187 Simon W.Sheldon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, vol. 30,  no. 2, 2008, pp. 264-292; ASEAN Secretariat “ASEAN Political-Security Community 
Blueprint”, Singapore Year Book of International Law, vol. 12, 2008, pp. 281-296.  
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the third part, strategies employed to counter the perceived China threat are 
analyzed. The fourth and final part of this chapter examines limitations to the soft-
balancing strategy. It explains this through the notable case of the South China Sea 
dispute. 
Strategic Complexity in Southeast Asia 
Similar to Indonesia‟s national motto of „unity in diversity‟, Southeast Asia has 
embraced a level of regional political unity that straddles cultural, political and 
developmental differences. Despite unresolved issues between the member 
states,
188
 and lingering mutual suspicions, ASEAN6 shares a political culture of 
informal mutual engagement which privileges state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity through the norm of non-interference. When taking into account the role 
of external players that are expected to also respect the code of non-interference, a 
diverse region also becomes a strategically complex one: this vast geopolitical 
domain stretches from mainland Southeast Asia where three „Indochina Wars‟ 
were fought (first involving the French colonial power which was defeated in 1954, 
then the United States that became involved in the infamous Vietnam War of the 
1960s to early 1970s, and finally China at the end of the 1970s), down the Malay 
peninsula and beyond the busy Malacca Strait that is vital to the region‟s trade into 
archipelagic Southeast Asia. During the Cold War ASEAN sought to promote the 
region as a „zone of peace, freedom and neutrality‟ (ZOPFAN) but in reality it 
relied upon American strategic influence.   
 
                                                 
188  Details and management of „intra-ASEAN relations‟ can be found in Amitav Acharya, Chapter 5 
“Managing intra-ASEAN relations”, in Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the 
problem of regional order, 2nd ed., New York, NY: Routledge, 2009, pp.148-191; N.Ganesan and Ramses 
Amer (eds.), International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, Singapore: 
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010. 
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Figure 3: Map of member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
 Post-Cold War Southeast Asia was characterized by much insecurity when the 
U.S. decided to reduce its forces in the region. Southeast Asian nations questioned 
U.S. commitment when reports appeared outlining a U.S. troops reduction from 
approximately 135,000 in 1990 to just over 100,000 in the Asia-Pacific over a ten-
year period (1990 to 2000).
189
 The reorientation of the U.S. military and China‟s 
economic and military growth affected the regional balance of power; and as a 
result, this change in regional dynamics added complexity to China-Southeast 
Asian security relations. 
Singapore‟s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong voiced his concern when he said: “If 
the rapprochement between the superpowers comes through…it will leave to 
                                                 
189 Douglas Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-
Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper, No. 299, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995, 
pp. 8-9. Figures from the U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, 
Washington DC: USGPO, 1992. 
Source: Education Place, [http://www.eduplace.com/ss/maps/pdf/se_asia_pac_pol.pdf], adapted by Alica Kizeková 
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China, India and Japan to contest for the leadership of the region.”190  Fearing 
which great power would fill this 'vacuum' led  ASEAN member states to pursue a 
proactive strategy of creating a network of dialogue, in which ASEAN would play 
the central role and would bring all parties together. Discussions about regional 
security order would be underpinned by ASEAN regional norms. 
China, the chief catalyst in this regional balance of power, was initially facing 
economic and political problems as a consequence of a temporary isolation in the 
light of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
191
 The ruling Chinese Communist 
Party‟s successful crackdown on  the pro-democracy demonstration in Beijing 
contrasted with  the wave of collapsing communist regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. What was a question of regime survival for China had been denounced as a 
barbarous act – the „Tiananmen Massacre‟ – by many in the outside world. Unlike 
U.S. and Western criticisms of China‟s mismanagement of the protest in Beijing,192 
ASEAN nations did not respond as negatively. Indonesia restored diplomatic 
relations with China,
193
 an example followed by Singapore (August 1990) and 
Brunei (1991). In this instance ASEAN member states acted in accordance with 
ASEAN‟s principles of non-interference in domestic affairs by not engaging in 
discussions about the incident. They also positively responded to China‟s gesture 
of renouncing its representation of overseas Chinese and respecting their local 
                                                 
190 Cited in Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Adelphi Paper, no. 279, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 13.  
191As presented in the aftermath of the incident: “The level of official dialogue between China and the West has 
fallen sharply. Western nations have suspended military relations for the most part, although some low-level 
contacts involving the sharing of intelligence, discussion of strategic issues, and design of weapons systems 
appear to continue. There have been dramatic declines in revenues from tourism (down 20 per cent in 1989), 
direct foreign investment (down 22 per cent in the first half of 1990), and foreign lending (down 40 per cent in 
1989), although Beijing has been able to protect its foreign exchange balances by imposing strict controls over 
imports.” Harry Harding, “The Impact of Tiananmen on China's Foreign Policy”, in China's Foreign Relations 
After Tiananmen: Challenges for the U.S., Robert S. Ross, Allen S. Whiting and Harry Harding, NBR Analysis, 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 1990. 
192 Foreign estimates of the civilian death toll were initially 2000, though this was revised to 1000. 
193 Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesia-China relations: a recent breakthrough”, Asian Survey, vol.30, no. 7, July 1990, 
pp. 682-696. For later tensions, based on potential resource issues, see Douglas Johnson, “Draw into the Fray: 
Indonesia's Natuna Island Meet China's Long Gaze South”, Asian Affairs, vol. 24, no. 3, Fall 1997, pp.153-161. 
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citizenships.
194
 Although China viewed these newly developed relationships with 
Southeast nations positively and wanted to use them to improve its image globally, 
it was at first hesitant to join ASEAN-led frameworks, fearful of how inviting new 
concepts from these regional organizations could undermine the stability of its 
regime and be used by the U.S. to constrain and criticize it.  
Despite progress in establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing, the ASEAN6 
countries were slow to overcome residual suspicions and approached China, which 
was experiencing impressive economic growth and military modernization, 
cautiously.
195
 Even though the U.S. demonstrated during the first Gulf War of 1991 
its superior capabilities,
196
 capabilities which China could not match in the event of 
an American military campaign against itself, this did not reassure the ASEAN6 
regarding China‟s assertive claims in the South China Sea. Brunei, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Vietnam (which was not yet an ASEAN member) opposed China‟s 
claim to sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. 
During the Cold War, as noted above, ASEAN sought to deny its area to great 
power competition through a policy of ZOPFAN, but was opposed to communism 
and hence was supported by the West. The communist part of Southeast Asia was 
confined to the former Indochina on mainland Southeast Asia, with Vietnam 
hosting Soviet bases while the Philippines had American ones.  ASEAN was then 
dealing with a more predictable system where the intentions of main players were 
                                                 
194 Jeannie Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper no. 328, London: International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1999. 
195 China recorded on average 9.4% growth of GDP in 1978-2003, the value of GDP reached US$1.24 trillion 
by 2003, which was more than twice the combined GDP of ASEAN5 (Brunei not included). However, its GDP 
per capita was lower than all ASEAN6, except for Indonesia. These figures come from World Bank 
Development Reports 1995, 2000/2001, 2002, 2003 in combination with Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 
2003-2004, An overview of the performance of these economies can be found in John Wong, “China-ASEAN 
relations: an economic perspective”, in China-ASEAN Relations: Economic and Legal Dimensions, ed. John 
Wong, Zou Keyuan and Zeng Huaquan, Singapore: World Scientific, 2006, pp. 321-336. 
196 See: “The Gulf War -- Lessons for Chinese Military S&T”, A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing  November 
1996, Federation of American Scientists, [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/stmil14.htm]. 
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clearly defined. In the post-Cold War era, the gap between ideology and social 
systems narrowed.
197
 ASEAN had an opportunity to showcase a more dynamic 
network dialogue and engage the other regional actors. 
The Quest for Security Cooperation 
In order to assess ASEAN‟s ability to act as a „diplomatic leader‟ and soft balance 
a strengthening China, it is vital to briefly review ASEAN‟s institutional 
framework and the internal decision-making. It is not the purpose of the following 
section to analyze all areas of ASEAN co-operation, because the primary focus 
here is security cooperation; as it evolved during ASEAN‟s first three decades 
ASEAN was not established as a „security alliance‟. However, it was aligned to 
oppose any external influences which threatened domestic and regional security, 
and these were mainly concerned with the spread of communist ideology or the 
emergence of proxy conflicts in its region.
198
 
Institutional Framework 
ASEAN‟s institutional design initially resembled the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA),
199
 which was an inspiration for ASEAN‟s forerunner institution, the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), comprising the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand, in 1961.
200
 This structure was adopted by ASEAN in the Bangkok 
                                                 
197 Lai Foon Wong, “China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era”, Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, vol.1, 2007, pp.373-404; Joseph S. Y. Cheng, “ASEAN‟s Role in the Chinese 
Foreign Policy Framework”, in The 2nd ASEAN Reader, ed. Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 430-434. 
198 Geoffrey B. Cockerham, “Regional Integration in ASEAN: Institutional Design and the ASEAN Way”, 
East Asia, vol. 27, issue 2, p.170; Shaun, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002; Ronald D. Palmer & Thomas J. Reckford Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast 
Asian Cooperation, N.Y.: Praeger, 1987. 
199  The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was founded by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, to promote closer economic cooperation and free trade in 
Europe, in 1960. See the official website: [http://www.efta.int/about-efta/history.aspx] 
200 Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982, p.22.  
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Declaration in 1967.
201
 It suited all member states because the institutional design 
was based on intergovernmentalism, with a strong promotion of state‟s sovereignty.  
The structure was very decentralized and dependent on national secretariats. The 
collaboration between member states took place in the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM), a council of ministers, and this meeting would convene once a 
year in a different state in accordance with a rotation calendar. A Secretary-General 
would be selected also on a rotational basis. The organization has evolved at a pace 
comfortable to all, with the consensus method of decision-making. This type of 
consensus has been criticized as ineffective.
202
 ASEAN has been named a „talk 
shop‟, in which the slow pace discussions do not produce sufficient and tangible 
results.
203
 However, this limitation did not stop the gradual evolution of the 
organization as it sought to improve its ability to cope with existing challenges.  
ASEAN‟s organizational structure became more centralized in the mid-1970s, 
when the ASEAN Secretariat was established in Bali, with a permanent location in 
Jakarta (1976).
204
 The role of the Secretariat was to assist the Secretary-General 
and it has become a document depository. It does not hold decision-making powers 
and the General-Secretary‟s role was only strengthened after the Cold War. He (no 
woman has yet held this post) now holds a ministerial status and his mandate 
                                                 
201 The 1967 Bangkok Declaration is the key document establishing the ASEAN. It was mainly focused on 
outlining areas of cooperation (economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative), with only a 
mention of „security‟ in its preamble. In terms of institutional design, the Declaration promoted an annual 
meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and committees. 1967 Asean Declaration, Adopted by the Foreign 
Ministers at the 1st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand on 8 August 1967, 
[http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1967%20ASEAN%20Declaration-pdf.pdf]. 
202 Anja Jetscke, “ASEAN”, Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2012, p. 330; Muthiah Alagappa, “Institutional Framework. Recommendation for 
Change”, in The 2nd ASEAN Reader, ed. Sharon. Siddique and Sree Kumar, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003, pp.22-27. 
203 Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: constructing a „talking shop‟ or a „norm 
brewery‟?” The Pacific Review, vol.19, no.2, June 2006, p.181-198. 
204 Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat Bali, 24 February 1976, 
[http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-secretariat/basic-documents/item/asean-secretariat-basic-documents-
agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-secretariat-bali-24-february-1976-2].  
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allows him to “initiate, advise, coordinate and implement” ASEAN activities. His 
mandate was extended from two to five years, with a possibility of extension.
205
  
In support of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the Secretary-General‟s duties, 
ASEAN strengthened its legitimacy among member states by organizing summits 
for Heads of Governments.
206
 The first took place in Bali in 1976.  These summits 
allow the signing of more binding agreements, such as the 1976 Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC), which introduced the role of a „High Council‟ – a 
mechanism for dispute settlement. During this period, ASEAN member states 
wanted to strengthen their security cooperation in light of the U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam and the U.S.-China rapprochement. The TAC outlined the following 
guiding principles for inter-state relations: “a) mutual respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; b) the 
right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; c) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; d) 
settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; e) renunciation of the 
threat or use of force; and f) effective cooperation among themselves.”207 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was amended by protocols in 1987 
and 1998. These amendments allowed opening the TAC to non-ASEAN Southeast 
Asian states and states outside the region. It serves as a non-aggression pact and 
provides basic norms of inter-state relations. Although framed in general terms and 
                                                 
205 Protocol Amending The Agreement On The Establishment Of The ASEAN Secretariat Manila, Philippines, 
22 July 1992, [http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-secretariat-basic-documents-protocol-amending-the-
agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-secretariat-manila-philippines-22-july-1992-2]; Gradual 
institutional reforms took place after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, which involved the ASEAN Vision 
of 1997 and Ha Noi Plan of Action of 1998, the Bali Concord II (ASEAN Economic Community of 2003, and 
the ASEAN Charter, adopted on 20 November 2008 (in effect on 15 December 2008). The Charter provides 
ASEAN with a legal personality and promotes  ASEAN identity – “One Vision, One Identity, One 
Community”,[http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf].  
206 The ASEAN Summits are the supreme policy-making body, the ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV „Organs‟, 
Article 7 „ASEAN Summit‟, p.14, [http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf]  
207 Article 2 in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 24 February 1976, 
[http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8472/8472.pdf].  
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without enforcement mechanisms, the TAC became a major diplomatic tool 
required for prospective membership within ASEAN, and a general requirement for 
membership of the later EAS process (see further below). China and ASEAN 
agreed to adhere to the TAC‟s principles in ASEAN-China cooperation towards the 
21st century on 16 December 1997.
208
 ASEAN has conducted foreign relations 
through annual meetings, which developed as ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings 
(PMCs) since the 1970s. The following section introduces China-ASEAN relations. 
The Evolution of ASEAN-China Relations 
ASEAN‟s relations with China where shaped by fears of Chinese influence in the 
region; this strengthened ASEAN‟s resolve to expand regional security 
cooperation.
209
 The relationship evolved in three major phases underpinned by 
changes in the broader security environment. The first phase was driven by enmity 
and correlated with Beijing‟s engagement with communist insurgencies in the 
region and the rising economic role of ethnic Chinese overseas. Indonesia, in 
particular, held a pessimistic view based on China‟s support for the Indonesian 
Communist Party and possible role in the 1965 Indonesian coup.
210
 Indonesia 
regarded ASEAN as a “shield against possible communist expansion”,211 with the 
regional version of the domino theory having states „falling‟ from Thailand, down 
through Malaysia, Singapore and then to Indonesia. After the end of the Cold War, 
                                                 
208 This agreement was among several listed in the Joint Declaration, which also included the Charter of the 
United Nations, and the Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of 
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China was perceived as a possible competitor in Jakarta‟s regional aspirations. This 
was particularly evident when Jakarta organized a series of workshops in the 1990s 
on managing conflict in the South China Sea. These workshops failed to provide 
tangible outcomes, due to China‟s non-compliance to mutually agreed norms 
during the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and the 1997 Vietnam oil rig dispute. 
Jakarta was further displeased by Beijing‟s claims to a gas-rich area at the Natuna 
Islands, occupied by Indonesia.
212
  
China equally viewed ASEAN with suspicion, regarding it as an instrument 
fashioned by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism that served as a „Third 
World‟ battleground of superpower competition (the very situation ASEAN in its 
institution and norm building wished to avoid). Beijing upheld this view even 
during the second phase in the early 1980s, when it was determined to reconcile 
political and economic relations with the U.S. and ASEAN states, providing a 
counterweight to Hanoi. China perceived Vietnam as a threat to its regional sphere 
of influence, due to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1976; Hanoi‟s ties 
with Moscow represented for China an encirclement strategy by its primary foe at 
the time, the Soviet Union.
213
  
Beijing gradually came to view ASEAN as a primary protector of stability and 
peace in the Asia-Pacific region and an important “Asian pole” in its pursuit for a 
multipolar order.
214
 China established formal diplomatic relations with ASEAN6 
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countries during the third phase in the early 1990s.
215
 After establishing diplomatic 
relations with Singapore and Indonesia, the relationships normalized and led to the 
first official attendance by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur as the Malaysian government‟s 
guest in July 1991. In the words of Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong: “Before 
ties between ASEAN and China were formally established in 1991, they were 
marked by mutual suspicion, mistrust and animosity largely because of China‟s 
support for the communist parties in ASEAN countries.”216  
Although the Chinese government expressed its wish to become ASEAN‟s 
dialogue partner at this time, it was not until the Joint Press Statement for the 
Meeting to Explore the Establishment of the Consultative Relationship with the 
People‟s Republic of China, during the then ASEAN Secretary-General Dato‟ Ajit 
Singh‟s visit to Beijing in September 1993, that the parties agreed to move the 
mutual relationship onto a more formal level. Legally, however, it was the 
following year, after the exchange of letters between ASEAN and the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, that the formal cooperative relationship was created in Bangkok 
in July 1994.
217
 Two joint committees were founded: one on economic and trade 
cooperation and the other on cooperation in science and technology. Eventually, 
China was granted full dialogue partner status in Jakarta in July 1996.
218
 
Despite the improved relations between ASEAN and Beijing, growing Chinese 
influence underpinned by expanding trade and investment and its assertive posture 
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Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. 
216 Ong Keng Yong, Keynote Address at AEAN-China Forum 2004, “Developing AEAN-China Relations:  
Realities and Prospects”, 23 June 2004, [http://www.asean.org/16256.htm].  
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towards Taiwan and the South China Sea dispute caused lingering distrust among 
the ruling elites of ASEAN countries.
219
  
The ‘China Threat Theory’ 
According to the Chinese interpretation of the „China threat theory‟, a term used by 
Chinese scholars, negative views of China can be traced back to an article written 
by a Japanese professor from Japan‟s National Defense Academy in August 
1990.
220
 The official version traces the beginning of the China threat theory to the 
end of 1992.
221
 This perception was further reinforced by Charles Krauthammer's 
essay Why We Must Contain China and the Chinese reply from Liowang weekly. 
Krauthammer characterized China as a “bully” that “tries relentlessly to expand its 
reach”. 222  He provided a detailed prescription of how to deal with China and 
suggested forming strong security alliances with Russia, Vietnam and Japan. 
Additionally, he said, the U.S. government should undermine the PRC regime by 
supporting Chinese dissidents and engaging in criticism of human rights abuses. 
Two weeks later, the Chinese Liaowang weekly referred to Krauthammer as a 
“Cold War knight” and called his article “arrogant,” “preposterous,” and “an idiot's 
gibberish”.223 
ASEAN‟s threat perception can be understood through four factors outlined in 
Stephen Walt‟s Origins of Alliances: the aggregate power possessed by the 
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threatening state, that state‟s geographical proximity, its offensive power, and the 
aggressive intentions of the state.
224
 The last point relates to a country‟s reputation 
and the more threatening this reputation is, the more inclined ASEAN is to use soft 
balancing against that state, which in this case is China (Figure 4).
225
  
Figure 4: ASEAN's soft- balancing strategy towards China 
 
China has gone through modernization of its national defense, which is one of its 
Four Modernizations, introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.  With the receding 
threat from the Soviet Union, which required strategies for dealing with forces 
moving far into China‟s hinterland, Beijing strategists started to prepare for a new 
doctrine, which called for deployments on China‟s periphery.226  The aim was to 
prepare a more mobile, lethal and professional force, which was further 
reconfirmed after the 1991 Gulf War in which the U.S. used advanced military 
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technology.
227
 Unable to produce such modern weaponry, China managed to 
acquire state-of-the-art hardware from Russia throughout the 1990s.
228
 It was 
reported that almost 97 per cent of China‟s arms imports valued at $1.75 billion 
during 1992-1994 came from Russia.
229
 These reforms required substantial funds; 
therefore, China increased its defense spending by double-digit percentage rates 
every year and officially reported an increase from $6.06 billion to $12.6 billion 
between 1990 and 1999.
230
 These estimates were scrutinized overseas, with some 
defense specialists arguing that the actual level of defense spending was two to 
three times the reported figures.
231
 
ASEAN members recognized China‟s right to modernize its national defense. 
However, the lack of transparency, and the use of its military capabilities in the 
contest over competing claims in the South China Sea, heightened legitimate 
concerns and resulted in soft balancing efforts to restrain China in the region.  
ASEAN’s Response to a Re-emerging China 
ASEAN6 responded to a rising China and the China threat theory in the 1990s by 
seeking to socialize China towards regionally responsible behavior and a 
commitment to shared norms through membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and via other mechanisms such as the TAC and an intensified bilateral 
dialogue. This was an indirect soft balancing strategy with the aim of constraining 
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China. This argument will be explored through analysis of China‟s engagement in 
the ASEAN-led
232
 ARF and ASEAN‟s dialogue with China over the South China 
Sea issue. 
This discussion directly responds to the major debate as to whether China was 
socialized and gradually internalized ASEAN‟s norms of behavior,233 or whether 
China cleverly manipulated its relations with Southeast Asian nations to reshape 
the regional order. It concludes that China initially embraced multilateralism as a 
measure to improve its image in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, and 
ASEAN6 had an impact on the decision by a group of Chinese elites to increase 
their country‟s engagement in multilateral discussion in areas of common interest. 
However, ASEAN did not succeed in convincing China to resolve the South China 
Sea dispute, despite the 2002 agreement on the Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea. Beijing developed a tendency to opt for a neorealist approach to 
multilateral cooperation and embraces cooperation solely in spheres which do not 
compromise its main national interests.
234
 This was noticeable in cases of China‟s 
violation of the agreed status quo by occupying Mischief Reef in the Spratly 
Islands in 1995, followed by the 1997 oil rig dispute with Vietnam. 
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Shaping China’s Behavior in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
The first case discusses ASEAN‟s soft balancing in the ARF with the aim to 
constrain China‟s behavior. This strategy was performed through multilateral 
institutional engagement. The argument made here is that ASEAN, insecure about 
China‟s intentions, facilitated China‟s membership in the ARF and engaged Beijing 
in dialogue on security issues and shared norms. This made it more costly for 
China to pursue its own interests without considering the impact on the region. 
Successful soft balancing further reduced potential for regional conflicts because 
all parties claim to adhere to the same code of conduct in their relations. Even if 
mainly declarative, such codes set the groundwork for diplomatic debate on 
disputes which can be channelled via multilateral fora. This cooperation in the 
multilateral framework should be viewed in the context of China‟s increased 
interest in multilateralism. The ARF‟s creation is also seen as a historical milestone 
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific because it paved the way for the establishment of the very 
first regional security organization, which involves ASEAN member states side by 
side with all major powers of the region, as well as the European Union. 
The ARF was established with the aim of enhancing security cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The origins of the ARF lie in a series of proposals from 
ASEAN member states and non-ASEAN states. One serious proposal to use the 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC, meetings between ASEAN 
members and external countries) came from the ASEAN Institute of Strategic 
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a Track II framework, in 1990. This initiative 
received negative responses from Indonesia and Malaysia, who did not wish to 
widen the scope of the ASEAN-PMC beyond economy to include regional security. 
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 
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to convert ASEAN-PMC into a formal security dialogue forum.
235
 Over the 
following three years this proposal would gain support from Japan, Australia and 
Canada as way to enhance regional cooperation. This proposal was met with 
opposition from the U.S. who saw multilateral organizations as threats to the U.S. 
bilateral alliances.
236
  
Eventually, the agreement to create the ARF came during the Foreign Ministers‟ 
Meeting in Singapore in 1993. The participating nations agreed that this 
collaboration would bring more predictable patterns into their security relations. 
ASEAN wanted to balance the three major powers in the region: the U.S., which 
had delivered a notice of its withdrawal from Subic Bay military base in the 
Philippines; Japan, which had a potential to remilitarize; and re-emerging power of 
China. 
In Michael Leifer‟s words:  
ASEAN’s goal was to create conditions for a stable balance of power… 
which would enable the Association to maintain its operational security 
doctrine.
237
  
The members of the ARF planned a three-stage development process for the new 
body: 
      Stage I : Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
      Stage II: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms 
      Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
238
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The first stage deserves a particular attention. During the initial ARF ministerial 
meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, participants established that the main objective 
should be to enhance regional confidence-building and preventive diplomacy.
239
 
This, however, proved to be a complex task overshadowed by differences between 
two groups of states. Countries such as Australia, Canada and the U.S. supported 
concrete CBMs, which would increase military transparency, and this was in 
opposition to a more informal approach from ASEAN countries and China, who 
emphasized declaratory measures, based on a voluntary steps.
240
 In light of mutual 
threat perceptions, and with the aim to socialize China into becoming a more 
predictable and regionally friendly actor, the ASEAN member states supported 
measures which would increase trust. The first major dialogue with regards to 
regional trust-building measures (TBMs) took place in Canberra during the ARF 
inter-sessional seminar in November 1994. These measures were outlined by Paul 
Dibb, who suggested that a combination of military and non-military TBMs 
ensures more confidence and reduction of suspicion and uncertainty in the region. 
They additionally minimize the potential for armed conflicts. Dibb divided the 
TBMs into two major groups: information sharing and measures of constraint.
241
 
He further distinguished the likelihood of achieving specific TBMs. The UN 
Conventional Arms Register, military-to-military contacts and allowing observers 
at military exercises are the least difficult TBMs to accomplish. More challenging 
TBMs relate to publishing defense white papers and creating a regional arms 
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register and maritime information databases. The most difficult TBMs include 
maritime surveillance cooperation and major military exercises.
242
 
Participants at the second ARF Ministerial Meeting agreed to a mix of more 
modest TBMs, such as participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms and 
sharing defense white papers. These submissions were to be made on a voluntary 
basis.
243
 The proponents of these measures argued that they were different from 
CBMs because they were gradually building trust rather than focusing on 
immediate results.
244
 Critics could not see how CBMs and TBMs could be different, 
other than bringing an alternative perspective because they both imitate concepts 
already in use in other parts of the world and in security processes (for example, 
the Helsinki Process and later OSCE mechanisms).
245
 
One function of the newly established ARF that ASEAN desired was to engage 
China within this multilateral, trust and confidence-building forum. China 
historically did not support mechanisms which would constrain its operability and 
cause Beijing to become dependent on practices which could undermine its 
autonomy. ASEAN and ARF‟s ability to maintain weak institutionalized structures 
in the presence of consensus decision-making, created a sense of non-intrusiveness, 
which was appealing to Chinese officials responsible for ARF policy in China.
246
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China responded by publishing a white paper on arms control and disarmament in 
November 1995, which was the first defense-related paper produced since 1949.
247
 
This was followed in 1998 by China‟s first official defense white paper, entitled 
China‟s National Defense. 248  While in the West publication of defense white 
papers promoting a greater transparency is a common practice, in China military 
transparency is viewed as undermining national security and rendering the country 
vulnerable.
249
 The strategic benefits of „deception‟, when faced with potential 
adversaries in possession of superior military capabilities, are known to military 
planners around the world but China in particular is noted for a strategic culture in 
which „deception‟ has been given special attention as an asymmetric tool.250 
Irrespective of the limitations of China‟s defense white papers (they are not as 
transparent as their Western counterparts), China‟s participation in the ARF since 
1994 contributed to socializing Chinese policy elites into a better understanding of 
the China threat theory and concerns in relation to China‟s military modernization. 
Thus, as a result of these external pressures, Beijing began to publish defense white 
papers and thus contributed to regional confidence-building.
251
 China also gained 
more confidence in sharing its perspectives on security topics, especially in 
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informal settings. During a Canada-China seminar in Toronto in 1997, the Chinese 
delegate explained the subtle difference between the terms “confidence” and “trust”. 
He argued that they are not used “interchangeably” in China. Trust (xinlai) is 
considered as the final destination and confidence (xinren) is the process towards 
attaining this end goal.
252
 
Track II and Track One-And-A-Half  
Apart from the official channels, discussions were conducted within less formal 
settings, in second track and track one-and-a-half meetings. Organizers also hoped 
they could shape China‟s disposition to discuss more sensitive security issues. The 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the most known 
and developed nongovernmental process in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It is disputed 
whether this cooperation falls under the second track or track one-and-a-half 
category. One way of assessing this is through the agenda and the participants at 
specific workshops and meetings. If the officials in their non-official capacity 
outnumber journalists, analysts and academics in particular meetings, then there is 
a likelihood that the track is more official, therefore, one-and-a-half; and there is a 
chance for the outcomes to be delivered to governmental officials and be translated 
into policies. If, however, non-officials form the majority, there is a lower chance 
for proposals to be accepted by policy-makers.
253
 Although framed as a Track II 
mechanism, with later meetings attended by academics, non-government experts, 
activists and youth leaders, CSCAP‟s membership committees included research 
centers and institutes from the Asia-Pacific region, providing strong conduits to 
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influence government and IGO policies.
254
 The original mission of CSCAP, 
established in 1992-93, was to provide “a more structured regional process of non-
governmental nature…to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence 
building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and 
cooperation.” 255  CSCAP was quite crucial at formulating the trust-building 
measures and the memorandum on preventive diplomacy. It contributed by drafting 
the working definition of „preventive diplomacy‟ for the ARF. 256  The CSCAP 
member committees recognized that China‟s membership was crucial if viable pan-
regional security architecture was to be established.
257
  
China hesitated to join the CSCAP until an agreement on Taiwan‟s involvement 
was reached in 1996, whereas the Taiwanese delegates could only participate in 
meetings in a private capacity. The level of organization of specific working groups 
(now called study groups) made it difficult for China to resist;
258
 it did not want to 
be left out of major debates.  
ARF and Track II mechanisms have played a vital role in ASEAN‟s soft balancing 
strategy towards China. ASEAN nations were not able, nor willing, to engage in 
countering China‟s power through conventional methods by using hard power. 
                                                 
254 See further: Charles E. Morrison, “Track I/Track 2 symbiosis in Asia-Pacific regionalism”, Pacific Review, 
vol. 17, issue 4, December 2004, pp.547-565. 
255 “Seoul Statement on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific” (cited in Desmond Ball, The Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Its Record and Its Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence, no. 139, Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, October 2000). 
256 The contributions of the non-official track is analyzed in Sheldon W. Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum 
Views the Councils for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: How Track II Assists Track I”, NBR Analysis 
13, no.4, July 2002, pp.5-23. 
257 Desmond Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Its Record and Its Prospects, 
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 139, Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, October 2000, p.13. 
258 China‟s engagement in track two mechanisms started within the South China Sea Workshop, which is 
explored later in this chapter and within a track one-and-a-half, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue. 
Additionally, China established its own non-official mechanism, the Boao Forum for Asia in 2001 and 
increased its senior level participation at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, where defense ministers discuss Asian 
security. China uses this dialogue to demonstrate a greater transparency in military affairs. More detailed 
discussion about China‟s unofficial diplomacy can be found in Brendan Taylor, “China‟s “Unofficial” 
Diplomacy”,  China‟s “New” Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?,  ed. Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, 
Qin Yaqing, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp.195-209. 
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They utilized institutional frameworks to engage China in cooperative security 
arrangements which constrained China by adopting shared principles, norms and 
rules of conduct. China benefited from its participation in CSCAP and ARF by 
creating networks of dialogue and improving its image vis-à-vis the negative 
perception based on the China threat theory. It also gained multiple opportunities to 
discuss economic cooperation with ASEAN member states. These trends would 
help lay the basis for future cooperation on non-traditional security issues, anti-
drug measures and dialogue on transborder issues.
259
 ASEAN states, however, 
discovered that China resorted to more assertive policies when it pursued its 
national interest.
260
 The limitations of ARF‟s constraints on China‟s behavior are 
discussed below in relation to China‟s claims in the South China Sea. 
Limits to Soft Balancing: The South China Sea Dispute 
This case study seeks to assess China‟s willingness to engage with ASEAN in talks 
in an effort to resolve the South China Sea dispute through the 1990s. If the soft-
balancing strategy worked, then China would have been successfully conditioned 
by ASEAN to internalize established norms and share the same understanding of 
codes of conduct in disputed areas. On the other hand, China‟s cooperative 
approach to this dispute could be attributed to its efforts to reduce the chances of an 
anti-China alliance led by the U.S. and ASEAN members who are driven by the 
                                                 
259 Lai Foon Wong, “China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era”, Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2007, pp.373-
404,[http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/373.full]; Ralph Emmers “International Regime Building in 
ASEAN: Cooperation Against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 
29 no. 3, 2007, pp.506-525; Tai Wei Lim, “ASEAN Coping Mechanisms to Manage the Rise of China”, East 
Asia, vol. 25,2008,  pp.407-422. 
260 The role of ARF in encouraging China in „the practice of good international behavior‟ is discussed in Ralf 
Emmers, “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, vol. 23, no.2, August 2001, pp. 275-291. 
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fear of a rising China, plus the prospect of U.S. containment of its primary 
competitor in the region.
261
  
The variable in this case is the „degree of cooperativeness‟ with ASEAN in regard 
to South China Sea negotiations and compared with China‟s unilateral activities in 
the disputed areas.  Cooperativeness would mean a gradual change in approach and 
eventual alteration in policies regarding the dispute, which would be more 
favorable to all parties involved. This means a reversal of China‟s insistence on its 
claim to all disputed waters, based on its U-shape line map, produced in 1947 (see 
the red U-shape line „H‟ in Figure 5, p.111). 262 On the other hand, a lack of 
cooperativeness would be evident if China continuously ignored the other claimant 
states and built new or upgraded the existing structures in disputed areas, or drilled 
and fished in disputed waters. 
Conflict Dynamics 
The South China Sea dispute refers to a complex range of overlapping territorial 
and maritime jurisdiction claims (Figure 5) and interests in controlling sea lanes 
and acquiring resources (fishing and energy)
263
 among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
264
 The dispute is primarily over the Spratly 
                                                 
261 Chinese motivations of learning and adaptation are explained and tested in more detail in Serene Hung, 
“China in ASEAN-led Multilateral Forums”, vol. 185, Occasional paper, Contemporary Asian Studies Series, 
University of Maryland, 2006. 
262 The background to Chinese historical claims and a figure with the First Official Map with the Chinese 
Traditional Maritime Boundary Line can be found in Zou Keyuan, “The Chinese traditional maritime boundary 
line in the South China Sea and its legal consequences for the resolution of the dispute over the Spratly 
Islands”, International Journal of Marine Coastal Law, vol. 14, issue 1, 1999, p. 29. 
263 Geophysical surveys and geologic studies confirmed the occurrence of major gas and oil reserves. See: 
Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298, London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1995, pp. 8-11. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates a total of 
discovered reserves and undiscovered resources at 28 billion billion barrels of oil deposits. It also claims that 
there is not enough evidence, outside Chinese estimates which cite 105 billion barrels, to support the argument 
that the South China Sea holds substantial amount of resources. See: “South China Sea”, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, last updated March 2008, [http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=SCS&trk=p3].  
264 These countries base their claims on legal and historical grounds. See: Liam A. Mito, “The Timor Gap 
Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the Spratly Islands”, American University International Law 
Review 13, no. 3, 1998, pp. 727-764. The individual claims are under the international law are analysed in 
Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, 
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Islands and the Paracels and adjacent EEZs. 
265
 China claims both segments, based 
on their historical usage, which dates back to the Han dynasty (206-220 A.D.).
266
 
China‟s thinking is said to be influenced by Confucian political thought, in which 
the rule is over “men and not space” and the claim is over territory where 
individuals reside and maintain influence, not over “linear boundaries”.267 However, 
this thinking is not unique to China. Traditional Southeast Asia also regarded 
people‟s allegiance to a ruler rather than territory as a deciding factor in the extent 
of a kingdom‟s domain. Ian Mabbett has written on early Southeast Asian polities 
not being geographic or cartographic: “The orientation implied is related to the 
dimensions not of space but of politics, and diplomacy…” 268  Thus, “Khmer 
villages acknowledged that they formed part of the Khmer kingdom. A Vietnamese 
village situated between them did not.”269 This means that traditional usage and 
access, perceptions of vulnerability, and historical conflicts remain part of the 
deeper political engagement in these disputes.
270
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common usage in academic literature and media and does not reflect a point of view with regards to specific 
sovereignty claims of any participating claimant. 
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Conference, American Enterprise Institute, 7-9 September 1994; Ji Guoxing, “The Spratly Disputes and 
Prospects for Settlement”, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 1994, p. 2. 
267 Gerardo M.C. Valero, Spratly Archipelago Dispute, Marine Policy, vol. 18, issue 4, 1994, p. 314, 323.  
268 Ian W. Mabbett, Truth, Myth, and Politics in Ancient India, New Delhi: Thompson Press, 1971, pp. 38-9. 
See also: Martin Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos, Bangkok: White 
Lotus, 1996. 
269 Ian Mabbett, p. 7. 
270  David Rosenberg, “Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure 
Movements”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. 12, issue 3/4, 2010, Winter, pp.4-12; Carlyle A. Thayer “The 
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Quarterly, vol. 12, issue 3/4, 2010, pp.13-17. 
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Figure 5: Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea 
 
 
China has approached the South China Sea dispute through the combination of an 
inflexible definition of territorial sovereignty, based on historical rights to claimed 
areas, and pragmatic participation in multitrack frameworks, with an agreement on 
a non-binding code of conduct.
271
 China‟s Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang 
Ying-fan, expressed China‟s willingness to shelve the dispute and resolve it at a 
later date through gradual negotiations.
272
 In discussions with fellow ASEAN6 
members, Indonesia proposed the South China Sea Workshop initiative, a Track II 
gathering only for ASEAN government officials in their personal capacities, 
                                                 
271 Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China policies on regional order, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 90-93. 
272 Wang Lanying, “Avoid conflicts, make joint efforts for development-Wang Yingfan, Director of Asian 
Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry, on the seminar on the South Sea issue”, Liaowang, August 1991,  
pp. 13-15; John W. Garver, “China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and 
National Interests”, The China Quarterly, no.132, December 1992. 
Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People‟s Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
May 2012, p. 37, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf] 
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technical experts and academics. This initiative was supported by Malaysia. 
However, non-claimant ASEAN6 member states, Singapore and Thailand, 
pressured Jakarta to open up the forum to involve external parties, in order to 
disperse tensions created by the perception that this „ASEAN only‟ framework was 
too exclusive, and therefore would not contribute adequately to a constructive 
regional dialogue. As a consequence, in 1991, China, Laos and Vietnam joined this 
workshop.
273
  
All parties agreed that the mandate of the South China Sea Workshop would not be 
one of conflict resolution, but rather a discussion forum to preserve opportunities 
for claimants to negotiate their bilateral deals with fellow claimant parties. 
Singapore did not want to create diplomatic tensions with Beijing, considering it 
had established diplomatic relations only the previous year. The purpose of the 
Workshop was therefore to discuss areas of co-operative marine management and 
build political willingness to resolve thereby promote a political environment more 
agreeable to resolving jurisdictional conflicts.
274
   
Despite these efforts, on 25 February 1992 China passed a Law on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People‟s Republic of China in the National 
People‟s Congress. As stated in Article 3 of the Law: 
The land territory of the People's Republic of China includes the mainland 
of the People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all 
islands appertaining there to including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu 
Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands 
                                                 
273 Hasjim Djalal, “Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative”, Ocean Development & International Law, 
vol.32, issue 2, 2001. 
274  The role of elite interactions within informal South China Sea workshops is analyzed in Mikael 
Weissmann,”The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A study in conflict prevention and 
peace building”, Asian Perspective, vol.34, no.3, 2010, pp.35-69; Hasjim Djalal, “Preventive Diplomacy and 
the South China Sea”, in the Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Regiona, ed. Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, Canberra: ANU, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1999. 
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and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the other islands belonging to the 
People's Republic of China.
275
 
This was a strategic manoeuvre on China‟s behalf to formalize its claims. In 
response to this assertive move, ASEAN issued the ASEAN Declaration on the 
South China Sea in July 1992, a so-called Manilla Declaration, and outlined the 
norms of regional conduct in this matter. The Association did not seek a resolution 
to these disputes, as not all ASEAN6 members were involved (Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand) and previously the issue was mainly viewed as China-
Vietnam conflict. However, in the light of China‟s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone, the member states shared an intensified understanding 
that there should be a peaceful resolution and avoidance of the use of force.
276
 The 
ASEAN foreign ministers approached the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, 
who was attending as a guest, to sign this declaration, but he refused to sign it, 
explaining that the leadership in Beijing was not going to sign a document the 
drafting of which had not involved Chinese diplomats. He, however, reassured the 
ASEAN delegates that China adhered to the declaration‟s principles.277 Following 
these Chinese reassurances, a climate of cooperative engagement prevailed. These 
regional events encouraged further dialogue with regard to jurisdictions and rights 
over ocean areas.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
China‟s occupation of the Mischief Reef, a small atoll near Palawan Island and 
within the Philippines‟ claimed 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
in January 1995, was a turning point in Beijing‟s apparent acceptance of regional 
                                                 
275 The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, adopted at the 
24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 25 February 1992, 
[http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P02006062031866812691
7.pdf] 
276 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manilla, 22 July 1992, 
[http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1992%20ASEAN%20Declaration%20on%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-
pdf.pdf] 
277 Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN and the South China Sea”, Security Challenges, vol. 6, no. 2, Winter 2010, 
p.42. 
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rules of conduct. This incident occurred a year after Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
rejected the use of force as a means of dealing with the South China Sea dispute 
during the ARF‟s first meeting in July 1994.278 A novelty factor was also that 
China engaged in an incident with an ASEAN member state, while previously it 
acted more assertively towards Vietnam, who was not a member of ASEAN6.
279
 
Filipino fishermen alerted authorities about a steel structure holding a Chinese 
concrete construction and a parabolic antenna.
280
 This move was condemned by 
Filipino President Fidel Ramos who accused China of violating the 1992 ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea.
281
 A military response to this incident was not 
viable. The Armed Forces of the Philippines would not have been able to challenge 
China‟s People‟s Liberation Army Navy. Therefore, President Ramos urged the 
ASEAN members to draft a statement, in which the foreign ministers urged: 
. . . all concerned to remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Manila 
Declaration on the South China Sea which we issued in July 1992 and 
which has been endorsed by other countries and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. The Manila Declaration urges all concerned to resolve 
differences in the South China Sea by peaceful means and to refrain from 
taking actions that de-stabilize the situation. We call upon all parties to 
refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region and further threaten 
the peace and security of the South China Sea. We specifically call for the 
early resolution of the problems caused by recent developments in 
Mischief Reef. 
We urge countries in the region to undertake cooperative activities which 
increase trust and confidence and promote stability in the area. We 
encourage all claimants and other countries in Southeast Asia to address 
the issue in various fora, including the Indonesia-sponsored Workshop 
Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.
282
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282 “Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea, 18 
March 1995”, [http://www.asean.org/2554.htm]; Severino 2010 pp.42-43, 
[http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol6no2Severino.pdf]. 
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ASEAN demonstrated the unity of its disapproval with China‟s actions at Mischief 
reef. This coordination of policies and restatement of norms showed that ASEAN6 
was able to act as a diplomatic entity; however, it does not demonstrate that 
ASEAN was acting as a „community‟; the member states did not express their 
support for the Philippines‟ claims in this incident. China was surprised to see this 
unprecedented public disapproval from ASEAN. In support of China‟s negotiation 
style, Beijing did not wish to resolve the issue in an open multilateral forum, rather 
by bilateral informal negotiations.
283
 Under external pressure though, China agreed 
to conduct an annual consultation on political and security issues in the „Senior 
Officials Conference‟. While the ARF was the main „international‟ soft balancing 
tool for ASEAN to constrain China‟s behavior, the Senior Officials Conference 
became a mechanism for „inclusive balancing‟ and facilitated practical negotiations 
over the South China Sea issue.
284
 
ASEAN‟s collective response was again tested in March 1997 when China decided 
to locate an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam (which joined ASEAN in July 
1995). ASEAN showed solidarity with Vietnam and prepared a joint position for 
the upcoming Senior Officials Conference in April 1997. In this particular instance, 
the ASEAN member states not only adhered to their shared meaning of structure 
(declarations of codes of acceptable conduct) and restated their commitment to 
regional norm compliance; they also identified with ASEAN and generated a 
                                                 
283 The contrast in preferred approach to dispute resolution and negotiation styles between China and the 
Philippines is covered in Aileen S.P. Baviera, “Bilateral Confidence Building with China in Relation to the 
South China Seas Dispute: A Philippine Perspective”, Prepared for the International Security Research and 
Outreach Programme International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, February 2001, 
p.22, [http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/assets/pdfs/baviera2001.pdf].  
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Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia”, European Journal of International Relations, vol.14, no.3, 
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the Asia-Pacific”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.27, no.1, 2005, pp. 123-145. 
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strong sense of “we-ness”.285 China decided to withdraw the rig, in light of this 
collective opposition from ASEAN6. This was a successful case of ASEAN using 
the soft-balancing strategy when challenged by China‟s assertive behavior in the 
region. 
After 1996, China showed a more proactive approach to regional diplomacy and 
security, demonstrated by its New Security Concept. This called for ending the 
„Cold War mentality‟ and dismantling military alliances, asserted that conflicts 
between states should be dealt with peacefully, and states should work towards 
common security through multilateral cooperation and economic integration.
286
 
China had an opportunity to contribute towards regional economic development 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which destabilized all ASEAN member 
states (though less so Malaysia, which instituted currency controls). China 
provided economic and medical aid to its neighbors and decided not to devaluate 
yuan. Retaining the value of the yuan disadvantaged China‟s exports; however, it 
did not lead to further currency devaluations in Southeast Asia.
287
 During this time, 
ASEAN member states tried to negotiate a multilateral code of conduct in the 
South China Sea with China (proposed by the Philippines in April 1999), but due to 
dependence on China‟s economic aid and China‟s opposition toward this document,  
the initiative was delayed.
288 
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The later signing of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea (DOC) in 2002 was a step forward in that it emphasized peaceful resolution of 
disputes „without resorting to the threat or use of force‟, and a commitment to 
further develop cooperation, trust and confidence among the parties.
289
 However, 
even through 2011-2012 there has been no comprehensive agreement on how this 
declaration should be developed beyond confidence building measures into binding 
principles, nor as to whether it should be the basis of a dispute resolution 
mechanism with verification or compliance procedures, of which PRC remains 
cautious.
290
 As a result, recent tensions in the South China Sea have moved into a 
more abrasive pattern of diplomacy that has not been resolved in the ARF, the East 
Asian Summit (EAS), or other fora.
291
 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated ASEAN‟s soft balancing toward China. ASEAN‟s 
approach was assessed from the perspective of ASEAN6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei), with a special focus on the period 
1990-1997. During this early period the ASEAN6 developed diplomatic relations 
with China and managed to engage Beijing in various Track I and Track II security 
mechanisms. China was initially a passive participant and used these frameworks 
to contest the China threat theory. It was not willing, however, to compromise its 
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national interests in the South China Sea and only gradually adhered to shared 
regional norms and codes of conduct. ASEAN used an institutional form of soft 
balancing when it brought China into regular meetings about common security 
issues. Nonetheless, this soft balancing strategy has its limitations in light of 
China‟s lukewarm compliance with regional norms such as „non-aggression‟, as 
was demonstrated during the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and the 1997 Vietnam 
oil rig incident. ASEAN‟s external pressure managed to integrate China into 
multilateral forums and provided a basis for more stable and predictable inter-state 
relations under the guidance of these multilateral frameworks, even though specific 
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea were not resolved. The 1990s provided 
China with a constructive learning experience, which Beijing utilized in its 
proactive engagement in Central Asia, where it co-founded the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. China‟s use of the SCO to soft balance 
the U.S. presence in Central Asia is analyzed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The SCO’s Soft Balancing Strategy 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the dynamics of the regional cooperation 
of China and Russia with the four Central Asian states:
292
 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and the SCO‟s response to the U.S. presence in Central Asia 
since 2001. This sets the context for the analysis of soft balancing and its 
mechanisms as possible strategies in the evolving organization. The conclusion is 
that the SCO was not established as an anti-U.S./anti-NATO organization. 
However, its agenda and direction have been influenced by the extended U.S. 
presence in the region, to the point that demands were made for the U.S. to set a 
deadline for its withdrawal of the troops based in the region.
293
 The SCO can also 
be seen as using the indirect mechanism of reducing long-term U.S. regional 
influence through the application of the “Shanghai Spirit”, a term employed by 
SCO to designate a set of regional norms underpinned by respect for state 
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members of NATO agreed to conclude the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan 
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Afghanistan, NATO Official Website, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-700332BF-
FD4C6CC5/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?].  
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sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.
294
 Unlike the U.S. or EU 
approaches, SCO members are reticent to comment on governance of SCO member 
states. They believe that their relationships should not be strictly defined, but rather 
evolve from consultations and with the goal of achieving common development.
295
 
The SCO has seen ASEAN spreading its own regional norms as an inspiration.
296
 
These organizations aspire to a continued increase of their presence in global 
politics as a viable alternative to the U.S. dominated international system. 
Figure 6: Map of member and observer states and dialogue partners of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization 
 
                                                 
294 “Press Conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit of the 
SCO”, 6 June 2006, [www.sectsco.org/html/01006.html]. 
295 “Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 5 July 2005, 
[www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html]  
296 “Interview by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang to Chinese Magazine „Zhonghuayingcai‟“, 25 May 2005, 
[www.sectsco.org/html/00468.html]. 
   Source: SIPRI 2007, adapted and updated by Alica Kizeková, December 2012. 
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Relations and interests in Central Asia have primarily been explored from the 
perspective of the interactions of the newly established Central Asian states and 
great powers extending regional influence. Often, modern geopolitics in this region 
has been viewed as the New Great Game.
297
 This refers to the competition for gas 
and oil between the great powers in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
298
 This 
chapter does not endeavor to explain the relations through the New Great Game 
concept, as it is misleading. The smaller Central Asian states are no longer victims 
of „imperial powers‟, as was the case during the competition between the British 
and Russian empires of the original Great Game in the 19
th
 century. Not only are 
states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus independent actors, which have their 
own interests and often use multi-vectoral foreign policies to balance the major 
external players, but, there is now another layer of cooperation through multilateral 
organizations, which promotes the concepts of mutual benefit, rather than the zero-
sum game of imperial competition.
299
 
This chapter is divided into three main parts: 1) the strategic architecture of post-
Cold war Central Asia, 2) the Shanghai Five processes and the SCO and 3) the 
SCO‟s soft balancing strategy. It is important to outline the origins of the SCO, 
especially the contributions of the Shanghai Five processes, which laid the 
institutional and ideological foundations of the organization. The purpose of this 
part is to point out the main agreements on confidence-building measures (CBMs) 
                                                 
297 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, the Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 1997; Alexander Cooley,  “The New Great Game in Central Asia: Geopolitics in a 
Post-Western World”, Foreign Affairs, 7 August 2012, 
[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137813/alexander-cooley/the-new-great-game-in-central-asia]; 
“Foreign Affairs Focus: The New Great Game in Central Asia”, Interview with Alexander Cooley by Jonathan 
D. Tepperman, 4 September 2012, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/audio-video/foreign-affairs-
focus-the-new-great-game-in-central-asia-with-al].    
298 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (inclusive of disputed Abkhazia and South Ossetia) 
299 The differences between the „original‟ and the „new‟ Great Games have been analyzed in more detail in 
Matthew Edwards, “The New Great Game and the new great gamers: disciplines of Kipling and Mackinder”, 
Central Asian Survey 22:1, March 2003, pp.83-102. 
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among the states and evolution of the agenda from border security discussions to 
non-security areas. Positive outcomes of CBMs contribute towards a more 
successful application of soft balancing because these processes increase mutual 
trust and contribute towards shared understanding of external threats to regional 
security.  
The Five CBMs are identified and assessed according to the following measures: 
communication, transparency, constraint, verification and declaratory.
300
 The aim 
of this section is not to point out the limitations of the Shanghai Five meetings, 
although there will be a brief assessment of how the strategic cultures of the two 
great powers, Russia and China, have influenced the fulfilment of the transparency 
and verification of CBMs. More importantly, it is necessary to examine which 
measures and procedures the selected states adopted to increase their mutual trust.  
These processes gradually shifted from bilateral to multilateral. The last part of this 
chapter deals with the SCO and outlines the areas of cooperation. It is argued that 
the framework has succeeded in constraining U.S. operability in the region, in part 
through soft balancing mechanisms. This has been achieved through territorial 
denial and the promotion of norms such as the “Shanghai Spirit”, which undermine 
the spread of Western-style democracy, and reinforce the regime security of all 
member states.  Attention is given to U.S. policies in Central Asia and its view of 
                                                 
300  These categories of CBMs can be found in James Mackintosh. “Confidence- and Security Building 
Measures: A Sceptical Look”, Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, Canberra, 1990, pp. 9-
10.  
Mackintosh suggests following descriptions of the CMBs: communication (information) and transparency 
CMBs include: publication of defense information and budgets, exchange of information, hot lines, joint crisis 
control centers, advance notification of force movements, exercises and mobilization and mandatory invitations 
of observers; constraint measure and verification measures include on-site inspections, no harassing activities 
which contribute to tension reduction, no threatening deployment in sensitive border and air areas and respect 
for nuclear free zones. Finally, declaratory measures relate to full compliance with non-first use of force 
agreements and non-first use of nuclear weapons. 
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the SCO‟s nature and role. This then sets the scene for assessing soft balancing in 
Central Asia. 
The Strategic Architecture of Post-Cold War Central Asia 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Central Asian 
republics became independent but lacked coherence as a  regional entity: they had 
no shared identity; they did not generate a unified response to common security 
challenges (such as corruption, crime, and terrorism); and they lacked commitment 
to democratic and economic reforms.
301
  In the post-Cold War period of 1991-1996, 
the region was comparatively underdeveloped and lacked incentive for democratic 
and economic reforms that would bring these states closer to the West. Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan were two exceptions. Kazakhstan, which possesses significant gas 
and coal reserves, and accounts for the second largest oil reserves and production 
among the former Soviet republics after Russia, has attracted the leading Western 
gas and oil industries.
302
 In 1993 it launched a joint Kazakh-U.S. 40-year venture 
on the Tengiz oil field, one of the greatest petrochemical finds.
303
 Yet investors 
have encountered difficulties operating in a country gravely affected by 
corruption.
304
 Kyrgyzstan embraced the macroeconomic reforms suggested by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the development to 
its own currency as early as 1993. The country was at first seen as a successful 
                                                 
301 Jim Nichol, Central Asia‟s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress, 
updated 7 January 2005. 
302 Kazakhstan Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, Country Analysis Brief, 
Energy Information Administration, updated November 2010, 
[http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf].  
303 The Tengizchevroil joint venture: 50% Chevron Texaco (U.S.), 20% Kazakhoil (Kazmunaigaz – KMG – as 
of 2002), 25% ExxonMobil (U.S.), 5% Lukoil (currently LukArco, Russia), with an estimated cost of $20 
billion, Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
304 Survey of Public Opinion in Kazakhstan and respondents from the country-by-country survey conducted by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1997 reported widespread and serious 
cases of corruption in civil service and business transactions, where “additional payments” were required to 
“get things done”. “Kazakhstan”, Freedom House Report, 1998, p.19, 
[http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT98/kazakh98.pdf].  
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transition to democratic institutions, an image that would be tarnished by ethnic 
tensions and a growing concentration of power around the presidency.
305
  
Economic transition was continuously sabotaged by President Askar Akayev, his 
family and close associates‟ enrichment in the face of the increased poverty of 
majority of Kyrgyz public.
306
  
Uzbekistan initially joined the IMF stabilization program, but the IMF suspended a 
$185 million standby loan in December 1996, in view of the Uzbek leadership‟s 
heavy interference in economic reforms. The government imposed restrictions on 
foreign exchanges and caused major problems for foreign companies in the 
country.
307
 Tashkent generated income from the export of cotton, the sale of gold, 
and the growing export of oil and gas, which allowed the country to become less 
dependent on foreign assets, though rural poverty would require later support from   
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other international agencies.
308
  
Tajikistan, the poorest and weakest of these states, lacked full control over its 
country and was completely dependent on help from the international community, 
especially Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Efforts to 
transform the economy were, however, disrupted by the prevalent drug trade 
coming from Afghanistan, which also undermined improvements to the Kyrgyz 
economy, due to serious cases of cross-border criminal activity and corruption.
309
 
                                                 
305  See: John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy, Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers, 
1999. 
306 Rafis Abazov, Nations in Transit 2003: Country Report of Kyrgyz Republic, United Nations, 
[http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan012423.pdf]. 
307  Neil J. Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road, Amsterdam: Harwood 
Academic, 2000, pp. 71-72. 
308 Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Bank and Uzbekistan”, ADB Fact Sheet, 31 December 
2011 [http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/UZB.pdf]; Reuel R. Hanks "Emerging Spatial Patterns 
of the Demographics, Labour Force and FDI in Uzbekistan", Central Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. 3-4, 
September-December 2000, pp.351-367; IMF "Report of Uzbekistan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper", IMF Country Report,  no. 5/160, May 2005 [Access via www.imf.org]. 
309 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia‟s Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 
2005, p.23. 
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These problems with restructuring economies have continued and the entrenched 
authoritarian leaderships of these countries have presided over weak rule of law, 
government mismanagement and poor corporate governance.
310
  
In this setting, the leaders of individual states have been more focused on 
individual nation building and preservation of their priorities. Despite the 
frequently declared need to work together to tackle common problems and deal 
with shared threats, they have been unable to set up effective intra-regional 
structures due to incompatible national interests and comparatively weak 
governance.
311
 Moreover, none is comfortable with a possible transfer of power 
towards a supranational regional body, similar to the EU.  Not capable of agreeing 
on an alternative (such as early ideas of a widely based Eurasian Union),
312
 the 
Stans accommodated and joined a Russian-sponsored regionalism through 
memberships in CIS structures and engaged in limited cooperation with the U.S. 
and NATO.
313
 These multilateral frameworks allowed Russia and the U.S. to 
influence the strategic environment of Central Asia during the first decade after the 
end of the Cold War.  
                                                 
310 See Nations in Transit 2011 Report, Freedom House, 
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=678]; The 2012 Nations in Transit Report described 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as a „consolidated authoritarian regime‟, 
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/kazakhstan]. See further Martha Brill Ocott, "The 
'Stans' at 20", Real Instituto Elcano, 28 December 2011, [http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=46397#]  
311 Roy Allison, “Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia”, Central Asian 
Survey  27, no. 2, June 2008, pp.185–202; Stina S. Torjesen, Understanding regional co-operation in Central 
Asia, 1991–2004,  DPhil Dissertation, Oxford: University of Oxford, 2008. 
312 Nazarbaev‟s Eurasian Union project, debated through 1994-1995, needs to be distinguished from later 
Russian models based on economic cooperation. See; Vitaly Portnikov, "Nazarbayev, Yeltsin Agree on Lease 
of Baikonur: A Eurasian Union, Nazarbayev-Style", The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 46, no. 13, 
1994, pp.9-11; BBC "Nazarbayev Submits Eurasian Union Plan to UN", BBC Monitoring Service - USSR, 9 
July 1994; BBC "Uzbek President Again Rejects the Idea of Eurasian Union", BBC Monitoring Service - 
USSR, 11 February, 1995; James Kilner, “Kazakhstan welcomes Putin‟s Eurasian Union concept”, The 
Telegraph, 15 December 2012 
[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/kazakhstan/8808500/Kazakhstan-welcomes-Putins-
Eurasian-Union-concept.html].Other early regional groupings, such as the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) group and the Central Asia Cooperation Organization 
(CACO)  were largely inter-government and did not include a wide Eurasian footprint. 
313 Assessment of the CIS and its failure of interstate cooperation can be found in Getting it wrong: regional 
cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, ed. Martha. B. Olcott, A. Aslund and S. W. Garnett, 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. 
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Additionally, with the establishment of the SCO, China has increased its presence 
and has gradually had a growing impact on regional development. According to 
Roy Allison, the Stans express their political solidarity through the SCO which has 
become a macro-regional entity that promotes the indivisibility of national 
sovereignty and freedom from external, mainly Western, models and values. They 
accepted a form of “protective integration” as a response to pressures on their 
domestic and regional agendas.
314
 Regime security has thereby been partly 
maintained in the face of external pressures seeking greater democratization and 
liberalization. 
Russia’s selective multilateralism 
For all presidents after the Cold War, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry 
Medvedev, preserving Russia‟s influence in the former Soviet republics remained a 
top priority. Despite its pro-European, pro-Western orientation and declining 
position in Central Asia in the early 1990s, Russia retained elements of regional 
hegemony and maintains active engagement in regional structures. These 
frameworks are mainly utilized to stabilize Russia‟s borders in the south, maintain 
economic and resource access, and build up its international standing. 
On a global level, Russia supports a collective leadership of major powers with the 
aim of creating a multipolar world
315
 or polycentric system of international 
relations.
316
 Russia‟s Foreign Policy Concept at the turn of the century argued that: 
There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure 
of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States. 
                                                 
314 Roy Allison, “Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia”, Central Asian 
Survey 27, no. 2, June 2008, pp.185–202. 
315 An overview on Russian arguments for multipolarity can be found in Martin A. Smith, “The Russian 
Multipolarity Debates”, Power in the Changing Global Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012, pp. 131-147.  
316 “The Executive Order on measures to implement foreign policy“, The Official Website of the President of 
Russia, 7 May 2012,[http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/acts/3764/print].  
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In solving principal questions of international security, the stakes are being 
placed on western institutions and forums of limited composition, and on 
weakening the role of the U.N. Security Council.  
The strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the international situation, 
provoke tensions and the arms race, and aggravate interstate 
contradictions; national and religious strife…Russia shall seek to achieve 
a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the 
diversity of the modem world with its great variety of interests.
317
 
However, in response to failed attempts to stop interventions in Iraq and Kosovo in 
1998 and 1999, Russia chose a selective approach to multilateralism
318
 and it has 
acted reluctantly to impose sanctions or support interventions within the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). In order to maintain its elevated position of the 
permanent veto power within the UNSC, it has mainly supported discussing non-
controversial issues and promotion of respect for territorial sovereignty and non-
interference in states‟ domestic affairs.319  
This selective approach is also present at the regional level. In Central Asia, 
Russia‟s interests are compelling and complex. In 1991, the majority of political 
elites
320
 in Russia believed that Central Asia was a burden on Russia‟s resources 
due to subsidies, a sentiment which was clearly articulated in the first Central 
Asian strategy. The idea was to withdraw from the region quickly but continue 
                                                 
317 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Vladimir Putin, President of the 
Russian Federation on 28 June 2000, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm].  
318 It is understood that Russia prefers an „effective multilateralism‟ or „multilateral diplomacy‟ with a strong 
support for intergovernmental cooperation rather than supranational organizations, such as the EU, where states 
converge their policies through negotiations. This diplomacy rejects the unilateral leadership of a single state. 
Access to the Policy Review of the Russian Federation 
[http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/3647DA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4DD#%D0%92%D0%92%D0%95
%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%95]; Andrei Zagorski, “Multilateralism in Russian foreign policy 
approaches”, in The Multilateral dimension in Russian foreign policy, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina 
Torjesen, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 47-48.  
319 Ibid, pp. 46-57 
320 The Russian foreign-policy elite is defined as “those actors who, by their occupation, have substantial 
potential to affect foreign policy, and have a high level of informed opinion due to their expertise and greater 
access to information” William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy. Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002, p. 21. The foreign policy making under President Putin is increasingly centralized, 
views and statements form official government officials have to be taken in consideration. On Russian foreign 
policy actors, see Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign PolicyDecision-Making, 
Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2005, pp. 9–14; Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian perceptions and 
policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 9, 
2009, pp. 207–244. 
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trading with the Stans under more beneficial conditions for Russia. It would also 
maintain control over transport corridors, especially energy transportation.
321
 In the 
1990s, Moscow institutionalized its relationships with the Stans through the CIS, a 
loose mechanism for regional cooperation, which proved to be ineffective due to 
the lack of commitment from member states and Russia‟s dissatisfaction with 
returns for its financial contributions.
322
 
Similar issues arose in the military sphere. For example, Russia‟s involvement in 
the Tajik civil war in 1992, when Moscow strengthened the 201st division of the 
former Soviet army by deploying well-trained units, led to fears of long-term 
entanglement. At the time, Russia was highly concerned with drugs and arms 
trafficking from Afghanistan, where the Islamic groups were organizing military 
attacks in border areas. In order to protect the surrounding countries from these 
incidents, the CIS members signed the “Tashkent Treaty”, a Collective Security 
Treaty, in May 1992, in which they agreed to a military assistance provision where 
an attack against one state party would be considered as an attack on all state 
parties.
323
 As a result of public opposition in Russia after a Russian outpost was 
destroyed by a Tajik militia group coming from Afghanistan on 13 July 1993, 
Moscow argued for establishing a joint force that would provide collective security 
within the CIS space.
324
 However, the Russian army ended up dominating the 
collective peacemaking forces in Tajikistan and the Stans opted for independent 
                                                 
321 Andrey A. Kazantsev, Russian Policy in Central Asia in 1991-2010: A Disappearing Power? EUI Working 
Papers, RSCAS 2010/59, pp. 9-10. 
322 Stephen Aris, Russia‟s Approach to Multilateral Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space: CSTO, EurAsEC 
and SCO, Russian Analytical Digest 76, 15 April 2010, [http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:1620/eth-
1620-01.pdf]  
323 Article 4, The Treaty on Collective Security (Договор о коллективной безопасности), Tashkent, 15 May 
1992, [http://www.dkb.gov.ru/b/azbengl.htm].  
324 Andrey A. Kazantsev, Russian Policy in Central Asia in 1991-2010: A Disappearing Power? EUI Working 
Papers, RSCAS 2010/59, p. 13. 
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security policies and creation of their own armies, which ultimately weakened this 
cooperation. 
With Yeltsin‟s presidency coming to an end in the late 1990s, the Kremlin 
regularly restated its commitment to re-engage with the former Soviet republics. 
Both the 2002 National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept 
highlighted the importance of the CIS area. The National Security Concept stated 
that an “outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian 
Federation and the external borders of CIS member states” consisted of a major 
threat for the world community.
325
 Russia further institutionalized its economic and 
security relations through two organizations: the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EEC) in 2000 and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. 
The CSTO has had to operate in relation to other security organizations in the 
region, NATO and GU(U)AM,
326
 especially in the context of the U.S. engagement 
in Central Asia and South Caucasus. Additionally, these frameworks also need to 
find a way of cooperating with the SCO. Russia is the main supporter of the CSTO-
SCO cooperation; the secretariats of the two organizations signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in October 2007.
327
 Despite sharing 
similar interests in enhancing regional security, this MOU is especially limited 
when it comes to outlining specific mechanisms which would prevent a possible 
duplication of tasks. Moreover, neither organization provided assistance when 
                                                 
325National Security Concept Of The Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 
January 2000, [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument]  
326 GU(U)AM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, the official website at http://guam-
organization.org/en/node/422 ; the forum was established in 1997 as GUAM and was renamed to GUUAM 
once Uzbekistan joined the cooperation in 1999; in the aftermath of the Andijan Uprising, Uzbekistan delivered 
the official withdrawal from GUUAM and the forum was renamed to GUAM in 2005. The organization aims at 
creating transport and market corridors to the West. The U.S.  actively supported its projects by providing 
financial assistance. See: S. Neil MacFarlane, 'The United States and regionalism in Central Asia', International 
Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004. 
327The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the SCO Secretariat and the Secretariat of CSTO, 
[МЕМОРАНДУМ о взаимопонимании между Секретариатом ШОС и Секретариатом ОДКБ], 5 October 
2007, [http://www.sectsco.org/RU123/show.asp?id=112].  
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Kyrgyzstan requested help during the social and political crises of 2010. Both the 
SCO and CSTO conduct joint military exercises simulating responses to the 
overthrow of a government, yet they argue that intervening in an internal conflict in 
a member state would constitute meddling in a state‟s domestic affairs. 328  
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001,
329
 President 
Putin supported the deployment of U.S. forces to Afghanistan and the use of 
military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, during his second term, 
2004-2008, Putin grew increasingly impatient with U.S. approaches to regional 
defense, especially with NATO‟s Eastern membership enlargement, and proposal 
to set up missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland. His position was made 
clear during the Munich Summit in February 2007, when he called for the end of 
the unipolar world and demanded the U.S. leave the area.
330 
 
Russia has used a series of strategies to create a counterweight to the U.S. presence 
in Central Asia. Moscow has promoted the idea of a multipolar world, with various 
centers of power.
331
 It used media and published scholarly works to explain its 
views. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued in an article written for the Foreign 
Affairs magazine that Russia was unjustly being encircled in its neighborhood and 
that the West was counterproductively undertaking a „containment strategy‟. The 
article was viewed as a response to Yuliya Tymoshenko‟s contribution “Containing 
                                                 
328 Yuliya Nikitina, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space”, Security Index: A Russian 
Journal on International Security 17:4, 2011, pp. 47-48. 
329 Hereafter, 9/11 or September 11. 
330  Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 February 2007, 
[http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id
=179&]. 
331 Thomas Ambrosio argues that Russia‟s approach to multipolarity has been “defensive in nature” and the 
primary goal is “to resist American domination of the international system”. Russia does not want to be viewed 
as a junior partner” and U.S. unilateral decisions should not affect Russia‟s security interests. Thomas 
Ambrosio, Challenging America‟s Global Preeminence: Russia‟s Quest for Multipolarity, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005, p.5. 
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Russia” in the May/June 2007 Foreign Affairs issue. 332  Lavrov decided to 
withdraw his piece, arguing that his writing had been subjected to editorial 
censorship.
333
 Consequently, the Russian Foreign Ministry reposted it on its 
website,
334
 and multipolarity remains a key component of Russian strategic 
thinking. 
Bilaterally, Russia has enhanced its energy cooperation with the former republics 
and reassured them of providing a security umbrella under the CSTO. Russia not 
only uses this organization to strengthen the interoperability between the armies of 
the SCO member states, but also hopes for the establishment of a regional Energy 
Club. This club would unify the energy market among the six SCO members and 
disadvantage the external powers when access and pricing of resources are 
negotiated. The SCO Business Council (Figure 8, p.164) has become a platform for 
discussions between government and businesses in relation to the SCO‟s energy 
strategy and collaboration in joint projects.
335
  
The United States’ pursuit of a regional strategy 
The collapse of the Soviet Union caught the U.S. by surprise. Not having solid 
historical experience, economic or diplomatic ties with the Stans, its strategic 
interests in the early 1990s were shaped by the Cold War. Consequently, the 
immediate priority was to manage relations with Russia. The FREEDOM Support 
                                                 
332 Yuliya Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, 
[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62613/yuliya-tymoshenko/containing-russia].  
333 “On an article by Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov for the Foreign Affairs magazine”, The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation”, 19 July 2007, 
[http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/BCFC98E7946709C0C325731D002238F5];  
 “Russia: 'Foreign Affairs' Editor Says Lavrov's Article Withdrawal A 'Surprise'”, RFERL, 21 July 2007,  
 [http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077744.html]. 
334 Sergei Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to the Future?”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation,  19 July 2007, [http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/8F8005F0C5CA3710C325731D0022E227] 
335 “The Business Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, English.news.cn, 28 April 2012, 
[http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-04/28/c_131558680.htm]; Vitaliy Bushuev and Valeriy 
Pervuhin, “SCO energy club: what it should be?” InfoSCO, 13 March 2012, [http://infoshos.ru/en/?idn=9616]    
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Act,
336
 authorized by President George H. W. Bush on 1
st
 April 1992, laid the 
groundwork for U.S. involvement in Central Asia. It called for “a once-in-a-
century opportunity to help freedom take root and flourish in the lands of Russia 
and Eurasia”.337The bill, which primarily targeted Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and 
the other states of the former Soviet Union, set out to provide financial assistance 
to dismantle nuclear weapons in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. 
However, this goal was broadened to supporting the creation of free market 
economies; enabling privatization and funding currency stabilization. It authorized 
$410 million in U.S. bilateral assistance.  By the time of signing, the U.S. had 
already disbursed 60% of the $6.33 billion aid assistance pledged to the former 
Soviet Union for the years 1991-1993.
338
  
Security cooperation has taken place primarily through NATO‟s Partnership for 
Peace program,
339
 which enabled a focus on developing peacekeeping, disaster 
relief, regional and NATO interoperability. This cooperation led to the creation of a 
Central Asia Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRASBAT).
340
 In September 1997, the 
CentrasBat-97 military exercise set out to test rapid-reaction response between the 
Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Uzbek joint battalion and the U.S. Army‟s 82nd airborne division, 
in case of a UN-authorized peacekeeping mission in Central Asia under NATO‟s 
operational command. Five hundred U.S. soldiers and 40 CentrasBat paratroopers 
secured Sairam airport near Chimkent in Kazakhstan against a hypothetical enemy. 
This was the longest-distance airborne operation in military history, when planes 
                                                 
336 FREEDOM Support Act, [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/docs/s2532.html].  
337  Bush‟s Statement on Signing the Bill, 
[http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21658#axzz1I93g4HLQ]. 
338 FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 1992 FACT SHEET, 
[http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/b920401.htm]. 
339 Membership in the Alliance‟s Partnership for Peace program was offered and accepted by Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 1994, Tajikistan joined in 2002.  
340 CENTRASBAT at GlobalSecurity.org, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm]. 
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with paratroopers flew 12,500 kilometres (7600 miles) in 19 hours non-stop.
341
 The 
exercise demonstrated that the U.S. was asserting its support for the independence 
of Central Asian states and its commitment to regional stability. 
Even before September 11, the U.S. had declared its assistance for Central Asian 
anti-terrorism activities. The Uzbek government gained backing from the U.S., 
listing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist organization in 1999. In 
the same year, the Pentagon commissioned a report to assess the strategic 
importance of Central Eurasia.  The main question addressed in this study was 
„Does the region matter‟? Two years later the answer was delivered by the Atlantic 
Council of the United States and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in the Strategic 
Assessment of Central Eurasia. This study, prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and openly published in January 2001, identified Afghanistan as the primary 
security concern of the entire Caucasus-Central Asia zone. It proposed a 'concert' of 
all neighboring powers, including China, Pakistan, Russia, India, Iran and Turkey, 
as well as the U.S. and Japan, to consult regularly so as to heighten the region's 
ability to secure its own defense and to limit external meddling and the conflicts 
which could thus arise. The authors admitted that the project‟s findings were 
targeted at U.S. officials and not a “specialized scholarly community”, and 
therefore required “a certain degree of oversimplification” due to “the vast, 
complex and comparatively unfamiliar nature of the subject to Americans”.342 Thus 
U.S. and NATO continued selective military cooperation with countries such as 
                                                 
341 “Historic U.S.-led Military Exercise Begins”, The Jamestown Foundation Monitor, vol. 3, issue 172, 17 
September 1997,  
[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=20022&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=211]. 
342 Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States of America, p. vii, 
[http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/0101-Strategic_Assessment_Central_Eurasia.pdf]. 
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Kazakhstan and Georgia, but on a limited scale which was not systemically 
conceptualized.
343
 
With hindsight, it can be argued that over the past twenty years the U.S. has 
maintained a consistent but uncoordinated policy in Central Asia,
344
 concerned 
primarily with Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan; energy politics; and 
democratization. The 2006 U.S. National Strategy concluded that “the five 
countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another and our relations with each, 
while important, will differ”.345 Thus, the U.S. Administration decided to approach 
the Stans individually through annual bilateral consultations. While Kazakhstan 
was repeatedly acknowledged as the “engine for growth”,346 and had shared the 
“deepest and broadest”347 relations with Washington, Uzbekistan, another regional 
contender, experienced a more volatile relationship with the U.S. It was criticized 
for its human rights violations and harsh suppression of the gathering in Andijan, 
which led to the eviction of U.S. troops from the K2 base in 2005. As a result, the 
Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become more valuable for the U.S. as the 
principal base for the troops operating in Afghanistan. In an effort to renegotiate 
basing rights with the Bakiyev government, the U.S. had to agree to new leasing 
                                                 
343 McDermott, Roger N. McDermott, “United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: The 
Need for a New Approach”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies. vol. 21, issue 4, October 2008, pp.615-641; 
Alexander Vinnikov, “NATO and Central Asia: Security, interests and values in a strategic region”, Security & 
Human Rights, vol. 20, issue 1, 2009, pp.68-82. 
344 The U.S. has three foreign policies for Asia: East Asia (which includes China), South and Central Asia 
(have been reintegrated within one Bureau in 2006, Afghanistan is meant to be the linking party between these 
two subregions) and Eurasia (which includes Russia). It is argued that this division is “outdated” in times when 
Asia has reconnected, often through trade links with China. See: E. A. Feigenbaum, “Why America No Longer 
Gets Asia”, The Washington Quarterly, pp. 25-43, Spring 2011. 
345The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 40, 
[http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf]. 
346 Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at Eurasian National University, 13 October 2005,[http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/54913.htm].  
347 Robert Blake, Testimony of Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian 
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, 
and the Global Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.- Central Asia Partnership, 
November 17 2010. 
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fees, providing Kyrgyzstan with over $150 million in aid.
348
 Tajikistan too, has 
played an important role by securing Afghan borders and maintaining transport 
connections between Tajikistan and Afghanistan through the $36 million bridge 
funded by the U.S.
349
 However, in this part of Central Asia, Uzbekistan still 
remains the most useful player in providing the U.S. with the shortest routes for 
shipping cargo and important road and railway connections to Afghanistan. In turn, 
Turkmenistan emerged as an important arena for Russian-U.S. and Chinese 
interactions. Its geographical location provides it with more freedom of operations 
vis-à-vis the Stans, which border Russia or China. There is also a renewed interest 
in finalizing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which 
would transfer natural gas from Turkmenistan to India, despite disagreements with 
regards to transfer agreements and pricing among the participants.
350
 This is 
sometimes viewed as part of a possible „New Silk Road‟ leading southward, though 
this initiative has yet to emerge as a coherent U.S. agenda.
351
  
It has been widely debated whether the SCO undermines U.S. interests in the 
region. The Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher confirmed that the U.S. 
never sought or was invited to gain membership of the SCO. If the U.S. held an 
observer status, U.S. leaders would play a secondary role in the organization, 
possessing no voting rights. Additionally, they would be subjected to the presence 
of the President of Iran, which holds observer status at the SCO and often uses 
                                                 
348 U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz government and economy can be found at the U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, [http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tc_recent_contributions.html].  
349 C.J. Chivers, “Seeking Trade to Bridge a Political North-South Divide”, New York Times, 2 June 2007, 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/02/world/asia/02tajikistan.html?pagewanted=all].  
350 R.G.Palau, “The TAPI Natural Gas Pipeline: Status & Source of Potential Delays”, Civil-Military Fusion 
Centre, February 2012, [https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Social%20Well-
being%20Archive/CFC_Afghanistan_TAPI_Feb12.pdf].  
351 Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, “The United States‟ 
“New Silk Road” Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed?” Address to the SAIS Central Asia Caucasus 
Institute and CSIS Forum, Washington, DC, 29 September 2011, 
[http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2011/174800.htm].  
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SCO summits to voice anti-American sentiments. Senior Associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Martha Olcott, confirmed that the SCO was 
clearly more than just a „discussion forum‟ where member states voiced their 
annoyance with U.S. policies; however, this did not directly threaten U.S. goals.352 
Iran‟s engagements with the SCO were „limited‟ and the Organization was unable 
to act in a „concerted fashion‟ when dealing with regional security threats. Stephen 
Blank from the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College further 
pointed out that the SCO was primarily a framework used by China to counter U.S. 
influence in Central Asia, especially in the spheres of politics and ideology. He 
concluded that the Central Asian states would not fully co-operate with the U.S. 
unless the U.S. stopped supporting regime change, as in the case of the 2003 Rose 
Revolution in Georgia or the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine.353  
The U.S. administration is convinced that the divergent interests of the Central 
Asian nations, Russia and China, and the immaturity of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization mechanism, have and will continue to prevent a coordinated concert 
of anti-U.S. activities that would undermine U.S. interests in the short and medium 
terms. Initially sceptical, U.S. Bureau of South and Central Asia noted the potential 
for enhanced cooperation in countering terrorism in Eurasia during a Beijing Media 
Roundtable with Assistant Secretary Robert O. Blake in March 2011.
354
 Moreover, 
the December 2011 report, Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan, by the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, acknowledges the SCO‟s role in counter-
                                                 
352 R. Boucher, M. Olcott and S. Blank, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is it Undermining U.S. 
Interests in Central Asia?” Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Washington, D.C., 26 September 2006, 
[http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=381&Region_i
d=0&Issue_id=0&ContentType=H,B&ContentRecordType=H&IsTextOnly=True&CFID=23548910&CFTOK
EN=95881001]. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Assistant Secretary Robert O. Blake‟s Media Roundtable in Beijing, Embassy of the United States of 
America, Beijing, 15 March 2011, [http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/032111media.html].  
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narcotics efforts.
355
 The U.S. remained consistent in its approach to Central Asia, 
largely promoted through diverse bilateral relations with the Stans. On the other 
hand, the U.S. perception of the SCO has undergone a gradual evolution from 
negative or indifferent to a cautious acceptance of the organization as providing a 
useful grouping for cooperation in selected areas.   
China’s evolving regional policy 
Over the last decade, China has increased its participation in global and regional 
multilateral organizations as part of its foreign policy. On the regional level, its 
engagements reach out to several subregions in Asia: Southeast Asia, Northeast 
Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. With the launch of the periphery policy 
(zhoubian zhengce) or the good neighbor policy (mulin zhengce), China gradually 
joined the Asian Development Bank (1986), the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation process (1989) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994) as well as the 
non-official “Track II” mechanism, the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (1996). Thereafter, China joined the WTO, ASEAN plus Japan, South 
Korea and China (ASEAN+3), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G20, and other 
processes such as the Shangri-La Dialogue. 
In the ASEAN-led frameworks, the PRC has had a secondary role, and less input in 
shaping ASEAN‟s future direction. 356  In contrast, its active leadership in 
establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has given China the 
                                                 
355 Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan, Majority Staff Report, prepared for the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 19 December, 2011, p. 12, [http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/senate-
committee-foreign-relations-report-central-asia-afghanistan/p26863].  
356 China‟s immediate neighbors generated enough pressure to convince Beijing to pursue active participation 
in regional multilateral organizations. China decided to join the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 in an effort to 
disperse the China threat perceptions and weaken U.S. ties with its Asian allies. See: Rosemary Foot,”China in 
the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought”, Asian Survey, 
vol.38, no.5, 1998, pp.425-440. 
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opportunity to shape the institutional framework as well as the agenda of SCO 
consultations.  
China‟s regional policies are formed with the following principles in mind. One of 
the core objectives is to harness continuous support for the „One China Principle‟ 
with regards to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. The U.S. presence in Asia is another 
major consideration. China is balancing the U.S. position not by military means, 
but rather through „institutional balancing‟, where it counts on high levels of 
economic interdependence, and harmonizing economic policies within regional 
organizations, such as the SCO, in which the U.S. is not a member state.
357
 Further, 
China strives to secure its borders and seize economic opportunities with 
neighboring states, especially in the energy sector.
358
 The result would be increased 
economic and political influence for Beijing without seeking to directly challenge 
U.S. global power or Russia‟s geostrategic interests.359 
Although China‟s relationships with Russia and the newly established states in 
Central Asia are consolidated within the SCO, its formal strategy is still 
evolving.
360
 It is greatly dependent on the policies of the other players, who appear 
to have either short or medium term goals or lack the capacity to sustain 
predictable patterns in the domestic environment, due to a weak economic base and 
ongoing political volatility, or a limited capacity to coordinate regional 
development. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became an 
                                                 
357 Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China‟s rise, London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
358 Stuart Harris, “China‟s regional policies: how much hegemony?”, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol.59, no.4, 2005, pp.481-492. 
359 G. John Ikenberry G. “The Future of the Liberal World Order”, Foreign Affairs, vol 90, no. 3, May/June 
2011, pp.56-68; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard “Harmonious World and China‟s Foreign Economic Policy: Features, 
Implications, and Challenges”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 13, no. 2, 2008, pp.165-192. 
360 Zhao Huasheng identifies six main priorities for China in Central Asia: (1) border security; (2) combating 
the “East Turkestan” movement; (3) energy; (4) economic interests; (5) geopolitics; and (6) the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Zhao Huasheng, „Central Asia in China‟s Diplomacy‟, Central Asia: views 
from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, ed. Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin and Zhao Huasheng, London: M.E. 
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important arena for cooperation and competition among three major powers: 
Russia, China and the U.S. China initially selected a cautious approach to 
establishing direct links with the newly independent Central Asian states and 
focused on normalization of its relations with Russia.
361
 However, it managed to 
strengthen its bilateral relationships with all the Stans by signing treaties of 
Friendship and Cooperation and improving confidence and mutual trust. Beijing 
differentiated its relationships with individual countries.  
It was primarily interested in neighboring countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in relation to specification of common borders, and economic and 
resource potentials. It was believed that China paid attention to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan mainly due to their efforts to implement reforms along the lines of 
the Chinese developmental model, but it initially neglected deeper trade contacts 
with these states because they did not face ethnic problems (such as Uighur 
population fleeing from Chinese authorities to Kazakhstan)
362
 which would 
threaten China‟s domestic or foreign policies.363 
Beijing has been particularly concerned with the threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
and separatism of the northwestern part of the PRC, the Xinjiang-Uighur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR). Historically and ethnically, the population of this 
region (Xinjiang as „Eastern Turkestan‟) is closer to the Central Asian states 
(viewed as „Western Turkestan‟) than to East Asia polities.364  However, China 
expects the largely Muslim local ethnic groups to coexist with the Han population 
                                                 
361 This strategy was especially important due to China‟s disrupted relations with the West in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. 
362 “China: Account for Forcibly Returned Uighurs”, Human Rights Watch, 2 September 2011, 
[http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/02/china-account-forcibly-returned-uighurs] 
363 Konstantin Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: from Trade to Strategic Partnership”, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus 45, no.3, 2007, pp. 40-51. 
364 Klara Khafizova, „Separatism in China‟s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Dynamics and Potential 
Impact on Central Asia‟, Central Asia and Caucasus 19, 2003, no.1, p.7. 
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in the Chinese cultural space. In order to strengthen the integration of the XUAR, 
Beijing implemented the Greater North-West development strategy, where 
Xinjiang plays a strategic role in the transit of energy resources, especially natural 
gas and oil, from the Central Asian states. China‟s economic development in these 
territories and cooperation with the Stans and Russia in curbing spill-over effects of 
extremism and terrorism are complementary and contribute towards consolidation 
of China‟s presence in the region. 365  For this reason, the PRC was willing to 
develop the Shanghai Five dialogue process into expanded SCO patterns of 
cooperation. 
The Shanghai Five Processes 
Confidence building among Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
was facilitated by the Shanghai Five (S-5) series of meetings, with the primary 
focus on achieving disarmament in border areas and building trust among 
participating nations.
366
 Some discussions were at first of a more polarized nature: 
China versus the CIS members, rather than truly multilateral meetings.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
365 Michael Clarke, „Making the crooked straight: China‟s grand strategy of „peaceful rise‟ and its Central 
Asian dimension‟, Asian Security, 2008, vol.4, no.2, pp.107-142. 
366  The process of border resolution started in the mid-1980s between the Soviet Union and China. 
Subsequently, the negotiations expanded with the inclusion of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1993. 
Marc Lanteigne, “Security, strategy, and the former USSR: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, 
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Figure 7: Overview of Shanghai Five Summits 
Summit Themes and Results 
The Shanghai Summit,  
26 April 1996 
The Agreement on Confidence-building in the Military Field 
in the Border Areas 
The Moscow Summit,  
24 April 1997 
The Agreement on the Mutual Reduction on Armed Forces in 
the Border Areas 
The Almaty Summit,  
3 July 1998 
Afghanistan, the Taliban, religious radicalism and terrorism, 
drugs and weapons smuggling 
The Bishkek Summit,  
24 August 1999 
U.S.-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Moscow and 
Beijing opposing the action; 
The new „Silk Road‟ – especially in the oil and gas sectors; 
Discussion on holding regular meetings 
The Dushanbe Summit,  
5 July 2000 
Importance of maintaining UN authority (esp. UN Security 
Council); 
Support for China‟s right vis-à-vis Taiwan and Russia‟s 
position in Chechnya; 
Uzbekistan attends the Summit; 
Decision to establish an organization to tackle security threats 
more effectively. 
 
The first two S-5 agreements
367
 had mainly declaratory value, in which there was a 
shared understanding about non-first use of force, and in the case of Russia and 
China, also the non-use of nuclear weapons.
368
 This was meant to increase 
                                                 
367 The Agreement on Confidence-building in the Military Field in the Border Area, Shanghai, 26 April 1996; 
The Agreement on the Mutual Reduction on Armed Forces in the Border Areas, Moscow, 24 April 1997; 
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mrmfba/index.html]; Also see: Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: the New Guide 
to Negotiations and Agreements, London: SAGE, 2003, pp. 272-276. 
368 Russia and China declared the no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other and non-targeting of 
strategic missiles at each other in September 1994. „Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction 
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confidence among all participants. Russia and China signed a Joint Statement on 19 
May 1991, where they agreed not to use force or even threaten one another with 
force.
369
 They further established that they would not sign agreements with a third 
country that would undermine security interests and the state sovereignty of the 
other state. Reaffirmation of these declarations was rather symbolic, considering 
that Russia was capable of retargeting its strategic missiles in twenty minutes, and 
China‟s strategic missiles were still, allegedly, targeted at Russia in July 1997.370 
Once the parties agreed on specific regulations in the border areas, they started to 
pay more attention to the shared security concerns related to the designated „three 
evils‟ of extremism, separatism and terrorism, and the S-5 summits (1998-2000) 
became more truly multilateral.  
Once the declaratory measures were outlined, the participating states discussed the 
constraint, communication, transparency and verification measures and agreed to 
provide each party with defense information, such as military doctrines and 
security concepts, and make defense budget figures available. The constraint 
measure relates to bringing the levels of military forces in border areas to a 
minimum, with a 100-kilometer zone on both sides of the border with China. 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan settled for 3,900 tanks, 3,810 of 
which are the Russian quota, in the area bordering China. In addition, Russia could 
deploy up to 4,500 armored fighting vehicles there. The same tank ceiling was also 
set for China. A 15% reduction in the existing Russian military grouping in the 
100-km border zone with China was also envisaged when first signed. The parties 
                                                                                                                                       
of‟, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, 27 April 2004, 
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjjk/2622/t93539.htm].  
369 Yuan Jing-dong, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures: A Preliminary Analysis, Working Paper, 
no.20, Centre for International Studies, Vancouver, January 1998,[http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=46425].  
370 Ming-Yen Tsai, From Adversaries to Partners? Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold 
War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p.92. 
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agreed to exchange relevant information and data on the military forces in the 
border area; and monitor and verify the implementation of the Agreement. They 
also agreed to regularly exchange relevant military information about the areas, 
which will be kept secret from any third party.
371
  
The Agreement further indicates that states should inform each other if they intend 
to hold a military exercise exceeding 25,000 personnel in the 100-kilometer 
geographical area. The other party is usually invited to observe the exercise in 
order to comprehend the scale of operations and reduce misperceptions between 
each other. This practice has clearly been incorporated into the SCO Peace 
Missions where Observer states are invited to monitor the joint military exercises 
of SCO member states. Moreover, China and Russia strengthened their mutual 
communication measure by setting up a telephone hotline in April 1996; there has 
also been a military hotline in place since December 2008.
372
 
From the start, the SCO states were facing two major limitations in obtaining the 
best possible outcomes in transparency and verification measures. As stated 
previously, transparency requires a full disclosure of defense budgets. Although 
China published an „arms control and disarmament‟ white paper in 1995, the 
description did not provide information on Chinese defense spending.
373
 Through 
2011, China was still viewed as downplaying its defense expenditure and the actual 
defense budget figures were believed to be two or more times higher.
374
 Besides 
                                                 
371 “The Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas”, Federation of American 
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372 Chris Hogg, “Army phone links China and Russia”, BBC News, 29 December 2008, 
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373 China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Information Service of the State Council of the People‟s Republic 
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transparency, another important confidence building measure is verification. The 
1996 Shanghai Agreement does not specify procedures for mutual inspections. The 
states should carry out their inspections only in instances of great irregularities or 
major threats. 
The following three S-5 summits held in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe extended 
the agenda of mutual cooperation beyond strengthening mutual trust in border areas. 
The 1998 Almaty Summit resulted in the Almaty Joint Statement, in which the 
establishment of the Central Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone was praised.
375
 It 
also focused on Afghanistan and the problems of religious extremism and terrorism. 
The five states called for a diplomatic solution to these issues under UN 
auspices.
376
 The fight against non-traditional security threats, along with separatism, 
became the primary security issues for the SCO. These issues, however, were 
framed within the context of the desire for regional stability, and the perceived 
need to play a greater role in any emerging „world order‟ 377 
Discussions at the 1999 Bishkek Summit dealt with the U.S.-led NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia. There was strong opposition against interference in 
internal affairs of states, even under “the pretext of humanitarian intervention and 
protection of human rights”, from Moscow and Beijing. On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                       
[http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB1104-04A-04B.pdf]; Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, 
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375 Although discussed as early as 1992, the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) would 
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(2009). “Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia: IAEA Welcomes Entry into Force of Treaty Joining Five 
States in Region”. International Atomic Energy Agency, 24 March 2009, 
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compliance with respecting human rights was also stated.
378
  At this time, debates 
about a new „Silk Road‟ – especially in the sectors of oil and gas – emerged. The 
agreement also involved setting up an anti-terrorist center in Bishkek to coordinate 
all activities in this sphere. Since discussions about normalizing common borders 
between China and Central Asian nations were dealt with, S-5 took the next step 
and decided to conduct regular meetings of the defense ministers of member states. 
Not much information about how these interactions would take place was released 
at the time.
379
 
The final S-5 Summit was a breakthrough, with the attendance of the Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov. Uzbekistan experienced bombings and incursions from 
the Taliban-backed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999. Since the S-5 
elevated its focus on fighting Islamic militants, Tashkent showed an interest in 
cooperating with the Stans, Russia and China in early 2000.  Subsequently, it was 
suggested that a formal regional organization should be established, subordinate to 
the authority of the United Nations Security Council.
380
This laid the foundation for 
a more formalized network dialogue between the Stans, China and Russia. These 
states had improved their military relations and reduced their forces along common 
borders. Throughout the Shanghai-Five processes, participating states acquired a 
shared understanding of traditional and non-traditional security threats in the region 
and pledged continued support for regular consultations in the quest for about 
solutions to common security problems.  Intensified dialogue through 2000-2001 at 
the level of defense ministers and foreign affairs ministers, as well as law-
                                                 
378 Marat Mamadshoyev, “The Shanghai G-5 becomes the Shanghai Forum,” Eurasia Insight, 7 July 2000,  
 [http://dev.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070700.shtml]. 
379 Roy Allison, “Limits to Multilateralism”, in Strategic Security Dilemmas in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
NBR Analysis, October 2003.  
380 Robert M. Cutler, “The Shattering of the Sino-Russian Entente Over the Shape of Central Asia?”, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 November 2001, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/163/print].  
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enforcement officials, prepared this grouping for a more formal structure as the 
SCO.
381
   
The main security concerns for all SCO member states have remained the „three 
evils‟ of extremism, separatism and terrorism. Fear of these threats has been 
closely connected to protecting internal security, which relates to the regime 
security and territorial integrity of these states.
382
 Elites from the SCO member 
states hold that the S-5 and the SCO are useful vehicles for harmonizing practices 
for intelligence sharing. Despite not providing collective security guaranties to 
SCO member states, the Organization became an important forum for states in need 
of diplomatic support in the event of a security crisis or external criticism of their 
human rights record.  
It was the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration which stressed the importance of respecting 
internal affairs of other states and their free choice to develop their policies in 
societal, economic and political spheres. There should be guarantees that no state 
would intervene under the pretext of „humanitarian intervention‟ or suggestions of 
human rights violations. These principles have been restated on several occasions 
at annual summits of the SCO. The Heads of States also agreed that the cooperation 
should further encourage a multipolar world and a creation of a “new, just, and 
rational international political and economic order”.383  
                                                 
381 Marat Nurgaliyev, Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Diplomacy of Japan 
Towards Central Asia, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2008 
[http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/080317-Marat_Nurgaliyev.pdf]. See further below 
382 Stephen Aris, “Tackling the „Three Evils‟: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – A Regional 
Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?”, Europe-Asia Studies 61, no.5, 
2009. 
383 “Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the People‟s Republic of 
China, of the Kyrgyz Republic, of the Russian Federation, and of the Republic of Tajikistan” 5 July 2000, 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
[http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/A69BB7197B47EC174325699C003B5F9D?OpenDocument].  
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Already, in this formative period, various mechanisms of engagement were 
established; mainly exchanges between departmental and ministerial officers in 
charge of relevant agenda. Since then, the SCO has become the main driver 
encouraging these principles and the facilitator of the soft-balancing strategy 
towards foreign influences in Central Asia. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
The SCO, which was established in Beijing on 15 June 2001, successfully 
converted S-5 processes into a formal multilateral organization. It has become a 
productive tool for enhancing cooperation between the Stans, Russia and China. 
The United Nations officially acknowledged the SCO as “an essential forum for 
addressing security in Eurasia in all its dimensions – political, economic, military, 
and environmental”.384 In a speech delivered on behalf of UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki Moon to the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in Yekaterinburg, 
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe highlighted several 
non-traditional security issues (food insecurity, climate change and the global 
financial crisis), that the UN Regional Centre for Central Asia and the SCO needed 
to tackle together. He stressed the importance of preventive security and counter-
terrorist strategy.  
Despite being accorded observer status at the UN General Assembly, forming 
external relations with other regional organizations,
385
 and contributing towards 
                                                 
384 Secretary-General's Message to the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), delivered by Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Yekaterinburg, Russia, 
16 June 2009, [http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3926#].  
385 The SCO officially collaborates with the UN, CSTO, EurAsEc, ASEAN and CIS. These interactions are 
regulated through the Regulation on the Status of Observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
accepted during the June 2004 Tashkent summit. In December 2004 the SCO was granted observer status in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. In April 2005 the SCO signed the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with ASEAN and the Commonwealth of Independent States, establishing a relationship of cooperation 
and partnership.  
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regional security, external parties have been puzzled on a number of counts: the 
nature of the Organization, its leadership, and the extent to which it will be 
successful in implementing its ambitious goals. For much of the SCO‟s existence, 
there has been a lack of informed analysis about the Organization compared to 
more established frameworks, such as ASEAN, the EU,
386
 NATO or APEC. The 
SCO is known for its opacity in reporting on its activities
.387
 The limited content on 
the official website and out-of-date reporting on SCO activities have generated 
negative views about the underlying motivations behind the establishment of the 
SCO and its role in the Asia-Pacific multilateral security architecture. Observers 
conclude that it is an “anti-Western front”,388 “the NATO of the East”,389  “a work 
in progress”,390  the “Shanghai Organization of Mutual Distrust”391  or a formal 
organization without any tangible influence.
392
  
                                                 
386 The EU only recently adopted its first Central Asia strategy: European Community Regional Strategy Paper 
for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013, 
[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf] ; The importance of creating stronger ties between 
the EU and the SCO in achieving a greater stability and cooperation in areas of energy security, the fight 
against the drug trade and terrorism was highlighted by Oksana Antonenko in “The EU should not ignore the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation”, The Policy Brief, Centre For European Reform, May 2007, 
[http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_sco_web_11may07.pdf]. Antonenko further stressed that this 
cooperation is challenging due to differences over human rights and arguments over the anti-western nature of 
the SCO. 
387 Documents from the period of the S-5 processes are no longer available as archived on the official website. 
A compilation of relevant material from the pre-2001 period was done during a fieldwork trip at the Centre of 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies in Shanghai in July 2008. The Official Website is regularly 
unavailable or it does not report adequately in English. An example of this is the website of the Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure of SCO (RATS), one of the two permanent agencies of the SCO, the „news‟ section of 
which has not been updated since 2005, more recent information is available in Chinese or Russian. The SCO 
presiding country in a particular year has a tendency to create a new website for the period of this presidency. 
The latest Chinese presidency provided an informative website before June 2012 summit in Beijing, however, 
the access to normative documents is often limited, due to being linked to the original SCO website, which is 
often down. Official Website of SCO 2012 Summit [http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/].  
388 Oleg Artyukov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization to become a serious concern for the USA”, 
Pravda, 16 June 2006. 
389 Parag Khanna, The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the 21st 
Century, New York, NY: Random House, 2009. 
390Amb. Pierre Morel, EU Special Rep. for Central Asia, Seminar „Asian Voices in Europe‟, “The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation: a new regional kid on the block?” Report, the EPC-Sasakawa Peace Foundation 
(SPF), 18 February 2008, [http://www.epc.eu/events_rep_details.php?pub_id=880&cat_id=6].  
391 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Office, Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office,  November 2008, 
[http://www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf].  
392 More detailed overview of this confusion in the literature and examples of various descriptions of the SCO 
can be found in Enrico Fels, Assessing Eurasia‟s Powerhouse: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Bochum: Winkler Verlag, 2009. 
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Some Western attitudes to this organization may be characterized as emotive, and 
the academic community of specialists has tended to ignore it, a viewing it as 
ineffective and driven by authoritarian leaders bent on preserving their regimes by 
not supporting democratization trends in the region.
393
 However, this has been 
changing, with a more thorough analysis of SCO emerging and recognition of its 
distinctive framework for conflict prevention in Central Asia.
394
 This thesis does 
not speculate about the SCO‟s final status. It is clear that the SCO provides a 
unique model of regional cooperation and does not follow the EU or ASEAN 
models. The assessments here test whether the Organization has been used as a soft 
balancing mechanism to constrain U.S. power in the region. 
Mandate and Norms 
The SCO‟s stated mission is to work towards “regional peace, security and stability” 
and create a “democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic 
order”.395 These goals are to be achieved through the principles of good-neighborly 
friendship and mutual trust. Since the foundation of the SCO, the member states 
have used yearly summits to restate these goals and gradually expand their 
cooperation into various spheres including science and technology, trade, education, 
culture, energy, environment, transport, economy and politics. The SCO states 
introduced a new norm, which they termed “Shanghai Spirit”, to describe their way 
of diplomacy based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect 
                                                 
393  Ruslan Izimov, “The SCO and the West”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 2, vol. 12, 2011; Thomas 
Ambrosio, “Catching the „Shanghai Spirit‟: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes 
Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, no.8, October 2008, pp.1321-1344. The 
„colored revolutions‟ are further detailed below, under the subheading, „ Sot Balancing Cases‟. 
394 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2011;Marcel de Haas and Frans-Paul van der Putten, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 
Towards a full-grown Security Alliance?, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
November 2007, [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071100_cscp_security_paper_3.pdf]. 
395 “Declaration of Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 15 June 2001. 
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for multicivilizations, [and] striving for common development”. 396 On the 
organization‟s fifth anniversary on 15 June 2006, the Shanghai Spirit was promoted 
as “new norm of international relations”. 397  The then SCO Secretary-General, 
Zhang Deguang, suggested that this norm represents not only a “source of unity 
and spiritual power”, but also a “concept of development and a system of 
values”.398  
Russia and China shared compatible visions of a multipolar world order and 
believed that the SCO was becoming a role model of an equitable mechanism 
enabling policy coordination, not only of regional but also global issues.
399
 The 
states work closely in combating threats of terrorism and separatism.
400
 Under the 
Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, the 
SCO members agreed that there were no good reasons to justify separatism and that 
the offenders should be punished accordingly under the law.
401
 China and Russia 
on several occasions voiced their opposition to Kosovo‟s independence, arguing 
that it would create a precedent for others seeking secession.
402
 Likewise, Moscow 
and Beijing have viewed genuine independence (versus autonomy) movements in 
                                                 
396 Jiang Zemin, “Deepening unity and coordination to jointly create a brilliant future”, speech at the SCO 
inaugural ceremony, St Petersburg, 15 June 2001, 
[http://english.china.org.cn/baodao/english/newsandreport/2001july/new14-1.htm]. 
397 “Commentary: SCO outlines new norm of international relations”, Xinhua, 16 June 2006, 
[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/16/eng20060616_274699.html]; “Declaration of the Heads of State 
of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and 
Common Prosperity”,  7 June 2012, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t939149.htm#]. 
398 Press Conference by Secretary-General Zhang Deguang on the Eve of the Fifth Anniversary Summit, 6 June 
2006, [www.sectsco.org/html/01006.html]; “Hu Jintao gives interview to SCO reporters”, Chinese 
Government‟s Official Web Portal, 30 May 2006, [http://english.gov.cn/2006-05/30/content_295924.htm]; The 
Kremlin has been equally supportive of these principles. In 2006, President Putin hailed the SCO‟s Shanghai 
Spirit as a “New Model of Successful International Cooperation”. Vladimir Putin, „SCO – the New Model of 
Successful International Cooperation‟, The Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Indonesia, 14 
June 2006, [http://www.indonesia.mid.ru/ros_asia_e_4.html].  
399 Later on, Chinese official documents tended to use the term „multilateralism‟ more often than 
„multipolarity‟, Leif-Eric Easley, “Multilateralism, Not Multipolarity Should be Goal,” The China Post, 29 
March 2008. 
400 Anti-terrorist activities are coordinated by the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure based in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan. 
401The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Shanghai, 15 June 2001, 
[http://www.hrichina.org/content/5204]. 
402 Niklas Swanström, „Georgia: The Split that Split the SCO‟, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 9 
March 2008, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4930]. 
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Chechnya and Tibet as fundamental attacks on their states, whether conceived as 
federal or multinational entities. Subsequently, Russia‟s use of force during the 
2008 August conflict with Georgia and recognition of sovereignty for Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia challenged the SCO‟s principles and strategic partnership with 
China (see further below). 
These goals and principles were incorporated into the Charter of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, which was signed in St Petersburg on 7 June 2002 and 
came into force on 19 September 2003. The document was signed in the Chinese 
and Russian languages which are the official SCO languages. On the basis of 
Article 2 of the Charter, the SCO will fulfil its goals by adhering to the Charter of 
the United Nations, respecting the states‟ territorial integrity and sovereignty and 
refraining from the use or threat of force in neighboring countries as well as at the 
international level. The SCO member states proclaimed that the Organization 
should not be viewed as an alliance directed against any other states and regions. It 
should rather be seen as a mechanism for fighting terrorism, separatism and 
extremism. The Organization identified these threats as its primary concerns and 
proposed a detailed plan of action on the day of establishment.  Further, it 
contributed to deliberations over how terrorism, separatism and extremism should 
be defined.
403
 By opting for such non-interventionist and cooperative security 
approaches (largely directed toward internal problems),
404
 the Organization clearly 
refrains from a traditional hard balancing approach in favor of the soft balancing 
strategy. Although there is no SCO foreign policy and the Organization best 
reflects „regional cooperation‟ rather than „regional integration‟, this mutual 
                                                 
403 “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism”, Shanghai, 15 June 2001, 
[http://www.hrichina.org/content/5204].  
404 It should be noted that anti-terrorism exercises do involve SCO militaries and may be viewed as threatening 
by some states, political actors, or ideologies. 
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understanding on how to approach common problems strengthens the desire of 
individual member states to work together and formulate common positions on 
regional matters. 
SCO Membership and the Sino-Russian Driver 
The SCO is composed of a diverse group of states. These include two global 
powers, China and Russia, with influence through permanent memberships in the 
UNSC and the possession of nuclear weapons, large territories and populations, 
thereby driving the Organization‟s scope beyond Central Asia. There are also two  
Stans with regional influence, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as two less 
influential Stans, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The internal dynamics of the SCO has 
been compared to “a barometer of the state of Russo-Chinese relations”,405 where 
the organizational development appears to be closely linked to the 
institutionalization of Sino-Russian relations.  
On the occasion of the 10
th
 anniversary of the SCO and the Treaty of Good-
Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and China in 
2011, Moscow and Beijing elevated the status of their „strategic partnership‟ to a 
„comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership‟. 406  Moscow and Beijing 
agreed to coordinate their policies, in multiple areas ranging from missile defense, 
internet information security, outer space and global warming, in multilateral 
                                                 
405 Stephen Aris, “SCO has been compared to „a barometer of the state of Russo-Chinese relations”, 
Russie.Nei.Visions, no.34, Ifri, September 2008, 
[http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/Ifri_RNV_Aris_SCO_Eng.pdf]. 
406 Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Politics of Two Anniversaries,” Comparative Connections, September 
2011; after reclaiming his presidency, President Putin‟s first visit to Asia was to Beijing, where he signed a 
joint communique to support this deepened partnership, “China, Russia sign joint communique to deepen 
cooperation”, English.news.cn, 6 June 2012, [http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-
06/06/c_131634971.htm]. 
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forums: such as SCO, BRICS, G20, and the Russia-India-China mechanism.
407
 
During the 2012 Summit in Beijing, the SCO heads of state issued a statement 
opposing the use of force in Iran and Syria. They called for „dialogue‟ rather than 
„military intervention‟ in the Middle East.408  Russia‟s Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, called the Sino-Russian partnership “irreversible” and conducive to “peace 
and stability in the world”.409 
Traditional divisions of labor within the SCO are arguably reflected in Russia‟s 
security agenda, and in China‟s economic sphere. Russia holds strong historical 
and cultural ties to Central Asia and these links create a sense of a „natural‟ sphere 
of influence. It is in Russia‟s interest to use various frameworks, including the 
SCO, to maintain the status quo in the region. One of the key soft power strategies 
is the use of Russian language among Russian nationals in the former Soviet 
republics. In 2007, President Putin signed a decree establishing „Russkiy Mir 
Foundation‟ to promote “the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a 
significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language 
teaching programs abroad.” In his words, the Russian language creates a 
“community that goes far beyond Russia itself” and is a “common heritage of many 
people” and will “never become the language of hatred or enmity, xenophobia or 
isolationism”.410 In the Eurasian context, Russian is sometimes used as language of 
                                                 
407 “China, Russia issue joint statement on major international issues”, English.news.cn, 16 June 2011, 
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/16/c_13934280.htm]; “News conference following 
Russian-Chinese talks”, Kremlin.ru Archive, 16 June 2011, [http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/2405]. 
408 “SCO Leaders Reject Force In Iran, Syria”, RFE/RL, 7 June 2012,   
 [http://www.rferl.org/content/sco-summit-rejects-force-iran-syria/24606443.html]. 
409 “China, Russia vow to further bilateral ties”, English.gov.cn , 21 August 2012, [http://english.gov.cn/2012-
08/21/content_2208031.htm]. 
410 “About Russkiy Mir Foundation”, President Vladimir Putin‟s Address to the Federal Assembly in April 
2007, Russkiy Mir Foundation Official Website, [http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/fund/about]. 
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inter-ethnic communication, even if used reluctantly and rarely given formal status 
as a national language.
411
 
Border security is another major consideration. Resolving common border issues 
with China allowed Russia to focus on more volatile parts of its neighborhood, 
especially towards the North and South Caucasus. Russia also pays attention to the 
expansion of NATO to the East. The Putin administration in particular used the 
SCO to voice its discontent with the continuous presence of foreign forces in 
Russia‟s neighborhood during 2004-2008. In the words of Vyacheslav Trubnkov, a 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, “I don‟t think we can be happy with the presence 
of extra-regional powers whether it is the US, China or some other country.”412 
Russia finds the SCO to be a good framework to balance its relationship with the 
U.S. in Central Asia and at the same time have better control over China‟s 
activities in the region. Militarily, it continues to rely on the Russian-led CSTO. It 
has been pushing for a greater CSTO-SCO collaboration; however, these contacts 
have remained rather limited.
413
 
Russia has had its differences with the majority of the SCO member states.  
Initially, Moscow and Tashkent stood united during the expulsion of U.S. forces 
from Uzbekistan in 2005 
414
 until Tashkent restarted its cooperation with 
                                                 
411 Sergie Gradirovsky & Neli  Esipova, “Russian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet States: Attitudes 
more favourable in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia”, Gallup World, 1 August 2008 
[http://www.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost-postsoviet-states.aspx]. 
412 Vladimir, Skosyrev, Interview with the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov, 
“Есть предел уступкам Москвы” [“There Is a Limit to Moscow's Concessions”], Nezavisimaya Gazeta Daily, 
12 May 2004, [http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-05-12/1_trubnikov.html]. 
413 Mikhail Troitskiy, “A Russian Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper no.17, Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail 
Troitskiy, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute May 2007, pp.30-44. 
414 “President of Uzbekistan and Russia Meet,” the Embassy of Uzbekistan in the United States, 29 June 2005, 
[http://www.uzbekistan.org/news/archive/236/?print=l]; Russia and Uzbekistan conducted a joint military 
exercise on 21-23 September 2005, See: Bruce Pannier, “Uzbekistan: Military Exercises with Russia Timely 
for Tashkent,” RFE/RL , 23 September 2005; Uzbekistan re-joined the CSTO and withdrew from the pro-
Western GUUAM in 2005. Moscow and Tashkent further signed a treaty of alliance in Moscow on 14 
November 2005. An attack on Russia would generate assistance from Uzbekistan and vice versa. See: 
“Anatomy of A Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005”, Silk Road Paper, John C.K. Daly, Kurt H. 
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Washington.
415
 A similar approach was taken by Kyrgyzstan, which was planning 
not to renew the lease for foreign troops at the Manas Airbase. There were reports 
that Bishkek had been negotiating a $2.1 billion package of Russian aid.
416
 In the 
end, Bishkek re-negotiated a deal with the U.S. government.
417
 Kazakhstan‟s 
President Nazarbaev questioned Moscow‟s support of separatist regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008.
418
 
Astana additionally expressed an interest in participating in the Baku-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, which bypasses Russia. The growing differences between Russia and the 
Stans, along with a gradual divergence of trade towards China, have contributed to 
the changed dynamics among these states in Central Asia.
419 
 
All Stans have been interested in obtaining consumer goods from China, while 
Beijing has negotiated agreements to import primary materials. Apart from energy, 
China has shown interest in accessing agricultural land; it secured a lease of 2000 
hectares of land in Tajikistan in January 2011. The arable land in this country is 
limited
420
 and this appropriation of the land for China‟s use caused discontent 
among the local population who feared a resettlement of Chinese nationals into 
                                                                                                                                       
Meppen, Vladimir Socor, S. Frederick Starr, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 
February 2006, [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0602Uzbek.pdf] 
415 “Uzbekistan: New US Ambassador, New Policy?” EurasiaNet.org, 12 November 2007, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111307a.shtml; “US-Uzbekistan Relations: Another 
Step Toward Rapprochement?” EurasiaNet.org, 22 January, 2008, 
[http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012308b.shtml].  
416  Isabel Gorst, “Kyrgyzstan to shut US military Base”, Financial Times, 19 February 2009, 
[http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2d949bc6-fe62-11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html#axzz2Dreq06OC] 
417 Jim Nichol, “Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications,” CRS Report 
for Congress, 1 July 2009, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40564.pdf].   
418 Bruce Pannier, “Former Soviet Sphere Shocked Into Silence By Conflict In Georgia”, RFE/RL,11 August 
2008, 
[http://www.rferl.org/content/Former_Soviet_Sphere_Shocked_Into_Silence_By_Ossetia_Conflict/1190128.ht
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419 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakh energy profits give foreign-policy heft”, EurasiaNet, 19 April 2007, 
[http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail//?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-
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July 2011, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38251&cHash=1c880ed7
361f0dc32c7d21caf3ce7055].  
 Page | 157  
 
Tajikistan to fill the void left by the departure of Tajik citizens for Russia.
421
 In 
exchange for opening up trade links and in the light of China‟s policy of recreating 
the „Silk Route‟ through the establishment of a free trade area, Beijing has 
subsidized major projects, as evidenced by its commitment of $900 million for 
regional cooperation and development.
422
 Russia has supported the majority of 
these projects, especially in setting up a network of telecommunications and 
transport corridors; however, it opposed the free trade area.
423
  
In contrast, China has not fully embraced the idea of coordinating energy policies 
through the Energy Club, a proposal by President Putin at the SCO Summit in June 
2006.
424  Chinese officials have preferred bilateral or „semi-official‟ agreements 
when it comes to energy.
425
 They secured contracts with Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to import oil via pipelines bypassing Russia.
426 
Beijing additionally 
showed an increased interest in security issues and called for more rapid responses 
towards security threats when it presided over the SCO in 2011-2012.
427
 China‟s 
strategic re-emergence has expanded its operational frontier throughout Central-
Eastern Asia, via network of pipelines which guarantee long-term energy supply as 
long as the transportation of the gas and oil is protected from destabilizing forces. 
This development challenges Russia and the U.S. long-term strategic interests. 
                                                 
421 Bruce Pannier, “Tajikistan Agrees To Allow Chinese Farmers To Till Land”, RFE/RL, 28 January 2011, 
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Russia, having lost its strategic advantage over energy transportation in 2010, 
wants to avoid being pulled southwards, where the U.S. “New Silk Road” strategy 
lies, and supports the expansion of the SCO‟s operability beyond Eurasia towards 
the Pacific. The division of labor between Russia and China has been undergoing a 
readjustment, where the two larger member states generate initiatives in economic 
and security areas. The SCO‟s mechanisms have provided a flexible framework for 
their evolving Central Asian policies, minimizing the necessity to compete in these 
spheres, especially since China has become Russia‟s primary trading partner.428 
The analysis of the internal dynamics, however, should not be reduced to 
discussions about Russia-China relations and their involvement in the SCO. The 
Organization plays an important role in the foreign, economic and security policy 
considerations of all Central Asian member states, especially with the scheduled 
2014 withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The Stans are in a unique 
position of promoting their interests through multi-vectoral foreign policies, by 
balancing the influence of Russia, the growing power of China and engaging in 
discussions with the EU, the U.S., NATO and the OSCE. The Stans hope to agree 
on “regional approaches to cooperation and security on an equal basis with the 
larger regional powers”.429 They have successfully balanced both great powers and 
benefited from their support in spheres that would not be backed by the EU or the 
U.S., due to democratic governance and human rights concerns.
430
 This overview 
of the SCO membership has shown that the Organization brings benefits to all 
                                                 
428 “China becomes Russia's top trade partner in first two months of 2012”, English.news.cn, 7 April 2012, 
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/07/c_131511784.htm].  
429 Ruslan Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective”, SIPRI Project 
Paper, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, August 2006, p.4. 
430 Detailed discussion about member states‟ perspectives can be found in Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 54-74. 
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states. How it helps the member states to constrain U.S. influence in the region is 
addressed in the later context of soft balancing cases. 
Graduated Enlargement 
In support of creating an environment of shared norms and common stances on 
major international relations issues among the SCO member states, the SCO has 
managed to form ties with different organizations and states beyond Central Asia. 
This creates a network of dialogue, which enables the SCO to spread its principles 
among likeminded countries and strengthen the impact of the soft balancing 
strategy towards the U.S.  
It has already been noted in this chapter which regional organizations signed 
MOUs with the SCO and whether their collaboration is declaratory or supported by 
practical projects. The SCO maintains that the membership is “open to other states 
in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and principles of the 
Charter”.431 In the 2002 Charter, however, the SCO did not specify either criteria 
for admitting new member states or regulations on the status of observers and 
dialogue partners. The SCO dealt with the observer status first and created a set of 
guidelines for states and intergovernmental international organizations that wished 
to receive observer status to the SCO.
432
 The first observer to join the SCO was 
Mongolia (2004), followed by India, Iran and Pakistan (2005) and Afghanistan 
(2012).  
Mongolia is the prime example where three major powers, the U.S., Russia and 
China, compete for influence. Blessed with resources, it is nonetheless cursed in 
                                                 
431 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Article 13”, 7 June 2002, 
[http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69]. 
432 The Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, The SCO Official website, 
24 April 2004,[http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=65].  
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terms of location. In the short and medium term, the country will be dependent on 
Russia and China. It relies on Russia for energy (around 90% of supply of 
petroleum and fuel
433
) and transport via railways. An example of this dependency 
on Russia is the fact that Mongolia cannot directly facilitate the transportation of 
resources for investors. For instance, Australia‟s Aspire Mining signed a non-
binding memorandum of understanding with JSC Russian Railways to extend the 
Trans-Mongolian Railway in northern Mongolia to facilitate deliveries of coal from 
the Ovoot mine.
434
 Additionally, Mongolia relies on China for exports of 
vegetables, rice and garments and the use of a port in Tianjin.
435
 Mongolians are 
afraid that their trade flows with China could be disrupted if Beijing decided to 
close the borders, as was the case in the past when the Dalai Lama was visiting 
Mongolia in 2002. Mongolia is still dependent on China for bilateral trade flows 
(which accounted for 86.1% of Mongolia‟s exports and 43.7% of imports as of 
2011), and has been concerned about Chinese investment flows into mining and 
energy sectors, especially coal.
436
   
It can be argued, however, that Mongolia has been trying to offset its dependence 
on China by regaining control over contracts concerning its natural resources. The 
Mongolian Parliament passed a law forbidding foreign state-owned companies 
from acquiring strategic industries, unless Ulaanbaatar approved the agreement. 
This law was supposed to reassure nationalists who were opposing the Ivanhoe 
Mines's plan to sell their shares to a Chinese state-owned aluminium 
                                                 
433John C.K.Daly, “Russia Dominates Mongolia in the New “Great Game”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol.5, issue 
99, 23 May 2008,  [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33662].  
434 “Aspire Signs MOU With Russian Railways Mongolian Subsidiary”, Aprire Mining Ltd, 21 June 2012, 
[http://www.aspiremininglimited.com/userfiles/file/332_20120621%20aspire%20signs%20mou%20with%20ru
ssian%20railways%20mongolian%20subsidiary.pdf].  
435 “Steady growth in China-Mongolia trade, economic co-op”, People‟s Daily Online, 19 June 2008, 
[http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6433356.html].  
436 Ashley Lee, “Mongolia's new foreign investment law explained”, International Financial Law Review, vol. 
31, issue 5, June 2012, p.15; DFAT “Mongolia Fact Sheet”, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, December 2012, [http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/mngl.pdf]. 
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manufacturer.
437
 Mongolia has sought to manage rising resource nationalism by 
diversifying its international partners as well as the creation of a Human 
Development Fund.
438
Despite efforts to reduce dependency over one outside 
influence, Mongolia needs to balance all major players. While Peabody Energy 
from St. Louis has been one of the companies with access to Tavan Tolgoi‟s 
untapped coal deposits, Ulaanbaatar also decided to include China's Shenhua and a 
Russian-Mongolian consortium. At the same time, state-owned Erdenes Tavan 
Tolgoi (ETT) is involved to develop Mongolia's coal mining interests.
439
 
Both Iran and Pakistan applied for full membership in the SCO. They, however, 
had to face a membership moratorium on the admission of new states imposed by 
the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers in May 2006. The SCO‟s position was that it 
lacked a proper admission mechanism to be able to process these applications. This 
situation has been resolved and the SCO has since drafted the obligations of a 
candidate country applying for SCO Membership, approved by the Heads of States 
on 11 June 2010.
440
    
 
 
                                                 
437  Dan Levin, “In Mongolia, a New, Penned-In Wealth”, The New York Times, 26 June 2012, 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/asia/mongolias-coal-deposits-draw-neighbors-
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438 Hugh Stephens & Charles Krusekopf “Dragon on the steppes: How Mongolia got it wrong on China”, 
iPolitics, 6 December 2012 [http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/12/06/dragon-on-the-steppes-how-mongolia-got-it-
wrong-on-china/]; “Giant copper mine offers Mongolia a cash bonanza”, South China Morning Post, 14 
December 2012 [http://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1075030/giant-copper-mine-offers-
mongolia-cash-bonanza]. 
439 “Mongolia picks Tavan Tolgoi coal miners”, The Australian, 5 July 2011, 
[http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/mongolia-picks-tavan-tolgoi-coal-miners/story-
e6frg9df-1226087780481].  
440 “The Regulation on the admission new of new member states to the SCO approved”, [Утверждено 
Положение о порядке приема новых членов в ШОС], Interfax.ru, 11 June 2010, 
[http://www.interfax.ru/politics/news.asp?id=140859]. 
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Based on these guidelines the applicant country: 
I. Must be located in the Eurasian region; 
II. Have diplomatic relations with all SCO member states; 
III. Maintain active trade and economic ties with them; 
IV. Have the status of observer or dialogue partner; 
V. Not be under UN sanctions; 
VI. Not be involved in an armed conflict with another state (s); 
VII. International obligations (in security field) must not be in conflict with 
international treaties or documents adopted by the SCO.
441
  
 
Iran‟s application has been put on hold until UN sanctions over its nuclear program 
are lifted.
442
 Pakistan, who has been the most eager to join the SCO, has also been 
rejected. 
443
 Its application has been dependant on India‟s stance on becoming a 
member state. Until recently the SCO was a low priority for India, although it 
expressed its „interest‟ in becoming a full member. The latest reports at the time of 
writing (2012) have suggested that both India and Pakistan were soon expected to 
upgrade their status (currently as observers) within the SCO framework. The best 
case scenario would be to include Afghanistan, Pakistan and India simultaneously, 
because it is rather challenging to fight the „three evils‟ along the Pakistani-Afghan 
border, if only Pakistan becomes a member state.
444
 India would also need to find 
                                                 
441 Alexander Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?”, Russia in Global Affairs, 
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442 “Russia Rejects SCO Membership For Iran Until UN Sanctions Lifted”, RFE/RL, 6 June 2012,  
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ways to collaborate with Pakistan in this forum and to resolve its border dispute 
with China.
445
 
The SCO is an attractive forum for countries to join because it promotes 
cooperation based on flexible principles with no „strings attached‟. Similar to 
ASEAN, the SCO evolves at a pace that suits all and decision-making is based on 
consensus. The collaboration among the member states, observers and dialogue 
partners takes place in an institutional framework, which is still evolving. 
However, there are two permanent bodies. One, the Secretariat, located in Beijing, 
provides the administrative functions for the SCO. The other is the Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure (RATS) which facilitates security cooperation (centred 
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
445 SCO further accepted Belarus and Sri Lanka (2010) and Turkey (2012) as „dialogue partners‟. Belarus shifts 
the SCO‟s sphere of influence closer to the EU borders and Turkey provides a bridge between Europe and Asia. 
Expression of interest in establishing contacts came from Egypt, Nepal, Serbia, Qatar, Azerbaijan (Alexander 
Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?” Russia in Global Affairs, 22 June 2011) 
and Vietnam (Kirill Barsky, interview with the writer, Hanoi, 23 November 2011). Japan is also trying to find a 
way of how to collaborate with the SCO; it is suggested that Japan has “colorless” presence in Central Asia, 
with “all-around good ties” with the observer member states and could be viewed as a “getaway to Asia” vis-à-
vis the West. See Akihiro Iwashita, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Japan: Moving Together to 
Reshape the Eurasian Community”, The Brooking Institute, January 2008. 
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Institutional Framework 
The SCO is structurally designed as an intergovernmental framework led by annual 
summits, and by regular meetings of the Heads of States and ministers.  
Figure 8: Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
 
                  
The Council of Heads of State is the primary decision-making body, which 
provides the overall direction of the SCO and deals with all main issues and 
external relations.
446
 Article 4 of the Charter of the SCO stipulates that all other 
SCO bodies, except for the permanent SCO Regional Anti-terrorism structure, need 
to obtain approval from the Council of Heads of States with regards to their 
functions. Although the Council of the Heads of States sets out the priorities of this 
                                                 
446 Charter of the SCO, “Article 5”, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69]. 
Source: Official Website of the Russian Federation Presidency of the SCO, 
[http://en.sco2009.ru/docs/sco/scheme.html] 
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organization, the pressing issues and formulations of agreements take place in 
advance within the Council of the Heads of Governments (prime ministers), which 
is responsible for economic issues, especially the SCO budget;
447
 and in the 
Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, responsible for day-to-day activities 
and debates about international issues and external contacts.
448
  
Each government selects a national coordinator who participates in the Council of 
National Coordinators and contributes to the organizing of all sessions of 
previously described SCO authorities. These coordinators represent their respective 
governments. The chairman of this Council comes from the country that hosts the 
Summit in that particular year.
449  
His operational mandate is to represent the 
Organization in all external affairs during his chairmanship.
450 
The former Russian 
National Coordinator, Ambassador Leonid Moiseev, provided several interviews 
during and after his chairmanship. Most notably he addressed the issue of the 
media portraying the SCO as an „Anti-NATO‟ organization, and he highlighted 
two main challenges for the Organization: the Global financial crisis and 
Afghanistan.
451 
 
In a recent interview, his successor, Ambassador-at-large Kirill Barsky, 
complained that biased views of the SCO still prevailed. He acknowledged that it 
was also the SCO‟s role to provide reliable information about its activities and 
contribute to a more objective portrayal of what the SCO was and what it did.
452
 In 
                                                 
447 Charter of the SCO, “Article 6”, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69]. 
448 Charter of the SCO, “Article 7”, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69]. 
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the agreement into action”,[Задача петербургской встречи глав правительств стран ШОС - перевести 
договоренности на язык практических действий], InfoSCO, 2 November 2011, 
[http://infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=9019]; Interview with the writer, Hanoi, Vietnam, 23 November 2011.,  
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a 2012 article for International Affairs, Barsky argues that despite pursuing active 
multi-vectoral foreign policies, the Central Asian nations view the SCO as “ „an 
umbrella‟ over them, beneath which each of the participants felt more comfortable 
and received the opportunity by collective efforts to defend their own and promote 
region-wide interests”. 453  His assessment addresses the issue of destabilizing 
factors to regional stability. He draws his examples from countries in North Africa 
and the Middle East and explains that the SCO member states need to work 
together if they wish to protect themselves from so-called “Twitter revolutions” 
and be ready to prevent and respond to all kinds of internal and regional crises.
454
 
One initiative that came out of the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009 was an 
amendment of the SCO Regulations on Politico-Diplomatic Measures and 
Mechanisms to Respond to Situations Endangering Peace, Security and Stability in 
the Region. The SCO member states became committed to the use of various non-
military measures for crisis prevention and response. One area of successful 
coordination has been the domain of cyberspace. An Agreement on Cooperation in 
the Field of International Information Security was passed in 2009, with the aim of 
countering criminal, military-political and terrorist threats via cyberspace. Work 
was undertaken to construct effective mechanisms of interaction among the six full 
member states. 
455
  
The SCO did not refrain from raising the issue of the „digital gap‟ between states: 
the more developed parties „monopolize‟ the production of software/hardware, 
creating dependence on these products from the less developed states whose 
chances of participating in international information technology collaborations 
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dwindle, as underlined by the above-noted SCO Agreement in the field of 
International Information Security in 2009. The SCO member states believed that 
the prevailing conventions lacked adequate codes of conduct in communications 
between different countries, omitting a broad spectrum of cyber-security abuses 
which could escalate into cyber-conflict. Russia‟s SCO National Coordinator, 
Ambassador Barsky, described the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
(2001), which came into force on 1 July 2004, as less than satisfactory.
456
  
Consequently, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, submitted a draft of the 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security before the 66th United 
Nations General Assembly Meeting on 12 September 2011. This initiative should 
be viewed in the context of reports singling out Russia and China as among the 
worst „culprits‟ of cyber-attacks, as “aggressive and capable collectors of US 
economic information and technologies”.457  
While all parties agree on areas of common concern, such as cyber-crime, they 
greatly diverge over controlling Internet content. The SCO advocates (1) 
restraining dissemination of information which provokes the „three evils‟ (terrorism, 
extremism, separatism) and (2) preventing other nations from using their core 
technologies to destabilise economic, social and political stability and security. The 
external parties, who prefer the use of term „cyber security‟, rather than 
„information security‟, argue that rigid or in correct government regulations can 
cause more harm to cyberspace security, claiming that private sector engagement is 
inevitable in the formulation of a constructive international norm.  
                                                 
456 Kirill Barsky, interviewed by author, Hanoi, Vietnam, 23 November 2011. 
457 Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, Report to Congress on Foreign Economic 
Collection and Industrial Espionage 2009-2011, October 2011, 
[http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf].   
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It needs to be remembered, though, that the SCO is more than a mere collection of 
governments; that is, it is more than the sum of its parts, and policy (even if it is 
perceived by external observers as „rigid‟) does emerge from a cooperative process. 
The national coordinators are closely connected to the primary permanent 
administrative body of the SCO, the Secretariat, based in Beijing. Since 2004, it 
has had the duty to deposit documents approved by the SCO bodies. Article 11 of 
the SCO Charter highlights the beginnings of a supranational role for the 
Secretariat,   though the organization as a whole remains largely reliant on inter-
governmental processes. Neither the Executive Secretary, elected for a non-
renewable three year period, nor the three Deputies of the Executive Secretary, 
should receive instructions from their national governments, organizations or other 
people.
458
 
The Secretariat is the main point of contact for all observers, dialogue partners and 
external parties. It organizes briefings for internet and print media. The member 
states are obliged to supply all relevant open materials and reference books that the 
Secretariat might need to fulfill the needs of the SCO authorities. The Secretariat is 
funded from the contributions from member states. China and Russia pay 24 per 
cent of the budget, followed by Kazakhstan with 21 per cent, Uzbekistan with 15 
per cent, Kyrgyzstan with 10 per cent and Tajikistan with 6 per cent. Beijing and 
Moscow each have seven positions in the Secretariat out of the 30 available 
roles.
459
 Despite having a „supranational status‟ within the SCO structure in theory, 
the Secretariat is still substantially dependent on individual governments when it 
comes to staffing, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, when considering its 
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budget. It is inevitable for the Secretariat to take on more responsibilities, 
especially in relation to hiring and terminating staff. Otherwise, it will continue 
facing premature recalls of staff by their ministries of foreign affairs or working 
with employees who are close to their retirement age and can be spared by their 
governments.
460
 Constructive reforms would strengthen the coordination of SCO 
activities and further consolidate its ties with the outside world. Then again, the 
heavy involvement of all heads of states in the SCO decision-making allows for 
decisions to be put to practice faster and have a greater impact when the SCO opts 
for the soft balancing strategy. 
Soft Balancing Behaviors and Mechanisms 
This thesis argues that SCO member states conduct soft balancing as they build, 
expand and adjust the scope of this regional organization. They employ non-
military tools (territorial denial and norms) to constrain the power of the U.S. 
(Figure 9), whose prolonged military operations in the region have been perceived 
as threatening. This view rests on two premises. The first is that the U.S. and its 
allies, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, based their troops in Central Asia in 
order to conduct operations against the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and wage a war 
in Afghanistan and subsequently in Iraq. The U.S. additionally provided foreign 
assistance to the Stans as a token of appreciation for allowing these troops to use 
Central Asian states‟ territories and their airspace. The second premise, underlined 
by a broader agenda, concerns U.S. efforts to establish pro-Western democratic 
governance in the Stans. 
 
                                                 
460 Alexander Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?” Russia in Global Affairs, 
22 June 2011. 
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Figure 9: SCO's soft-balancing strategy towards the U.S. 
 
Both premises should be viewed in the context of discontent by Russia and China 
with the foreign military presence in their neighborhood and their opposition to 
external pressures to impose a Western model of democracy without taking into 
consideration local cultures and politico-historical traditions. Leaders in Moscow 
and Beijing believe that the Color Revolutions of 2005-2007 were a “series of 
contagious and illegitimate political changes in Eurasia”, which led to a “collective 
sense of threat” among SCO member states.461 As a result, governments in the 
Stans, Russia and China increased their control over the media, advocacy networks 
and political activism to maintain the order and stability of their regimes.
462
 
The following section tests the soft balancing argument through analysis of the 
SCO‟s response to hosting the U.S. military in Uzbekistan and the SCO‟s 
resistance to democratization efforts from the West by promoting the “Shanghai 
                                                 
461 Titus C. Chen, “China‟s Reaction to the Color Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing”, 
Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010, p.5; Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak M. Brudny, “Russia and the colour 
revolutions”, Democratization, vol.19, no.1, 2012, pp.15-36.   
462Jennifer Murtazashvili,“Coloured by revolution: the political economy of autocratic stability in Uzbekistan”, 
Democratization, vol. 19, no.1, 2012, pp. 78-97. 
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Spirit”. Drawing on Adler and Barnett‟s study of security communities,463 three 
indicators are used to evaluate the behavior and discourse of SCO members: shared 
meeting of structures and values, mutual identification among community members, 
and compliance with norms and practices accepted by the group. 
It is first necessary to assess whether the SCO is acting as an emerging community, 
based on these indicators. The first indicator, related to the 2002 SCO Charter, 
emphasizes the shared adherence to principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity of 
states and non-interference in internal affairs among SCO members.
464
  The second 
indicator stresses the sense of mutual identity, when member states would identify 
security with SCO partners rather than external powers, in this case the U.S. The 
third indicator refers to internalized norms and behavior that members of the SCO 
expect, based on the Shanghai Spirit. The SCO members promote the Shanghai 
Spirit as a distinctive and new international relations norm, which calls for “mutual 
trust and benefit, equality, respect for cultural diversity, and desire for common 
development”.465 In the procedural sense, decision making within the SCO is based 
on consultation and consensus, when a member state should take into consideration 
the views of SCO partners and is committed to solutions that bear in mind regional 
development guided by SCO principles.
466
  
 
                                                 
463 Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael, “A framework for the study of security communities” in Security 
Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
464 SCO Charter, Article 2 “Principles”, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69]. 
465 “Hu Jintao gives interview to SCO reporters”, Chinese Government‟s Official Web Portal, 30 May 2006, 
[http://english.gov.cn/2006-05/30/content_295924.htm]; See also: Cheng Guoping, PRC Vice Foreign 
Minister, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Cause Worth Ceaseless Efforts”, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the PRC, 29 May 2012, 
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465 Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on 
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466 The third indicator is further assessed in the next chapter, when Russia‟s involvement in the 2008 Russia-
Georgia War in the South Caucasus is discussed. 
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Is the SCO a ‘Community’? 
The SCO can be viewed as a „diplomatic community‟ acting on the basis of a 
shared regional identity in order to conform to a soft balancing strategy. The SCO 
grew from a similar situation to ASEAN during its establishment in relation to 
balancing internal and external security threats. The SCO does not hold a direct 
mandate to promote the regime security of its member states; however, through its 
principles, it provides an environment where member states discuss countering 
threats that cause violations of territorial sovereignty, interfere with domestic 
affairs and advocate secession. A major challenge to the SCO‟s approaches and 
principles came in 2005, when Kyrgyzstan experienced the so-called „Tulip 
Revolution‟ and the public not only demanded more democratic reforms (such as 
during demonstrations in Georgia, the Rose Revolution in 2003 or Ukraine, the 
Orange Revolution in 2004) but also resorted to violence, and therefore, challenged 
the notion of the invincibility of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes.
467
 These gains, 
however, were temporary. In 2007, data showed that the Kyrgyz democratic 
opening was starting to wear away, based upon power sharing by political elites 
across political boundaries and collusive business interests.
468  
The following cases highlight examples of when the SCO was a relevant platform 
for member states and acted as a cohesive group, managing the U.S. military 
presence in the region and resisting Western forms of democracy. 
 
                                                 
467 Marc Lanteigne, “In Medias Res: The Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Security 
Community”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4, Winter, 2006/2007, pp. 605-622. 
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Soft Balancing: Case of Territorial Denial 
The first case discusses the soft balancing case of „territorial denial‟, when 
Uzbekistan requested that the U.S. vacate the airbase at Karshi-Khanabad (K2), a 
decision which constrained the U.S. operability in the region. This move was 
supported by the SCO‟s Declaration in Astana in June 2005. Uzbekistan, driven by 
a desire to distance itself from Russia, welcomed the opportunity to strengthen its 
ties with the U.S. in the mid-1990s. President Karimov agreed to send Uzbek 
officers to the U.S. for training and possible joint military exercises during his 
meeting with the U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, the Uzbek Defense 
Minister Rustam Akhemedov and Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdul Aziz Komilov in 
Tashkent in April 1995.
469
 Military relations with the U.S. were enshrined in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Perry and Akhemedov on 13 
October 1995.
470
 The MOU additionally invited Uzbekistan to participate in 
NATO‟s Partnership for Peace Program. 
Ties between Washington and Tashkent further consolidated in the aftermath of the 
9/11 terrorist attack. The Karimov government, in need of a greater cooperation 
against the threat from Islamic militancy in the region, immediately facilitated the 
opening up of Uzbek airspace for the U.S. and allies engaged in the attack on the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. In a televized meeting with Uzbek security officials, 
Karimov praised the U.S. decisiveness to eradicate terrorism and proclaimed that 
Uzbekistan would “make its own contribution to the liquidation of camps and bases 
                                                 
469 President Karimov voiced his criticism of Russia and Uzbekistan‟s calls for more independence during 
Perry‟s visit. See: “Uzbek Leader Says “Imperial Ambitions” Rising in Russia”, Associate Press, 6 April 1995, 
[http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1995/Uzbek-Leader-Says-Imperial-Ambitions-Rising-in-Russia/id-
41b56ce49c7b8dce29ab6a486d027685]. 
470 “United States and Uzbekistan defense chiefs sign Memorandum of Understanding”, U.S. Department of 
Defense, 13 October 1995, [http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=648].  
 Page | 174  
 
of terrorists in Afghanistan and [Tashkent] was ready to make its airspace available 
for this purpose”.471  
This collaboration should be viewed in the context of the overall U.S. strategy in 
Central Asia, itself largely galvanized by the need to intervene in Afghanistan. In 
the wake of September 11‟, security became the primary driver in U.S.-Central 
Asia relations. The U.S. administration outlined its priorities in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy which specifically highlighted the need for India and Pakistan to 
resolve their disputes and the requirement to expand U.S. bases “beyond Western 
Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-
distance deployment of U.S. forces”.472 However, Central Asia was mentioned in 
this document only in relation to enhancing energy security. 
Deeper political and military links were built with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
which provided the U.S. with basing rights at two locations in Central Asia, Manas 
in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in Uzbekistan, in order to support the Operation Enduring 
Freedom. The use of the air base at K2 was under favorable conditions for the U.S. 
through the U.S.-Uzbek status of forces agreement (SOFA). The U.S. was allowed 
to use the airspace for up to 1500 U.S. troops in exchange for security guarantees 
for Uzbekistan, as well as the prospect of ongoing developmental and military 
aid.
473
 Additional support came from Tajikistan, which allowed the use of its 
international airport in Dushanbe for refuelling, while Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan permitted U.S. forces to fly through their airspace.
474
 Some argued 
                                                 
471 Sebastian Alison, “Uzbekistan opens airspace to U.S. warplanes”, Afghanistan News Center, 2 October 
2001, [http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/october/oct1q2001.html].  
472 The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, U.S. Department of State, September 
2002, [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf].  
473 Jim Nichol, Uzbekistan‟s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications, CRS 
Report for Congress, 7 October 2005, [http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/4245.pdf] 
474 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, CRS Report for 
Congress, 19 September 2012, p.33, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf]. 
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that setting up these bases was not a matter of logistics, but rather to prevent the 
„Afghanization‟ of Central Asia and curb the influence of the terrorist networks, 
which could spread to neighboring regions and eventually threaten the U.S.
475
  
Risks for Uzbekistan  
Uzbekistan‟s cooperation with the U.S. had its drawbacks. The presence of the U.S. 
military on Uzbek territory antagonized radical Islamic groups, especially the IMU 
(the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). The lack of predictable results in the war in 
Afghanistan meant that Uzbekistan had to balance ties with Russia to avoid a risk 
of being isolated in the region if the Operation Enduring Freedom failed.
476
 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 9/11, both Russia and Uzbekistan benefited from 
the U.S. presence and financial assistance in the region. Russia, unable to afford the 
funding of wider counter-terrorist operations, focused on domestic terrorism in 
Chechnya. Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to collaborate in the energy sector and 
Russia became Uzbekistan‟s major buyer of natural gas. On the other hand, 
Tashkent systematically limited engagement in Russian-led regional forums, for 
fear of falling under Moscow‟s influence. For example, even though originally a 
member of the CSTO, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in 1999, returned to 
cooperation again from 2006, but again sought to withdraw from membership 
through June-December 2012. This pattern was based on fears of Russian and 
                                                 
475 Fiona Hill, “The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Iran, The Brookings Institution, 15 August 2002, 
[http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2002/0815russia_hill.aspx]. Discussion about various scenarios of the 
regional development can be found in “1st GCSP-OSCE Academy Seminar: “Central Asia 2008”, reported by 
Selbi Hanova, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2008, [http://www.gcsp.ch/Leadership-in-Conflict-
Management/International-Security/Publications/GCSP-Publications/Geneva-Papers/Conference-
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476 Minton F. Goldman, Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, and The War on Terror, Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009, p.125. 
 Page | 176  
 
Kazakhstan‟s perceived domination of the organization, and the claim that the 
CSTO did not take into account Uzbekistan‟s views.477 
The final major limitation to U.S.-Uzbek relations was the U.S. pressure on 
Karimov‟s government to limit his control over political life and improve human 
and civil rights practices in Uzbekistan. U.S. Department of State stated in its 
annual Human Rights report in 2004-2005 that:  
Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights… President 
Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch that serves him 
dominate political life and exercise nearly complete control over the other 
branches…The Government's human rights remained very poor, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses…The Government 
employed official and unofficial means to restrict severely freedom of 
speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression stifled public 
criticism of the Government.
478
  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) described this situation as a major test of U.S. human 
rights policy in the post-9/11 period. The report highlighted positive aspects of the 
U.S. policy towards Uzbekistan, especially making the U.S. aid conditional on 
Tashkent‟s improvement of rights in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, HRW viewed 
such „progress‟ unfavorably when the State Government released a new assistance 
package of $16 million for military and security enhancement.
479
 
The tipping point for the Uzbek government was Washington‟s request for an 
investigation of the 2005 violence in Andijan during which hundreds of civilians 
                                                 
477 RFE/RL “Uzbekistan suspends membership in CSTO”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 June 2012 
[http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-csto-suspends-membership/24629244.html]; John Chipman et al. 
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died or were wounded.
480
 The government brutally suppressed popular 
antigovernment demonstration in the southeastern part of Uzbekistan, Ferghana 
Valley, which is a “knot of difficult problems: disputed border territories, 
interethnic tensions, the activities of Islamic radicals”. 481 This uprising was a 
response to adverse economic policies and anger over jailing those who practiced 
their religion at mosques which were not registered by the state. A trial with 23 
local businessmen who were arrested for „religious extremism‟ triggered the 
protests.
482
 The protesters broke into Andijan prison and rescued as many as 500 
prisoners, rampaged and demanded democratic freedoms and employment 
opportunities. 
483
President Karimov refused to comply with the request from 
abroad to conduct a thorough investigation. The European Union imposed a visa 
ban on 12 Uzbek officials who were “directly responsible for the indiscriminate 
and disproportionate use of force and for the obstruction of an independent 
inquiry”.484 Additionally, the EU embargoed military equipment and arms. The U.S. 
condemned the raid on the prison; however they mainly criticized the Karimov 
government for repression, though thereafter military and developmental aid was 
reduced.
485
  
                                                 
480 Sources report that „hundreds‟ of people died during this incident. International Crisis Group reported „750 
people‟ in “Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising”, Asia Briefing no.38, Brussels, 25 May 2005, 
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November 2005. 
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Russia and China did not request an investigation and did not criticize the Uzbek 
government. Russia‟s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that “militants from 
fundamentalist organisations and Talibs, among others, have long been planning an 
invasion of Uzbekistan‟s territory”. 486  The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed 
their „delight‟ that the situation in Andijan was under control. 487  The Kyrgyz 
Acting President Bakiev summed up the situation in Ferghana Valley as bearing 
“the hallmarks of extremism”.488 
Condemnation and constant pressure from the U.S. to investigate the situation 
resulted in Uzbekistan‟s restrictions on U.S. use of the K2 base. Bans on night-time 
operations and limits on the number of flights and of heavy cargo aircraft were 
imposed, which disadvantaged the troops considering they needed aircraft for 
search and rescue operations available at all times. As a result, they were forced to 
relocate to Bagram airbase in Afghanistan where refuelling was comparatively 
difficult.
489
 
The SCO came out in support of Uzbekistan‟s action to expel Western forces from 
K2. The member states released a declaration in Astana on 6 July 2005: 
Today we are noticing the positive dynamics of stabilizing the internal 
political situation in Afghanistan. A number of the SCO member states 
provided their ground infrastructure for temporary stationing of military 
contingents of some states, members of the coalition, as well as their 
territory and air space for military transit in the interest of anti-terrorist 
cooperation. Considering the completion of the active military stage of 
anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization consider it necessary that respective members 
of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of 
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the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military 
contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.
490
 
On 29 July 2005, Tashkent officially demanded the termination of the U.S. 
military presence at K2 within 180 days. Uzbekistan honored the U.S.-
Uzbek status of forces agreement, which indicated “180 days” as a suitable 
period for vacating the airbase. In the aftermath of this eviction, the U.S. 
became increasingly dependent on Kyrgyzstan, which in the words of 
Martha Brill Olcott was “weak and at best incompetent” in terms of 
providing a stable partnership.
491
   
This termination of the U.S.-Uzbek agreement was welcomed among the 
SCO member states. During this process both Russia and China offered 
collaboration in various spheres to Tashkent. The Chinese approached the 
situation through strengthening economic cooperation with Uzbekistan. 
During a state visit in Beijing, President Karimov signed a treaty of 
“partnership, friendship and cooperation” and over 20 economic contracts 
(worth $1.5 billion). Russia, on the other hand, extended its support in the 
military sphere and announced joint exercises on Uzbek territory.
492
  This 
collective psychological support for the Karimov regime was a sign of 
appreciation from these countries; Uzbekistan restricted U.S. operability 
and signalled the ending of the U.S. presence on Uzbek territory. The SCO 
here was used as a soft balancing mechanism providing protection from 
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Western criticisms, allowing a less powerful Central Asian state to stand up 
to the U.S. 
Normative Soft Balancing: Sovereign Democracy and the Shanghai Spirit 
The SCO not only contributes to equality and solidarity among the SCO member 
states, it also provides a security umbrella for member states‟ regimes. Infusion of 
democratic principles undermines the regime status quo and therefore poses a 
threat to the existing leadership. This can gradually disrupt policy coordination 
with likeminded countries. The research into this phenomenon reveals that there is 
an increased tendency among authoritarian regimes to collaborate in order to 
reduce chances for a regime change.
493
 This thesis argues that these governments 
develop a shared understanding about this common threat and use their cooperation 
within a regional organization to soft balance against states trying to influence 
political systems and impose democratic concepts in line with the Western 
world.
494
 The SCO is one such organization, which has opposed intervention from 
the U.S. by supporting regime preservation in its member states.  
The SCO was referred to in the media as a “club of authoritarian states”495 or an 
“anti-Western front”; 496  while the Russian leadership has argued that the 
Organization‟s purpose was to “become a modern organization of a new type in 
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line with the demands of [a] multi-polar world”. 497 The members argue that it is 
necessary to accept the diversity among nations and their political systems and 
maintain the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs.  These states act defensively by employing soft balancing towards 
external regime changers. These strategies are used on unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral levels. Although this thesis explores the behavior of states through 
regional organizations, examples are used to explain how soft balancing by using 
soft power tools of individual member states supports overall efforts of containing 
those supporting regime change. The primary objective of policy coordination is 
preserving the status quo.  
One of the ways of countering the Western normative agenda is the promotion of 
“sovereign democracy”, in which the interference from democratic movements and 
non-governmental organizations is not welcomed and is suppressed.
498
 This 
concept is highly supported in Russia, where it was first explained by Victor 
Surkov, the Kremlin aide, during the United Russia seminar in February 2006.
499
 
Surkov argued that the main threats to Russia‟s sovereignty are “international 
terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness, and „soft‟ takeovers 
by „orange technologies‟ [U.S. - and Western-supported opposition movements] in 
a time of decreased national immunity to foreign influence.”500 
This thinking is in line with the social-constructivist „socialization‟ view, which 
argues that norms and values are transmitted through social interactions and 
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persuasion, with target states then internalizing these new norms.
501
ASEAN is a 
primary example of a regional organization that has been promoting its own norms 
and elevated concepts of non-interference and sovereignty to strengthen regime 
survival over democratic norms. The doctrine of non-interference protects the 
member states from outside pressures, with limited uptake of human rights or 
democratic participation.
502
 The SCO adapted this format and has been promoting 
the Shanghai Spirit, which calls for respecting different cultures, traditions and 
political systems.  The SCO established its own „Observer Mission‟ to oversee the 
election processes in the SCO member states. During the presidential elections in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2009 both the OSCE and the SCO observers were invited to monitor 
the election. While the OSCE stated that results were manipulated and “failed to 
meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections”,503 the SCO concluded that 
the election was “honest” and “transparent”.504 Following the invitation to observe 
Russia‟s 4 March 2012 presidential election, OSCE reported inconsistencies and 
“the contest was clearly skewed in favor of one of the contestants”.505 In contrast, 
the SCO reported that “the election of the President of the Russian Federation at 
the polling stations observed by the Mission was free, transparent and fair, and 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the national election legislation 
of the Russian Federation and its international obligations, which makes it 
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democratic and legitimate.”506 These two reports were in an obvious contrast. The 
SCO has set up a monitoring mechanism which counterbalances the findings from 
OSCE and therefore, it challenges the legitimacy of OSCE perspectives. This forms 
part of a wider battle over norms within the OSCE through 2005-2012, with Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan often critical of human rights monitoring as a form of 
political intervention.
507
   
In the aftermath of the 2012 U.S. Presidential elections, Russia's Central Election 
Commission openly criticized the U.S. electoral system and outlined areas of 
malfunction in a report released just before voting stations opened in the U.S.
508
 
Previously Russia‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on its website a 90-page 
document Report on the situation with human rights in certain states United States 
of America in which it analyzed U.S. human rights violations at home and 
abroad.
509
 This example demonstrates that individual SCO member states as well 
as the SCO as a whole respond to Western democratization pressures by 
introducing their own norms and actively point out shortcomings of Western 
democracies during the SCO summits or through national ministries of foreign 
affairs. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter examined the context and soft balancing strategy of the 
SCO towards the U.S. in Central Asia. Russia, China and the Stans created a 
framework in which all parties aim for equality, despite differences in power. This 
represents an opportunity for the Stans to balance between interests of three major 
powers, China, Russia and the U.S. All SCO member states support political 
stability and believe that the so-called color revolutions destabilize the region. The 
collective diplomatic response in support of Uzbekistan‟s stance on investigation of 
the 2005 Andijan incident showed that the SCO is a mechanism used by the 
member states to soft balance the presence and influence of external players in 
Central Asia. The SCO seeks to create a politico-military sphere in which its 
member states are dominant, thereby allowing only provisional, short-term access 
for external powers such as the U.S. and NATO states. If a partial failure in relation 
to Kyrgyzstan, these mechanisms were a success in relation to Uzbekistan through 
2006-2011. However, the limits to SCO norms can be demonstrated when it comes 
to restraining the behavior of its stronger members in situations where „hard power‟ 
strategies seem viable. This can be seen in the challenge posed by the military 
conflict between Russia and Georgia through 2008, which is explored in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX: Limits to SCO Soft Balancing 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the SCO emerged as a regional organization 
with the aim of countering terrorism, extremism and separatism (the „three evils‟). 
It has also become a useful soft-balancing mechanism to counterbalance American 
military and normative presence in the region. The two most dominant SCO 
member states, Russia and China, have demonstrated a strong interest in resisting 
U.S. assertive policies, especially in terms of the continued use of airpower during 
interventions, expanding the U.S. presence via the National Missile Defense 
program and democratization efforts in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow have 
balanced against these threats through the SCO by supporting Uzbekistan‟s call for 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the base of Karshi-Khanabad and creating a 
collaborative environment based on the „Shanghai Spirit‟, where decisions are 
taken after consultation with all SCO member states. Additionally, Russia is 
pushing for wider acceptance of the idea of “sovereign democracy” in which 
external interference is not welcome.
510
 In this context, states develop at a pace and 
direction that suits their historical, social, economic, cultural and political makeup. 
Apart from these convergent interests, the SCO member states have their own 
priorities. China is primarily worried about securing its Western border and 
countering separatist activities in its Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Russia, 
on the other hand, is concerned with separatism and extremism in its Northern 
Caucasus region, in the south, and with protecting its nationals living in 
neighboring countries. The SCO promotes “non-use of force” in solving trans-
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border problems and opts for indirect soft balancing strategies to counter 
destabilizing and threatening forces.  
This chapter analyzes a major test of unity for the SCO as well as for the Sino-
Russian relationship, which was the 2008 Russia-Georgia War in the Caucasus, and 
SCO‟s response to this conflict. China and the SCO showed minimal support for 
Russia‟s military actions and did not endorse the recognition of the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during and after this crisis. Russia demonstrated 
that it was willing to intervene by using force and supported redrawing the borders 
in the Caucasus and weakening NATO‟s operability in the region, which created 
unease among the smaller neighbouring countries. As a result, China‟s presence in 
Central Asia has been viewed as more benign and its position within the SCO has 
been strengthened.  
This chapter also demonstrates SCO‟s lack of intention and capability to engage in 
hard balancing vis-à-vis a foreign presence in the region, showing a preference for 
the soft balancing strategy instead. The chapter starts by outlining the SCO‟s lack 
of essential elements of a traditional military alliance. It then elaborates on the 
background to the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 and the SCO‟s reaction to Russia‟s 
involvement in this conflict. The chapter ends with discussing the SCO‟s ability to 
maintain its organizational coherence despite the split between member states over 
Russia‟s military actions in Georgia and disagreement over the recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. In this case Russia‟s approach 
to the regional conflict revealed the limits to the SCO‟s soft-balancing strategy 
because Russia‟s national interests prevailed and the immaturity of the SCO to 
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conduct long-term soft balancing towards a dominant or threatening state was 
further highlighted. 
Is the SCO a Military Alliance? 
The SCO‟s reaction to the 2005 U.S. military withdrawal from Uzbekistan and the 
subsequent joint military exercises, named „Peace Mission‟ (2005 and 2007), gave 
an impetus to analysts to conclude that the SCO would become a military alliance 
or an „Asian Warsaw Pact‟. 511  The SCO‟s interest in military operations also 
convinced critics that the SCO‟s goal was to create an anti-American alliance and it 
has “already begun to work”.512  
The SCO vehemently and repeatedly rejected such assertions, saying that the 
Organization was not directed against a third party and the primary goal was to 
fight the „three evils‟. 513 SCO officials explained that the Organization was 
concerned mainly with non-traditional security threats such as organized crime, 
terrorism, separatism and narco-trafficking.
514
The member states find the 
management of internal security to be the most challenging; therefore, they invest 
the greatest effort into creating an interoperable security environment by 
harmonizing their norms and exchange information about best practices for 
                                                 
511 Peter Brookes, “Club for dictators: An ugly agenda for Asia”, The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2006, 
[http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2006/06/club-for-dictators-an-ugly-agenda-for-asia].  
512 Ariel Cohen and John J.Tkacik, Jr., “Sino-Russian military manoeuvres: a threat to U.S. interests in 
Eurasia”, Backgrounder no. 1883, The Heritage Foundation, 30 September 2005, 
[http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/09/sino-russian-military-maneuvers-a-threat-to-us-interests-in-
eurasia]. 
513 See for example: “Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism”, Shanghai, 15 
June 2001,  [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=68]; Tugsbilguun Tumurkhuleg, “Does the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization represent an example of a military alliance?” in Eurasia‟s Ascent in Energy and 
Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership, Robert Bedeski and Niklas Swanström, Hoboken: Routledge, 2012;  
514 Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: „Tackling the Three Evils‟. A Regional Response 
to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?” EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, vol.61, no.3, 
May 2009, pp.457-482. 
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intelligence sharing.
515
This is conducted within the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS) which is the second permanent organ in the SCO structure (along 
with the Secretariat), in Tashkent.
516
  
The decision to establish a center for counter-terrorism cooperation underpins the 
significance and commitment of the SCO member states to combat terrorist 
activities in the region. In the period since the SCO‟s establishment, which 
coincides with the period since 9/11, incidents of terrorist activity have increased in 
all member states. This has led to an era of regional expansion of terrorist 
organizations and the strengthening of their contacts with groups such as Al-
Qaeda.
517
 The RATS is viewed as “the most effective mechanism within the SCO, 
because there are fewer layers of bureaucracy between the RATS and the highest 
level in the member states.”518 
Coordination within the RATS has encountered some difficulties. One of the 
primary problems concerns the different definitions of terrorism held by member 
governments. China, in particular, does not have an official definition of „terrorist 
organization‟ and focuses on defining „terrorist acts‟.519  
                                                 
515 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia”, Central 
Asian Survey, vol.27, no.2, 2008, pp.185-202; Stephen Aris, “The Response of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation to the Crisis in Kyrgyzstan”, Civil Wars, vol.14, no.3, 2012, pp.451-476. 
516 The Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism stated the RATS headquarters would be 
in Bishkek (Article 10), however, in order to engage Uzbekistan in the SCO security cooperation the office was 
established in Tashkent.  
517 Most prominent cases are: Moscow metro bombing in February 2004, Beslan siege in September 2004 and 
incidents in Xinjiang, China throughout 2008-2011.  See: Zhao Xiaodong, The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Asia Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, 
Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden, August 2012. However, it is also true that this climate has allowed states to „crack-
down‟ more generally on Islamist and opposition groups, e.g. operations in Uzbekistan against Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
and the so-called Akromiya group, Sarah Kendzior, “Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in 
the Andijon Massacre”, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14 no. 4, Fall 2006, pp.545-562; Gulnoza Saidazimova “Central 
Asia: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Calls for Islamic State Find Support”, Eurasia Insight, 17 January 2006 [Access via 
www.eurasianet.org]. 
518  Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2011, p.25. 
519 The SCO promotes a broad definition of „terrorism‟, which means: “any act intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such 
act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security 
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PRC‟s Standing Committee of the National People‟s Congress passed the 
following decision in October 2011, allowing a wide ambit for the prosecution of 
terrorist acts, with such acts defined as: 
Activities that severely endanger society that have the goal of creating 
terror in society, endangering public security, or threatening state organs 
and international organizations and which, by the use of violence, 
sabotage, intimidation, and other methods, cause or are intended to cause 
human casualties, great loss to property, damage to public infrastructure, 
and chaos in the social order, as well as activities that incite, finance, or 
assist the implementation of the above activities through any other means. 
(Decision on Issues Related to Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work, art. 
2.)
520
 
 
The RATS also faces obstacles when trying to expand its mandate into counter-
narcotics operations. Some governments have one agency which deals with both 
drug trafficking and terrorism, while others such as Russia, have two agencies that 
coordinate these activities separately.
521
 However, Russia‟s Federal Drug Control 
Service has expressed support for establishing an anti-drug coordination unit within 
the SCO, which would work closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
522
 
Initially the RATS was not meant to hold an operational role. Its tasks expanded in 
2005 when the RATS was asked to coordinate investigations and create a list of 
wanted terrorists and organizations, train specialists and conduct anti-terrorist 
exercises and operations.
523
 Since this decision was made, the SCO has held 
several military exercises: Peace Mission-2005 in China, Peace Mission-2007 in 
Russia, Peace Mission-2009 in China, Peace Mission-2010 in Kazakhstan, Peace 
                                                                                                                                       
or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and 
prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties”. Shanghai Convention on Combating  
Terrorism, Separatism and  Extremism, Shanghai, 15 June  2001. 
520 Laney Zhang, “China: Legal Definition of Terrorist Activities Clarified”, Global Legal Monitor, Library of 
Congress, 4 November 2011 [http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402874_text]. 
521 Richard Weitz, “Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center”, EurasiaNet.org, 25 September 
2012, [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65960]. 
522 Kirill Barsky, “Central Asia Under the SCO‟s „Impermeable Umbrella‟”, International Affairs, no.4, 2012. 
523 Matthew Oresman, “The Shanghai Cooperation Summit: Where Do We Go From Here?” China-Eurasia 
Forum Quarterly, Special Edition: the SCO at One, July 2005, 
[http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/CEF_Quarterly_July_2005.pdf]. 
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Mission-2011 in Russia and Peace Mission-2012 in Tajikistan.
524
 The scope of 
these exercises and the level of their interoperability are far below those of U.S.-led 
alliances. The SCO members have continuously downplayed their significance as 
“anti-terror” exercises and a conduit for Russia and China cooperation.525  
There are several limitations preventing the SCO from becoming a military 
counterweight to NATO. A successful military alliance requires the commitment of 
all parties involved. Russia has been the primary driver of SCO military 
cooperation. It exercises a dominant role in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). By 
connecting the CSTO with the SCO, it has a better chance to coordinate an anti-
NATO opposition with the purpose of preventing NATO enlargement to the East 
and the U.S. installation of the National Missile Defense in Europe. However, both 
President Putin and his SCO adviser, the National Coordinator Barsky,
526
 stated 
that the SCO was not a military alliance, but “an organization which can play an 
important role in promoting development in Asia”.527 Likewise, though Kazakhstan 
                                                 
524 See for example: Marcel de Haas, “The „Peace Mission 2007‟ Exercises: The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation Advances”, Central Asian Series 07/28, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2007, 
[http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070900_cscp_paper_haas.pdf]; Roger N. McDermott, “The 
Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Occasional Paper, Washington, D.C.: The James Foundation, 
October 2007, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32]; Stephen Blank, 
“Peace-Mission 2009: A Military Scenario Beyond Central Asia”, China Brief, vol. IX, issue 17, Washington, 
D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 20 August 2009, pp.7-9, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35433&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&
cHash=201d76e87b]; Richard Weitz, “China‟s Growing Clout in the SCO: Peace Mission 2010”, China Brief, 
vol. X, issue 20, Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 8 October 2010, pp.7-11, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37018&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&
cHash=f3fdfd0568]; Zhang Hong, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization not Asia‟s NATO”, China Daily, 17 
June 2011, [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-06/17/content_12733305.htm]; Roger McDermott, 
“China Leads the SCO Peace Mission in Central Asia”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 9, issue, Washington, D.C.: 
The Jamestown Foundation,  26 June 2012, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39538] 
525 Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Mounting Challenges and Multilateralism”, Comparative Connections, 
vol.13, no.1, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2011, 
[https://csis.org/files/publication/1101qchina_russia.pdf] 
526 Kirill Barsky, “Central Asia Under the SCO‟s „Impermeable Umbrella‟”, International Affairs, no.4, 2012. 
527 Vladimir Putin, quoted in Troitsky, “A Russian Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper, no.17, Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, May 2007, p.47. 
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has been an active player in SCO and CSTO exercises, Uzbekistan has not, while 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have only small military forces.
528
 
Despite China‟s increased engagement in security cooperation in Central Asia, 
Beijing continues to promote non-interference in domestic affairs and objects to 
participating in any formal military alliances.
529
 A military alliance would require 
more involvement in defense collaboration with the weaker Stans, and potential 
long-term entanglement in local conflicts. China is focused on maintaining regional 
stability, but chooses other means to this end.
530
 The further militarization of 
Central Asia could easily destabilize the region, which could threaten the 
realization of economic goals and also distract China from maintaining control over 
Taiwan‟s activities in case Taipei decides to challenge the status quo of „One China‟ 
and declare formal independence.
531
 However, China perceives SCO „peace-
mission‟ operations as a means of supporting political stability in Central Asia, 
thereby ensuring future economic and resource access. In general, these exercises 
have offered the PLA (the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army) the opportunity to 
project power abroad, with some exercises demonstrating the potential ability to 
                                                 
528 As of 2012, Kazakhstan has 49,000 active military personnel and paramilitary forces of 31,500, while 
Kyrgyzstan has 10,900 active military personnel and 9,500 in its paramilitary forces. Tajikistan has some 8,800 
active military personnel and 7,500 in its paramilitary, but is supported by over 5,000-7,000 Russian soldiers, 
John Chipman et al. The Military Balance, London, IISS, 2012;  RFE/RL “Russia signs deal to prolong troop 
presence at Tajik military base”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 December 2012, 
[http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-signs-deal-troop-presence-tajikistan-military-base/24730251.html]. 
529 Zhao Huasheng, “Central Asia in China‟s diplomacy”, in Central Asia, Views from Washington, Moscow 
and Beijing, Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.159. 
530 See further Niklas Swanström China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers, Silk Road Paper, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, December 2011, 
[http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1112Swanstrom.pdf]. 
531Tugsbilguun Tumurkhuleg 2012, pp.184-185; the high level of priority of Taiwan in China‟s security 
consideration was highlighted in the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration which included two references to Taiwan, 
“Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the People‟s Republic of China, 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, of the Russian Federation, and of the Republic of Tajikistan”, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow 6 June 2000, 
[http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/A69BB7197B47EC174325699C003B5F9D?OpenDocument]. 
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protect oil and gas pipelines in the region.
532
 These activities, however, are 
conducted within the context of SCO cooperation and consent of the host states. 
The Stans enjoy multi-vectoral defense collaboration with Russia, China and the 
U.S. They differ in their commitment to specific security frameworks. Kazakhstan 
is a primary example of a proactive approach. It is suggested that President 
Nazarbaev tried to “dilute Russian dominance” in security questions by proposing 
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia 
(CICA).
533
 On the other hand, Uzbekistan is the least proactive when it comes to 
regional security cooperation. Washington‟s “„New Silk Road vision” and the 
focus on Afghanistan rendered neighboring Uzbekistan a pivotal player for transits 
of U.S. and NATO cargo in and out of Afghanistan. It was reported that U.S. 
President Obama called President Karimov on 28 September 2011 to thank him for 
cooperation in facilitating these transits.
534
 The Uzbeks have supported the CSTO 
since 2006, in light of weakened relations with the West in the aftermath of the 
Andijan incident. However, this collaboration is only partial because they do not 
want to participate in the CSTO rapid reaction force. It was reported that President 
Lukashenko, as acting head of the CSTO, asked Uzbekistan to reconsider its 
membership; but as long as it was in Uzbekistan's national interest, President 
                                                 
532  See Marcel de Haas, “„The Peace Mission 2007‟ Exercises: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
Advances”,  Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 
2007, [www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc]. 
533 CICA is a multinational forum created after the proposal of the Kazakh President Nazarbaev in 1992. 
[http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?lang=1]; See: Bayles and Dunai 2007, p.14. 
534 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, CRS Report for 
Congress, 19 September 2012, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf].  
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Karimov reportedly said, it would continue participating in these structures.
535
 
Tashkent suspended its membership in the CSTO on 29 June 2012.
536
 
The SCO clearly does not aim to become a military alliance in the short and 
medium term. There has been, however, contradiction in Russia‟s commitment to 
declarations on non-use of force and non-interference in domestic affairs in other 
states. The 2008 Russia-Georgia War provides a solid example of this 
contradictory behavior. Before examining SCO‟s reaction to Russia‟s involvement, 
the background to this conflict needs to be considered. 
Beyond the Five-Day War 
The origins and significance of the August 2008 War are embedded in the wider 
geographical and historical contexts of Russia's problematic engagement in the 
Caucasus. Although the fighting started in South Ossetia, the conflict encompassed 
other parts of Georgia,
537
 and tensions even spread to the Northern Caucasus. 
Mutual suspicion among all parties had been building up since the early 1990s. The 
legal-state relations became particularly unclear when the USSR allowed its 
autonomous republics to decide freely, by referendum, whether they desired to 
remain within the USSR or consider their independence. Abkhazia demonstrated its 
pro-Soviet (and later pro-Russian) orientation quite firmly when, on 17 March 
                                                 
535 Farkhod Tolipov, “CSTO summit raises ambiguity regarding Uzbekistan's membership”, Central Asia 
Newswire, 23 Jauary 2012, 
[http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/general/viewstory.aspx?id=11216].  
536 “Uzbekistan suspends its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)”, 
[http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2313&mode=snews].  
537 Officially, Georgia has two autonomous republics: Abkhazia (Sokhumi) and Ajara (Batumi). This thesis 
does not explore the relationship between Georgia and Ajara, which has remained in line with the famous quote 
from the former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia: “Adjarans! Remember that you are Georgians!” 
quoted in Thomas Goltz, „The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia‟s Descent into Chaos‟, in The Guns of 
August 2008, ed. Svante. E. Cornell and S. Frederick. Starr, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p.17. 
 Page | 195  
 
1991, it participated in the referendum and expressed support for remaining within 
the USSR.
538
  
Georgia, on the contrary, did not take part in this referendum, but instead organized 
an alternative poll to confirm the restoration of the country‟s independence from 
the USSR. Abkhazia abstained from the vote and continued to be a part of the 
USSR until it collapsed in December 1991. On this basis, and with the dissolution 
of the USSR, the Abkhaz leadership suggested the establishment of a Federation, 
wherein the Georgians and the Abkhaz would be equal. These suggestions were 
supported by provocative declarations from the Abkhaz nationalist leadership, to 
which the Georgian side responded with an intervention by tanks on the Abkhaz 
capital Sukhumi.
539
 
The Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-93 was a bloody conflict resulting in up to 
10,000 lives lost and a quarter of a million refugees, mainly ethnic Georgians.
540
 
During the conflict, the Abkhaz received support from the North Caucasus 
(Chechen fighters
541
) and from the Russian military forces based in Abkhazia. 
Russia and the UN mediated negotiations between the Abkhaz and the Georgians, 
resulting in the Moscow Treaty of 1994 which provided a mandate for the 
                                                 
538 The Abkhaz intellectuals and leadership wrote to Moscow to request secession from Georgia on several 
occasions. Some prominent examples are the letter to President Breznev in 1978, when 130 intellectuals asked 
for Abkhazia to secede being part of Georgia and join the USSR, based on violations of Abkhaz rights within 
Georgia. A compromise was made by opening the Abkhaz State University; however, all signatories lost their 
jobs. In 1988, the so-called Abkhazian Letter was signed by 60 leading Abkhaz, in which they demanded a 
restoration of pre-1931 sovereign Abkhazia. Georgia reacted to this letter by tightening Abkhaz rights and 
making the Georgian language obligatory for entry exams to universities. Source: Tim Potier, Conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: a legal appraisal, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, pp.9-
10. 
539 Thomas Goltz, „The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia‟s Descent into Chaos‟, in The Guns of August 
2008, ed. Svante. E. Cornell and S. Frederick. Starr, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009, pp. 20-27. 
540 ”Sparing over Abkhazia: Tensions between Russia and Georgia", IISS Strategic Comments, vol.14, issue 05, 
June 2008. [http://www.iiss.org.uk/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=18128].  
541 After the first Chechen war of 1994-1996, which Russia lost and in which Chechnya gained de facto 
independence, the Chechen leadership visited Georgia and apologized for the involvement of Chechens in the 
1992-93 Abkhaz-Georgian war: Chechnya was mending relations with the neighbors in order to strengthen its 
quasi-state. Thornike Gordadze, ”Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s", in The Guns of August 2008: 
Russia‟s War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr , Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 2009, p. 40. 
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oversight of a ceasefire for up to 3000 peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The Georgian government desired a multinational UN 
Peacekeeping Force, being aware that the CIS consisted mainly of Russian 
peacekeepers. The United Nations was embroiled in the Balkans at that time and so 
agreed to monitor the CIS operations instead. Under these conditions, the UN 
provided a de facto endorsement of Russia‟s presence in post-Soviet space.  
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict gradually evolved from arguments over the future 
of South Ossetia and accompanied by legislative conflict, into an armed conflict 
during the period January 1991 to June 1992. It resulted in an estimated 2,000-
4,000 deaths and the displacement of approximately 43,000 people.
542
 This 
localized conflict became a regional concern once the refugees crossed the North-
South Ossetian border and in North Ossetia these refugees became instantly 
engaged in another dispute, between the Ossetians and the Ingush, which has 
remained unresolved.
543
 This situation directly impacted on Russia‟s internal 
security.  
Since the 1992 ceasefire brokered by Russia, South Ossetia had existed as a de 
facto independent state. The Dagomys (Sochi) agreement ordered the formation of 
a security corridor (Article 1) and the establishment of a Joint Control Commission 
of the four parties involved in the conflict: Georgia, Russia and North and South 
Ossetia (Article 3). The warring parties were ordered to demilitarize the security 
zone and, in the event of a breach of the agreement, to promptly investigate the 
                                                 
542 Sergey Markedonov, “Caucasus Conflict Breaks Old Rules of the Game”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 45, 
Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 4 September 2008, p.2. 
543 For the wider historical context, see Babak Rezvani, “The Ossetian-Ingush confrontation: Explaining a 
horizontal conflict”, Iran & The Caucasus, vol. 14, issue 2, 2010, pp.419-429. 
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incident and commence the restoration of peace and order in the area.
544
 This 
suggests that Georgia agreed to cede some sovereignty over to South Ossetia.  
Initially, the structure of the Russia-dominated CIS Peacekeeping Forces appeared 
to provide a viable solution, and the agreements, negotiated with Russia‟s support, 
determined that the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts should 
stop and become so-called „frozen conflicts‟. The international community, 
however, was focused on the return of internally displaced people and the 
possibilities of trade relations and energy transport routes through Georgian 
territory, and clearly overlooked Russia‟s unwillingness to counter illegal 
economic activity and support secessionist tendencies in Georgia.
545
 From 2004, 
Tbilisi became more assertive in its policy of achieving internal coherence by 
employing a soft power offensive of „charming‟ the territories into a more 
democratic and reformed Georgia, and by portraying Russia as the „creeping 
aggressor‟, mainly concerned with maintaining its influence in the South Caucasus 
and gradually annexing the territories to Russia.  
Moscow, on the other hand, eased visa regulations for Ajara, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, while applying stricter conditions for Georgian nationals. This soft 
power tool was later complemented with the issuance of passports to residents of 
the autonomous republics, a policy which allowed Russia to secure the right to 
intervene in Georgia in cases when the rights of its citizens were violated. In a 
                                                 
544 The Dagomys (Sochi) Agreement (Cоглашение о принципах мирного урегулирования грузино-
осетинского конфликта), Sochi, 24 June 1992, Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Bulletin, no. 
13-14, 1992, p.31, Available in Russian at 
[http://www.caucasica.org/docs/detail.php?ID=1329&PHPSESSID=85ce24d286e083a2941a5edb041f4078];   
”Georgia: Shevardnadze Discusses 1992 South Ossetia Agreement”, Interview, Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty, 23 February 2006, [http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066081.html].   
545 Russia‟s state interests have been additionally supported by Eurasianists, led by Aleksandr Dugin, who 
promote Russia‟s dominance over former post-Soviet space with a goal of re-creating an empire. In exchange, 
the nationals from these regions and countries seek to preserve their traditions. Dugin‟s view of the Russia-
Georgia war was analyzed by MarlèneLaruelle in ”Neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin on the Russia-Georgia 
Conflict”, CACI Analyst, 3 September 2008, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4928].  
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letter addressed to the President of the UN Security Commission on 11 August 
2008, Russia‟s Ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, stated that:  
The scale of the attack against the servicemen of the Russian Federation 
deployed in the territory of Georgia on legitimate grounds, and against 
citizens of the Russian Federation, the number of deaths it caused as well 
as the statements by the political and military leadership of Georgia, which 
revealed the Georgian side’s aggressive intentions, demonstrate that we 
are dealing with the illegal use of military force against the Russian 
Federation. In those circumstances, the Russian side had no choice but to 
use its inherent right to self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations.
546
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia voiced their preference to secede from Georgia on 
several occasions. However, their institutions have been rather symbolic due to the 
lack of international recognition and their overreliance on economic engagements 
with Russia. The leadership of these unrecognized entities focused on power 
consolidation and establishment of strong ties with Russia, hoping to gain more 
legitimacy internationally. Georgia challenged these efforts by a consistent policy 
of reunification under Tbilisi‟s authority. The 2004 war with South Ossetia resulted 
in Tbilisi‟s control over all villages populated with ethnic Georgians and installing 
an alternative South Ossetian-led government for these communities. Trade 
interactions between different ethnic groups were further restricted. Georgia also 
demanded internationalization of the peacekeeping forces.  
Russia‟s interests in the South Caucasus go beyond providing a sustainable support 
for the de facto authorities. Geopolitically, it does not want to lose control over the 
transportation routes and it aims to constrain the economic and strategic orientation 
of Azerbaijan and Georgia towards the West. Moscow may have responded to 
                                                 
546 Letter dated 11 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2008/545, United Nations Security Council, 11 
August 2008, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Georgia%20S%202008%20545.pdf] ; further discussion about Russia‟s legal case for the 
intervention can be found in Nicolai N. Petro, “The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia", Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 32, issue 5, May 2009, pp.1524-1549, 
[http://uri.academia.edu/nnpetro/Papers/152748/_The_Legal_Case_for_Russian_Intervention_in_Georgia]. 
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Georgia‟s increased Western involvement, including construction of the Baku–
Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, by disrupting the supply of electricity and gas to 
Georgia in January 2006 (a claim rejected by Russia, which suggested that 
extremists or Chechen militants may have sabotaged gas pipelines).
547
 Russia also 
deported Georgian migrant workers in response to Georgia‟s arrests of four 
Russian military officers on counts of espionage in September 2006. The severed 
transportation links and deported Georgian workers would have had a significant 
impact on Georgia‟s inflow of money sent by these workers to their families.548  
The situation became worse after NATO‟s endorsement of Georgia‟s membership 
application in April 2008. During the Bucharest Summit, NATO proclaimed that 
Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members and the Treaty organization 
was ready to start an „intensive engagement‟ with these applicants.549  Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine further declared a proactive stance on resolving all „frozen 
conflicts‟ within their respective territories during the GUAM550 Summit in Batumi 
in July 2008.
551
 At first, Russia followed suit and actively spoke for unfreezing the 
conflicts. During his last press conference in February 2008, President Putin stated 
that Russia would not follow the U.S. and Europe‟s example and recognize the 
independent Kosovo. Nor would he endorse the independence of Abkhazia and 
                                                 
547 Nick Paton Walsh, “Georgian leader attacks Russia after gas blasts”, The Guardian, 23 Januay 2006, 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/23/russia.georgia]. 
548 It is estimated that approximately 500 000 Georgians worked in Russia, generating roughly US$556 million 
in 2006. Moscow expelled less than 1% of Georgian migrant workers. „Economic and Political Transition in 
Georgia‟, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1171].  
549 Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO Official Website, 3 April 2008, 
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm]; The NATO membership for Georgia has been 
put on hold and might be gradual, until Georgia resolves its questions of territorial integrity. 
550 GU(U)AM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, the official website at http://guam-
organization.org/en/node/422 ; the forum was established in 1997 as GUAM and was renamed GUUAM once 
Uzbekistan joined the cooperation in 1999; in the aftermath of the Andijan Uprising, Uzbekistan delivered the 
official withdrawal from GUUAM and the forum was renamed to GUAM in 2005. The organization aims at 
creating transport and market corridors to the West. The U.S. has actively supported its projects by providing 
financial assistance. See: S. Neil MacFarlane, 'The United States and regionalism in Central Asia', 
International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004. 
551 Richard Weitz, „GUAM and the Georgian War‟, CACI Analyst, 20 August 2008, 
[http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4917].  
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South Ossetia, thus linking these difference cases. However, a month later, he 
gained majority support within the State Duma to recognize these two entities 
along with Transnistria.
552
 
In August 2008, tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated into an 
armed conflict, which climaxed in the Five-Day War between Georgia and 
Russia.
553
 The war started with large-scale violence between South Ossetians and 
Georgians on 7-8 August 2008. President Saakashvili grew increasingly impatient 
with his inability to reunite Georgia and responded to numerous hostile acts 
between the parties prior to the war by launching an attack on Tskhinvali. Some 
Georgian elites, such as the former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, 
disapproved of Saakashvili‟s decision to send forces into South Ossetia. 
Shevardnadze noted that Georgia had the right to intervene within its territory; 
however, in his view this attack was a “mistake” and it was ill prepared.554 
Russia responded to this incident by launching a counter-attack and destroying 
infrastructure and communications on 8 August 2008. This was the third major 
conflict between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, although it was the first time Russia had 
performed a full scale military engagement in the region since its establishment 
post-USSR. Moscow named the mission “Forcing Georgia to Peace”,555 and argued 
it was preventing a major humanitarian disaster for the Ossetian people. President 
Medvedev spoke of an “act of aggression” performed by Georgian forces against 
                                                 
552 Sergei Markedonov, „A Russian Perspective: Forging Peace in the Caucasus‟, Russian Analytical Digest, 
no.40, 8 May 2008, pp. 5-9. [http://www.abkhazworld.com/Pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_40.pdf].  
553 A detailed chronology of the war can be found in „The Chronology of Events‟, IISS Strategic Comments, 
vol. 14, issue 7, September 2008,  
[http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-7/a-
chronology-of-the-crisis/].  
554 Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, Russia Today, 16 August 2008, [http://rt.com/politics/interview-with-
eduard-shevardnadze-2008-08-16/].  
555 See Roy Allison, „Russia resurgent? Moscow‟s campaign to “coerce Georgia to peace”‟, International 
Affairs, vol. 84, issue 6, 2008, pp. 1145–1171. 
[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ALLISON_RussiaResurgent_MoscowCampaignToCoerce
GeorgiaToPeace.pdf].  
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Russian civilians and peacekeepers. He called upon Russian law and international 
obligations to “protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they 
are”.556 On 9 August, Russian forces crossed the borders to Abkhazia and on the 
following day, the ground forces were joined by the Russian Black Sea Fleet near 
the Georgian coast of the Black Sea. The Russian air force bombed the Georgian 
town of Gori (west of Tbilisi). The Russian attacks succeeded in regaining control 
over Tskhinvali.  
The movements of forces are illustrated by the map below. 
Figure 10: Map of August 2008 Russia-Georgia War 
 
 
This situation displeased China, the organizer of the 2008 Olympic Games, which 
called for an immediate ceasefire, restraint by all parties and stabilization of the 
region. Once the Russian troops entered the Georgian towns of Senaki and Zugdidi, 
the international community started an intensified „war in words‟, in which U.S. 
President Bush spoke about Russia‟s invasion of the sovereign Georgia and called 
upon Russia to “respect Georgia‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty”.557 The U.S. 
                                                 
556 Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia, 8 August 2008,  
[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml].  
557 “Georgia: the war in words”, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 14, issue 7, September 2008, 
[http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-7/georgia-
the-war-in-words/]. 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,  London: IISS.org, 
2008, [http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/about/georgian-
russian-dialogue/analysis-of-the-russia-georgia-war/]  
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew 
Bryza, went as far as to call Russia‟s part in the conflict “one of the most ill-
advised and simply stupid”, which would have a disastrous impact on Russia‟s 
reputation worldwide. From the U.S. perspective, Washington would not take a 
direct part in this conflict, preferring to build partnerships with both countries.
558
 
The much anticipated Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,
559
 established by the Council of the European 
Union on 2 December 2008, provided findings on the origins and the course of the 
conflict. It was written by 30 European historical, legal and military specialists. 
The team, under the supervision of Swiss Diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, came to the 
conclusion that: 
At least as far as the initial phase of the conflict is concerned, an additional 
legal question is whether the Georgian use of force against Russian 
peacekeeping forces on Georgian territory, i.e. in South Ossetia, might 
have been justified. Again the answer is in the negative. There was no 
ongoing armed attack by Russia before the start of the Georgian operation. 
Georgian claims of a large-scale presence of Russian armed forces in 
South Ossetia prior to the Georgian offensive on 7/8 August could not be 
substantiated by the Mission. It could also not be verified that Russia was 
on the verge of such a major attack, in spite of certain elements and 
equipment having been made readily available. There is also no evidence 
to support any claims that Russian peacekeeping units in South Ossetia 
were in flagrant breach of their obligations under relevant international 
agreements such as the Sochi Agreement and thus may have forfeited 
their international legal status. Consequently, the use of force by Georgia 
against Russian peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 
August 2008 was contrary to international law.
560
 
 
This finding confirmed that Georgia‟s intervention in South Ossetia was illegal and 
Saakashvilli‟s argument that Georgia was only responding to violations by Russia‟s 
armed forces was false. The report was also critical of the legality of Russia‟s 
                                                 
558 “Senior U.S. Official Calls Russian Actions „Ill-Advised And Simply Stupid‟”, Radio Free Europe, 15 
August 2008, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Bryza_Calls_Russian_Actions_Ill_Advised_Stupid/1191332.html]  
559 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. I, September 2009, 
[http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf].  
560 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. I, September 2009, 
p. 23, [http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf]. 
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involvement in the conflict. The following section concentrates on the SCO‟s 
stance on this conflict and Russia‟s involvement. 
 
SCO’s Reaction to Russia’s Involvement in the South Caucasus 
The Russia-Georgia conflict has revealed a divergent response to the crisis between 
Russia and the other member states. This was the first full scale military conflict 
since the establishment of the SCO that required a clear stance from these states. 
However, the Organization cautiously hid behind formulaic statements and 
encouraged the Russians to resolve the situation in a cooperative and peaceful 
fashion. The former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan shared a common fear that a similar harsh approach from Russia could 
be taken towards them in the event of their disobedience in the future.
561
 On the 
other hand, they ostensibly had the support of a second great power, China, and 
therefore, the republics were anxiously waiting to see how their Chinese partners 
would behave.  
From the outset, the SCO has promoted itself as the framework that fights against 
separatism and 'splitism'.
562
 It was surprising then, that with this knowledge and 
adherence to SCO norms, Russia would seek to support the independence from 
Georgia of the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During and in 
the aftermath of the August 2008 war, the SCO chose a cautious endorsement of 
                                                 
561 It should be noted that this applies mainly to the smaller states. Kazakhstan has sought to engage Russia as 
part of a wider policy of global relationships, while Uzbekistan has been driven back towards Russian 
cooperation after human rights issues weakened its links with the United States in 2005. 
562  It has been noted that the Chinese leadership uses the terms „separatism‟ (fenlizhuyi) and „splitism‟ 
(fenliezhuyi) interchangeably. The difference derives from how the leadership views the intensity of various 
independence movements within China. Splitism relates to the Dalai Lama‟s moral support of the Tibetan 
people at large, while Taiwanese independence or the East Turkestan movement are considered as „separatist‟. 
See the interpretation by Sheo NandanPandey, “Chinese Counter Terror Intelligence Module - Compatibility to 
Nov 26 Mumbai Type Terror Attacks”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 2993, 27 December 2008, 
[http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2993.html]. 
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Russia over Georgia. It went ahead with the scheduled Annual Meeting in 
Dushanbe on 28 August 2008. The subsequent Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads 
of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization voiced “deep 
concern” with regards to the tensions in South Ossetia and called for a resolution in 
“a peaceful way through dialogue”. The Declaration proceeded to highlight 
“Russia‟s active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region” and praised 
its acceptance of the Six Principles of Settling the Conflict in South Ossetia on 12 
August 2008. The SCO member states also restated their “commitment to 
preventive diplomacy”, and expressed their support for the legitimate roles of the 
UN and the UN Security Council in conflict prevention.
563
  
However, there was a clear absence of vocal support for Russia in this war and no 
sign of condemnation of Georgia for initiating the conflict. This can be interpreted 
as the member states considering their national interests rather than strengthening 
their regional cooperation. Moreover, the fact that the SCO refrained from 
recognizing the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia also 
demonstrates that the SCO would not support activities which lead to the 
disintegration of a state. The SCO therefore, adhered to its norms, which reject 
separatism, but was reluctant to overtly criticize Russia‟s actions. The Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism stipulates that the 
annexation of a territory or disintegration of a state is an act that should be 
punished according to the national law of the parties involved. In Russia‟s case, it 
felt obliged to intervene to protect its own nationals in a foreign country. This has 
been part of a more general aspect in Russian defense policy which seeks to protect 
                                                 
563 The Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Dushanbe, 28 August 2008, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=90].  
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Russian interests, citizens and peacekeepers abroad, a concept reinforced by the 
military doctrines promulgated in October 2009 and February 2010.
564
 
The SCO‟s approach to this matter has demonstrated that it is not an instrument of 
a single member state. Yet it also showed immaturity on the part of the SCO with 
regard to the prevention of possible conflicts in the wider region. To date, this has 
been the only large-scale conflict between a member state and an external party. 
However, the question remains as to whether the SCO would become more 
engaged if there was a conflict between two member states.  
China’s Perspectives 
China‟s muted response to the conflict between Russia and Georgia is the result of 
a moral and practical dilemma. Morally, China did not back Russia‟s approach due 
to the incompatibility with its policies of 'Peaceful Development' and 'Harmonious 
World',
565
 which revoke the use of force to settle disputes. The escalation of the 
conflict also coincided with the Beijing Olympics, and China could not afford to 
send out a mixed message to the world about its benign intentions. This position 
was made clear by President Hu Jintao during his meeting with Russian President 
Medvedev on 27 August 2008. President Medvedev informed his Chinese 
counterpart about the developments in the South Caucasus, to which the Chinese 
President responded by stating that China was aware of the developments in the 
region and was “expecting all sides concerned to properly settle the issue through 
dialogue and coordination”. Medvedev reassured Hu that Russia would cooperate 
with China within the SCO framework to strengthen the peace and stability of the 
                                                 
564 Jim Nichol, Russian Military Reform and Defence Policy, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 24 August 2011, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42006.pdf]. 
565 See State Council Information Office of the PRC, China‟s Peaceful Development Road, White Paper 
(Beijing, December 2005); and Xinhua, “President Hu Makes Four-Point Proposal for Building Harmonious 
World”, China View, 16 September 2005, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-
09/16/content_3496789.htm]. 
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region.
566
China also faced a domestic moral dilemma: supporting the independence 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could provide a green light to those regions within 
China that had been campaigning for greater autonomy or a clear separation.  
From the practical point of view, China viewed this conflict more as a standoff 
between Russia and the West (underlined by the U.S.-led eastward NATO 
expansion) than as a simple bilateral conflict between Georgia and Russia. While it 
sympathized with Russia‟s discontent at having Western troops approach its 
neighboring region, it was not ready to be party to another Cold War. China‟s 
„Peaceful Development‟ has depended on the prevailing international system in 
both economic and security terms. It would have little to gain from taking a stance 
that would create tensions with the West and Russia.
567
  
One of the greatest concerns for China is its energy insecurity; Premier Wen Jiabao 
acknowledged that the lack of energy resources is a “soft rib” in the country‟s 
social and economic development.
568
 Reliance on foreign energy supplies renders 
China particularly vulnerable. Since August 2010, Russia and China have been 
connected by an oil pipeline, running from Siberian Skovorodino to China‟s north-
eastern frontier, yet China continues to diversify its energy sources and avoids 
being exclusively committed to an energy agreement with any one country.
569
 In 
                                                 
566 Ling Jihua, Wang Huning and Dai Bingguo, “Hu Jintao Meets with Russian President Medvedev”, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 28 August 2008, 
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t509750.htm].  
567 Jing Huang, “Beijing‟s Perspectives on the Russo-Georgian Conflict: Dilemma and Choices”, China Brief, 
vol. VIII, issue 17, The Jamestown Foundation, 3 September 2008, 
[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5133].  
568 Wen Jiabao, “Attach Great Importance to, and Strengthen Leadership over the Building of a Resource-
Saving Society at an Accelerating Pace”, Xinhua, 3 July 2005, Quoted in Chinese Perceptions of Traditional 
and Nontraditional Security Threats, Susan L. Craig, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
March 2007, p.120, [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub765.pdf].  
569 China became an oil importer in 1993, prior to this date it was a net exporter. It has diversified its oil and 
gas imports through energy deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The 2000-kilometre gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan, traversing Kazakhstan and functional from December 2009, is notable as it is meant to provide 
40 billion cubic metres of gas per year. 
See: EricaStrecker Downs, China‟s Quest for Energy SecuritySanta Monica, CA: RAND, 2000; Viacheslav 
Belokrinitskiy, ”Southwesterly Enlargement of Greater China”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 45, no.3, 2007; 
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exchange for a loan of $25 billon from Beijing, Moscow agreed to provide China 
with 300,000 barrels of oil a day for the next 20 years. However, analysts have 
warned that Russia‟s increasing production of oil will cause a decline in its mature 
oil fields and may result in an inability to meet China‟s accelerated energy 
demands in the long-term.
570
Another issue for China may be Russia‟s supply 
pricing disputes with other countries, such as its cutting off of its gas supply to 
Ukraine. This, in comparison with U.S., which dominates the energy markets 
around the globe and operates in the Middle East (the primary source of China‟s 
crude oil imports), causes China to be cautious about balancing its needs and 
maintaining its alliances with regional partners. 
571
 The SCO, with its principles of 
non-interference and peaceful resolution of conflicts, represents a safe framework 
from which China may operate, not least because it enables Beijing to diversify its 
access to alternative energy suppliers, especially with Kazakhstan and pipelines run 
through Kazakhstan‟s territory.572  
When questioned at a security symposium in Beijing in 2009 as to why China did 
not support Russia in its activities in the 2008 war against Georgia, a prominent 
Chinese Major General responded that China had not clearly understood what 
Russia‟s political objectives were prior to the conflict.573 Had Russia argued that 
                                                                                                                                       
Roland Dannreuther, “China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity”, International Affairs 87:6, 2011, 
p. 1357. 
570 Isabel Gorst, “Russia opens China pipeline for Siberian oil”, The Financial Times, 29 August 2010, 
[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dd89374a-b38c-11df-81aa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1RKc41tEG]. 
571 China‟s Energy Data available from U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
[http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/China/pdf.pdf] 572 China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation as early 
as 1997. The direct China-Kazakh oil pipeline, owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
and the Kazakh oil company (KazMunayGas) opened in 2006. Chen Feng, “Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline 
opens to operation”, Xinhua, 11 July 2006, [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-
07/12/content_4819484.htm].   
572 China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation as early as 1997. The direct China-Kazakh oil pipeline, 
owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Kazakh oil company (KazMunayGas) 
opened in 2006. Chen Feng, “Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline opens to operation”, Xinhua, 11 July 2006, 
[http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/12/content_4819484.htm].   
573 China Security Symposium, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, 22 June 2009, which the author 
attended. The Major General is not explicitly named because the Symposium follows Chatham House rules. 
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the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were historically parts of Russia‟s 
territory and therefore, Russia wanted to re-attach these areas to Russia, then, 
according to the Major General, it would have been in line with China‟s stance on 
such matters. The Chinese strategists did not understand Russia‟s support for 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. The Major General concluded that 
this situation had no impact on the Russia-China relationship or on the SCO‟s 
operations in Central Asia. During his presentation at the symposium he admitted 
that there was still historical distrust between Russia and China, although he 
acknowledged the positive momentum after the end of the Cold War and posited 
that eventually the two countries would come to play complementary roles.  He 
also expressed uncertainty of the extent to which the U.S. could manage to contain 
both Russia and China because their mutual relationship had improved to such an 
extent on so many levels.  
When Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, China‟s Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement which said that:  
China has expressed concern over the latest developments of the 
situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We understand the complicated 
history and reality of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issue. In the 
meantime, in light of our consistent principle and position on issues alike, 
we hope to see relevant parties resolve the issue properly through 
dialogue and consultation.
574
 
 
Chinese caution in its response to the Russia-Georgia war not only stemmed from a 
policy of opposing secessionism, which could then be mimicked by Tibet and 
Xinjiang, but also its foreign policy pledge, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, along with the related  New Security Concept.
575
This calls for 
                                                 
574 “Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang‟s Remarks on Russia's recognition of the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia”, 27 August 2008, [http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t509344.htm].  
575Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept”, 
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm]. The position paper explains the new security concept 
as aiming to rising above one-sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial 
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cooperation, consultation and maintaining peace and stability. Finally, the 2005 
formulations of „Peaceful Development‟ and „Harmonious World‟, as cited above 
represented a rising China‟s pledge to peace rather than provoking further conflict. 
The latter would be in line with hegemonic transition theory, as identified in 
chapter two of this thesis. Rather than unsettling the status quo in a revisionist 
quest for preponderance, it is in the PRC‟s interest to help maintain an international 
system that is conducive to its economic development, including access to stable 
oil supplies, overseen by the United States‟ global agenda. This preferred role has 
been termed „responsible stakeholder‟576 in the West. In its hope to see an engaged 
China it complements the „Peaceful Development‟ formulation of China‟s 
diplomacy. While not entirely in agreement with the U.S. led system, China has 
soft balancing options to exercise and need not resort to overtly confrontational 
ones; nor endorse them in others. 
The Stans’ Perspectives 
Russia‟s intervention in South Ossetia sent a clear message to the ex-Soviet 
republics: their efforts to foster closer relations with the United States, possibly 
through their cooperation with regards to basing rights or military exercises, might 
be disrupted. The Russian leadership‟s explanation that it had merely responded to 
Georgia‟s attacks on South Ossetia did not diminish the concerns among 
neighboring countries. When chairing the CIS, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek 
Bakiev called for an urgent discussion about the conflict. However, this was met 
with silence from the other CIS members. The only outspoken leader was Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev who, after a conversation with the Russian Prime 
                                                 
576 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in 2005: “We now need to inspire China to become a 
responsible stakeholder in the international system”, Xinhua, “New Vocabulary Ushers China-US relations into 
Global Scenarios”, People‟s Daily Online, 22 December 2005. 
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Minister Putin in Beijing on 8 August 2008, stated that Georgia‟s initiation of a 
military conflict in South Ossetia was “unwise” and called for a “diplomatic 
solution to the crisis”. 577 Kazakhstan did not endorse Russia‟s bid for South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian independence in August 2008. Supporting Russia‟s 
position could undermine its ties with the West, as well as its growing partnership 
with China. Yet, if Kazakhstan managed to gain more influence in the Organization 
for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), there could come an opportunity for 
Russia to promote its own agenda through an intensified Kazakh-Russian 
partnership.  
The Jamestown Foundation reported that senior officers of the Kazakh armed 
forces privately acknowledged that they were “proud for Russia” engaging 
militarily in Georgia, but could not express their support publicly and risk a 
possible “international humiliation”.578 Although Kazakhstan and the U.S. sealed 
their security cooperation by renewing their „U.S.-Kazakhstan Five Year Plan of 
Military Cooperation, 2008-13‟ in February 2008, Kazakhstan agreed to purchase 
and modernize its military equipment and weapons from Russia‟s 
Rosoboroneksport; to conduct joint operational training courses; and to train elite 
Kazakh army units in Russian military academies. Kazakh Defense Minister, 
Daniyal Akhmetov, and his Russian counterpart Anatoliy Serdyukov, who 
maintained regular monthly meetings, issued an official joint statement on 12 
February 2008,
579
 suggesting that the Russia-Kazakh militaries were still 
                                                 
577 Bruce Pannier, “Former Soviet Sphere Shocked Into Silence By Conflict In Georgia”, Radio Free Europe, 
11 August 2008, 
[http://www.rferl.org/content/Former_Soviet_Sphere_Shocked_Into_Silence_By_Ossetia_Conflict/1190128.ht
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578 Roger McDermott, “Nazarbayev Signals Kazakhstan's OSCE Priorities”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, the 
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579“Kazakh, Russian Defense Ministers Talk in Moscow”, Radio Free Europe Newline, 14 February 2008, 
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intertwined, despite the arguments that NATO‟s Partnership for Peace Program and 
the training of Kazakh officers in NATO countries has had the effect of drawing 
Kazakh defense away from Russia. There are perceptions that those Kazakh 
officers who are receptive of military ideas and methods from the West face a 
majority who are pro-Russian, and therefore, sceptical of these programs. 
Kazakhstan, along with the other members of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), condemned Georgia‟s aggression in South Ossetia during 
the CSTO foreign ministers meeting on 4 September 2008.
580
 
The Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War 
In 2008, China and the Central Asian member states of the SCO did not show overt 
support for the Russian intervention in the Russia-Georgia War and the subsequent 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Beijing particularly faced a major 
dilemma; on one hand, it sympathized with Moscow‟s opposition to NATO‟s 
expansion, and on the other hand, it was concerned with endorsing the 
establishment of states based on ethnicity. Furthermore, it disapproved of the 
extensive use of force by Russia. In all major declarations that followed, the SCO 
member states restated their adherence to the principles of non-intervention and 
territorial integrity. In the aftermath, China succeeded in gaining support from the 
SCO regarding the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which in the 
words of the SCO Secretary General, Bolat Nurgaliev, is part of the PRC and 
therefore any clashes should be dealt with as a “solely internal affair”.581 
The internal balance within the SCO, as described in the previous chapter, has 
tilted towards China. The Russia-Georgia conflict did not alter the geopolitical 
                                                 
580 “Security Treaty Leaders Condemn Georgia For Aggression”, RFERL, 5 September 2008, 
[http://www.rferl.org/content/Security_Treaty_Leaders_Condemn_Georgia_For_Aggression_/1196765.html].  
581 “Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2009”, Information from 10 July 2009, SCO Official Website, 31 
December 2009, [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=182].  
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situation in Central Asia in other major ways; however, more attention started to be 
paid to military and political questions.
582
 In 2011, both the SCO and China-Russia 
relationship celebrated their 10
th
 anniversary. The SCO, despite its inability to 
pressure the withdrawal of foreign military forces from the region, not preventing 
the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia as well as its failure to respond to 
the crises in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, remained intact and pledged a further expansion 
of its membership and agenda. After the successful SCO-sponsored conference on 
Afghanistan attended by the U.S., EU, OSCE, G8 and NATO in Moscow in March 
2009, the member states showed confidence in the organization‟s ability to become 
a significant discussion platform for not only region-related matters, but also global 
policy issues, such as “international information security”. Russia and China have 
elevated their “strategic partnership relations” to a “comprehensive strategic 
cooperation and partnership” and pledged to coordinate their policies not only 
within the SCO, but also in BRICS, G20 and OPEC.
583
  
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the SCO‟s response to Russia‟s involvement in the 2008 
Russia-Georgia War as an empirical limitation to the soft balancing concept, but 
this does not suggest that the opposite is the case. The SCO is not an emerging hard 
balancer wearing the disguise of a soft power organization. Indeed, this chapter has 
refuted explanations that the SCO‟s implicit strategy was for it to become a 
military alliance and use hard power to balance the U.S. and NATO interests in the 
region. These erroneous interpretations failed to take into account that SCO 
                                                 
582 See a summary of the impacts of the conflict on the region: Sun Zhuangzhi and Zhao Huirong, “Chinese 
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cooperation in the security sphere was primarily focused on non-traditional security 
issues, under the umbrella of the RATS. The organization is not bound by NATO-
like article 5 security guarantees that would require member states to provide 
military assistance in a security crisis.  
This test of unity shows that the SCO is pragmatic when it comes to voicing 
support for actions of individual member states. In Uzbekistan‟s case, the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from the Uzbek territory was supported by the SCO, 
because the Uzbek actions conformed to the SCO principles. Russia, on the other 
hand, failed to adhere to the SCO norms by employing an unprecedented use of 
force in its conflict with Georgia. Russia further recognized the separatist parts, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although, the Stans and China did not provide strong 
support of Russia, they have strengthened their cooperation within the SCO and 
have continued conducting joint military exercises. Soft balancing has not been 
discredited by the actions of Russia outside the region, or by concern among SCO 
members on the merit of Russia‟s actions. Rather, it has exhibited an emerging 
maturity beyond its comparative youth as a regional organization: one that allows 
for differences of viewpoint without compromising its cohesion. In this sense, the 
SCO represents a fresh start for multilateral security after jettisoning what the 
Chinese commonly term the „Cold War mentality‟. Some increase of Chinese 
influence within the organization (as experienced through 2008-2012) may well 
provide stronger support for SCO norms and soft power credentials in the future.   
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Conclusion: Key Findings and Implications 
 
In analyzing the soft balancing of ASEAN and the SCO and its role within the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific, this thesis has challenged the dominant prevalent interpretations 
of balancing behavior and perspectives about the role of multilateral regional 
frameworks within International Relations theory. Many existing assumptions 
about ASEAN and the SCO tend to overemphasize great power competition in 
relation to these organizations and do not consider the regional context of 
Southeast and Central Asia. Therefore, this thesis has investigated these 
multilateral frameworks in the context of their specific regions and perceptions of 
the key state actors who are the member states of ASEAN and the SCO.  
Two main objectives were achieved in this thesis: theoretical and practical analysis. 
In regards to the theory, the goal was to assess the existing literature on soft 
balancing and how the concept fits into the context of existing alignment strategies. 
Soft balancing has a justifiable place between the two extreme state strategies: 
balancing and bandwagoning. It is a less risky option for second-ranking powers 
when they use non-military tools and a less direct approach to countering a possible 
threat.  
To address the second goal, which is the practical analysis, this thesis has 
endeavored to demonstrate the empirical evidence for soft balancing in Southeast 
Asia in the early 1990s and soft balancing in Central Asia post 9/11, and thus to 
show the utility of soft balancing as a viable analytical framework in International 
Relations theory. Through ASEAN, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Thailand (as the ASEAN6), had sought to socialize a rising China 
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to commit itself to shared norms. They also sought to shape its behavior to act in a 
less confrontational mode, especially in the case of the South China Sea dispute.  
Through the SCO, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, have exercized soft balanced against the foreign military presence of the 
United States and allied forces in Central Asia by calling for a timetable for the 
withdrawal of troops from military bases in the region. This strategy was successful 
in 2005 when Uzbekistan evicted U.S. troops from its Karshi-Khanabad airbase 
after the SCO summit in Astana in June, when the member states issued a 
statement demanding the exact deadline for the withdrawal. The SCO member 
states have also strengthened the normative aspect of their collaboration by 
promoting the „Shanghai Spirit‟ and the concept of „sovereign democracy‟, which 
respects territorial sovereignty and regime security. This competes with Western 
style of democratically-based legitimacy. 
This concluding chapter outlines the key findings of the foregoing analysis by 
highlighting the key theoretical perspectives which have been used to examine state 
behavior in regional organizations, theoretical aspects of soft balancing, followed 
by regional strategic frameworks for cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of soft balancing in the cases of 
ASEAN and the SCO. The chapter then proceeds into assessing the implications of 
soft balancing for the Indo-Asia-Pacific and concludes with future prospects for 
soft balancing. 
Theoretical approaches have proven to be valuable tools for explaining the 
interactions of ASEAN and the SCO member states. A combination of neorealist 
(structural) realism and constructivism was used to assess the role of these 
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organizations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and the soft balancing strategy. It has been 
found that states behave in the neorealist way when they use multilateral 
frameworks and accept their norms  but only as far as it is in their national interests. 
In the case of ASEAN soft balancing China, Beijing was willing to join ASEAN-
led structures and adhere to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC); however, 
it would not consult ASEAN partners about its activities in the South China Sea. In 
the SCO case, as was seen in Chapter Six, Russia also adopted the „Shanghai Spirit‟ 
norms, but failed to act peacefully and negotiate during the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
crisis. 
Through constructivism states have found their participation in both official and 
non-official multilateral frameworks to be productive. They engaged one another‟s 
ideas and norms, leading to a better appreciation of each other‟s perspectives. 
ASEAN promoted the „ASEAN Way‟ and consultations about trust-building 
measures. ASEAN member states and China declared their commitment to improve 
these measures through their interactions in regional organizations. The SCO has 
also been a vocal advocate of regional norms and has become a proactive 
proponent of dialogue among nations and respect for diversity. 
Reassessing the Soft-balancing Framework 
As noted in the literature review, soft balancing is subject to continuing scholarly 
discussion, its definition and utility questioned by critics who make the following 
points: 1) by broadening the definition of balancing, the proponents of soft 
balancing perform conceptual stretching, failing to explain adequately the 
difference between „soft balancing‟ and „diplomatic friction‟; 2) soft balancing 
cases are too recent and therefore, unverifiable; 3) the main soft balancers, China 
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and Russia, are known for being non-transparent, rendering it impossible to gather 
enough evidence to support the soft balancing argument; and 4) not enough 
attention is paid to current explanations of the soft balancing behavior, the focus 
being on past cases.  
In contrast, this thesis argues that the proponents of soft balancing provide 
sufficient description of the concept and soft balancing tools. They also clarify the 
distinction between the soft power and soft balancing, according to which states‟ 
soft power contributes to advancing with a soft balancing coalition; thus, it is a soft 
balancing asset. States resort to soft balancing in cases of diplomatic friction. Both 
organizations, ASEAN and the SCO, voice their support for minimizing this 
friction through consultations and non-use of force. Soft balancing allows 
participating states to coordinate their diplomatic action and obtain from diplomatic 
engagements more beneficial outcomes for themselves vis-à-vis a state which is 
viewed as dominant or threatening. The issue of limited external validity has been 
addressed, namely through Kai He‟s work on ASEAN‟s Post-Cold War Strategy 
and also exploration of American and Chinese soft balancing strategies.
584
 China 
and Russia have been the subject of further research through the work of Stephen 
Aris
585
 on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Chaka Ferguson‟s analysis 
of the use of soft power as the norm to soft balance American hegemony.
586
  
This thesis revives discussion about the validity of the soft balancing argument by 
analyzing this indirect, subtle and non-military security behavior by middle and 
great powers through regional organizations. The case studies here are both 
                                                 
584 Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China‟s rise, London: 
Rutledge, 2009. 
585 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2011. 
586 Chaka Ferguson, “The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese-Russian 
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intergovernmental organizations and their member states are geographically close. 
Their cooperation is led by shared rules of conduct. Both ASEAN and the SCO 
pursue their soft balancing through a network in the context of a larger Indo-Asian 
dialogue. There engagements often overlap; however, it has not been the purpose 
of this work to explore inter-regional relationships such as the ASEAN-SCO 
partnership, which is currently underdeveloped, though this topic presents itself as 
a worthy research endeavor in the future.  
ASEAN‟s soft balancing has been investigated first (in Chapter Four) and has 
provided an experiential basis for the SCO‟s later soft balancing (in Chapter Five), 
especially in the sphere of trust and confidence-building measures. They both 
operate in distinctive regional contexts, though The People‟s Republic of China 
may be identified as a unifying factor between these two regional organizations. 
ASEAN used soft balancing towards the PRC in the 1990s when China was still 
hesitant and suspicious of joining regional multilateral security frameworks. It was 
a “norm taker”, partially adopting the „ASEAN Way‟ norms. On the other hand, 
Beijing participated in a soft balancing coalition in the SCO towards the U.S. (a 
foreign presence) in Central Asia in the middle of the first decade of the 21
st
 
century. As one of the founders of the SCO, China has functioned as an influential 
“norm maker” in the SCO. 
Regional Strategic Framework for Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
The primary focus of this thesis has been the “Indo-Asia-Pacific”, with a specific 
focus on Central and Southeast Asia. Where appropriate, references were made to 
U.S., Japanese, Australian, EU and NATO policies. The discussion dealt with the 
period after the end of the Cold War, which terminated the bipolar system and 
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reinstalled U.S primacy. This period also witnessed the rise of China, which made 
the weaker states in Southeast Asia insecure about China‟s intentions and whether 
– in light of its impressive economic growth and military modernization – it would 
join the contest for the leadership in East Asia.  
ASEAN6 was driven by China threat perceptions and created opportunities to 
engage China in formal and informal discussions about regional issues. Beijing 
gradually established diplomatic ties with individual Southeast Asian nations and 
upgraded its relationship with ASEAN onto a more formal level as ASEAN‟s 
dialogue partner. The PRC agreed to join the ASEAN Regional Forum and sign the 
TAC, which outlined the guiding principles for inter-state and inter-regional 
collaboration: that is, respect each other‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no 
interference in the internal affairs of another state, the use of force should be 
renounced and states should resolve their disputes amicably and effectively.  
However, on several occasions, China projected more assertive policies and 
lowered its degree of cooperativeness with its ASEAN dialogue partners. This has 
been particularly true in the case of China‟s insistence on its claims to disputed 
waters in the South China Sea. ASEAN showed the unity of its disapproval with 
China‟s actions and has insisted on resolving this ongoing issue within the 
multilateral forum.  
China‟s increased interest in multilateralism was put in practice in Central Asia, 
after a series of confidence-building negotiations on border security among China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It is often assumed that the SCO is 
an anti-NATO, anti-Western, regional bloc dominated by China and Russia. 
However, this is not an accurate description of the SCO. Despite Russia and China 
having structural advantages vis-à-vis smaller Central Asian republics, in terms of 
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their influence through the United Nations Security Council and their power 
(nuclear weapons and larger, more sophisticated militaries), the SCO‟s agenda 
considers interests of all member states and the Central Asian republics have equal 
rights to opt out from participating in specific projects if their national interests are 
not met. Additionally, the smaller states choose to conduct multilateral foreign 
policies and balance the three major powers, Russia, the U.S. and China, by 
gaining military and economic assistance from all of them. 
This has mainly been the case after 9/11, when external military forces relocated to 
Central Asia and foreign troops have specifically used the airbases in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. The SCO member states argued that this collaboration should be 
temporary and should end when Afghanistan‟s situation stabilized. The prolonged 
presence of U.S. and allied troops and continuous pressure from the West to 
democratize the governance in the Central Asian states, Russia and China, resulted 
in the SCO‟s soft balancing behaviors. The Western presence and normative 
agenda were challenged by declarations and the promotion of alternative norms 
based on non-interference and sovereignty to strengthen regime survival. 
Success and Failure of Soft Balancing: Cases of ASEAN and the SCO 
When the SCO and ASEAN have deliberated and issued joint statements on 
specific security issues they have shown that they can function like middle powers; 
in other words, their actions are those of unified actors in the international arena. 
Their soft balancing behavior has manifested itself in several ways. ASEAN has 
facilitated the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
encouraged a three-stage developmental process to achieve a stable and a more 
predictable regional balance of power. It was successful in engaging China in this 
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framework and finalizing agreements on regional trust-building measures. This was 
the first step in reduction of mistrust and minimizing the chances for regional 
conflicts. The second stage, however, has not been very successful. Although the 
ARF, with the help of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 
formulated a definition of „preventive diplomacy‟, conflicts in the South China Sea 
were not averted, for example, the Mischief Reef Incident between China and the 
Philippines. ASEAN‟s response and the outcome of the 1997 oil rig dispute 
between China and Vietnam was more successful. Even though China repeatedly 
challenged the status quo and acted in contradiction to the norms of regional 
conduct, with ASEAN unable to prevent this incident, enough united pressure was 
generated to convince Beijing of wrongdoing and led to China‟s withdrawal of the 
rig.  
The SCO member states worked on their confidence-building prior to the 
establishment of the SCO, within the Shanghai Five processes. They were 
successful in declaring their commitment to increasing the transparency of their 
military manoeuvres in border areas and their shared understanding of arms 
reduction along these borders. They also managed to agree on constraints regarding 
the quota of their military forces in the 100-km border zone. However, 
transparency and verification measures were not fully achieved due to the lack of 
full disclosure of defense spending and non-binding commitment to mutual 
inspections.  
The SCO fully endorsed these confidence-building measures and provided a 
platform for further discussion and for conducting joint military exercises, „Peace 
Missions‟, in order to improve interoperability between the SCO states‟ defense 
sectors and also to increase mutual trust and confidence between these states. The  
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„Peace Missions‟ generated considerable press coverage, which often implied that 
these exercises were targeting Western countries and NATO, whilst the SCO 
member states have proclaimed repeatedly that they used these drills to perfect the 
mechanism for fighting against the „three evils‟: separatism, terrorism and 
extremism. Secondary benefits of such cooperation include the preservation of 
economic stability and security for energy resources, but this agenda has not 
targeted external states explicitly. 
As outlined in Chapter Five, the SCO member states are primarily concerned with 
their domestic security and the SCO was not created as an anti-NATO vehicle. 
However, insofar as these member states reject meddling in internal affairs they use 
the SCO to limit foreign interference by providing a non-invasive alternative. The 
Central Asian states, Russia and China refrained from criticizing the Uzbek 
government for the brutal suppression of a civilian uprising in Andijan in 2005. 
The SCO member states did not request an inquiry into this incident. They praised 
President Karimov‟s ability to restore the order and blamed the escalation on 
increased levels of extremism in the Ferghana Valley where Andijan is located. 
These states share a common goal to constrain democratic concepts imposed on 
them from the West. They encourage respect for diversity of cultures and political 
systems. The concepts of „sovereign democracy‟ and the „Shanghai Spirit‟ form the 
SCO‟s normative dimension. In order to deal with external criticism, the 
mechanism of the „Observer Mission‟ was created to monitor elections. In contrast 
with the negative view of elections in Central Asia by the Organization for Security 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the SCO concluded that the elections in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2009 and Russia in 2012 were legitimate, honest and transparent.  
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The evidence suggests mixed outcomes for the strategic use of soft balancing, 
though advantages are sufficiently significant to warrant the elevation of soft 
balancing to the mainstream of strategic models. States have used soft balancing in 
an effort to minimize risks and optimize benefits because traditional balancing 
would be too costly under conditions of such systemic uncertainty during the 
transition from a unipolar to multipolar world order. Middle powers, in particular, 
opt for less formal alliances to avoid great power dominance within regional 
organizations. They also choose soft balancing when the threat is lower or 
uncertain – in the sense that intentions are unclear – because a tighter alliance 
would bear higher risks compared to anticipated rewards. 
 
Future of Soft Balancing 
The importance of soft balancing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific may be expected to 
increase as the demand for resources rises. Thus the competition among great 
powers for influence may intensify in Central and Southeast Asia, as both regions 
have major transportation networks, e.g. along the „New Silk Road‟ and through 
the Strait of Malacca.  
The South China Sea dispute has shown little evidence of abating. In a bid to 
consolidate its claims over disputed waters, the Chinese province of Hainan 
legislated new laws in November 2012. Under these regulations Chinese maritime 
police can conduct search operations of suspicious foreign ships and request that 
they leave should they appear within the 12-nautical-mile zone near the islands 
claimed by China. The phrasing of the new regulations is deemed to be vague and 
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does not identify what constitutes „illegal activities‟.587 ASEAN Secretary General, 
Surin Pitsuwan, said that this development has elevated concerns and anxiety 
among all ASEAN member states, especially those that are dependent on the 
freedom of navigation through these waters.
588
 The Philippines has been alarmed 
and issued an official statement on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs website asking 
Beijing to: 
 . . . immediately clarify its reported plans to interdict ships that enter what it 
considers its territory in the South China Sea. If media reports are accurate, this 
planned action by China is a gross violation of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), international law, particularly UNCLOS, and 
a direct threat to the entire international community as it violates not only the 
maritime domain of coastal states established under UNCLOS, but also impedes 
the fundamental freedom of navigation and lawful commerce.
589
  
At the time of writing (December 2012), the PRC government has yet to provide a 
full list of acts deemed illegal. The spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, dismissed the accusations that China would violate any 
domestic or international laws. He suggested that China was consistent in its policy 
of protecting its territorial sovereignty, rights and interests. He concluded with a 
restatement that China would conduct friendly negotiations in order to solve 
disputes.
590
 
If the South China Sea dispute appears to be bringing ASEAN to a strategic 
crossroads between hard and soft power (the power of threat versus the power of 
attraction), the broader picture of a China that is enmeshed in economic and 
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diplomatic cooperation suggests that these constructivist forces will outweigh the 
particularistic requirements of territorial claims. After all, the issue of the status of 
Taiwan, which ranks higher on the hierarchy of China‟s sovereignty claims, has 
been left unresolved in view of the unwanted consequences of military action and 
loss of international goodwill. China‟s „Peaceful Development‟ reassurances and 
commitment to a „Harmonious World‟ speak to a normative identity formation 
which is difficult to reverse through individual events or provincial-level 
legislation. A momentum across a range of acts would need to develop for a new 
inter-subjectivity of threat to replace the cooperative norms in operation at the 
regional level.  In short, ASEAN still has the „constructivist‟ card to play in its soft 
balancing behavior. China is unlikely to make a short-term realist calculation of 
asserting its South China Sea claims, especially as this would likely draw the U.S. 
into committing itself to further defending freedom of the seas.  It remains to be 
seen whether rising tensions will push Southeast states into hedging strategies or 
further into hard alliance systems that might undermine regional norms.   
Likewise, it seems unlikely that the SCO will evolve into a formal alliance system, 
though the grouping has demonstrated security cooperation that might evolve into a 
future security community (beyond its current, looser diplomatic framework). To 
date, the two main powers (Russia and China) have increased their cooperation 
with Central Asian states bilaterally and via SCO channels, using the Organization 
to reduce external pressures. Likewise, the grouping as a forum for ongoing 
dialogue has reduced internal tensions among member states, for example, between 
Russia and China, and among Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, 
engagement of SCO norms remains uneven in external behaviour (as indicated by 
Russia‟s attack on Georgia), and weaker member states will need continued help to 
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maintain economic and political stability.  It remains to be seen whether SCO 
strategies can effectively shape the wider Eurasia strategic environment. 
In all, regional powers will face various traditional and non-traditional threats in 
these complex environments. To alleviate these challenges, network regionalism 
will play a crucial role in facilitating dialogue among nations. Great and middle 
powers will opt for soft balancing through official and non-official multilateral 
frameworks to limit the power of hegemonic or rising powers perceived as 
threatening. The best outcome for states in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is to build a 
deeper sense of trust and shared goals. Thus over time states are likely to become 
more confident and flexible in the face of a changing world order, a transition with 
attendant risks and opportunities. Soft balancing has emerged as an important 
strategy used in evolving regional and multilateral frameworks, and has been of 
critical significance to ASEAN and the SCO. 
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APPENDIX ONE: Asia Pacific Regional Architecture 
 
Figure 11: ASEAN and the SCO in the context of the Asia Pacific Regional Architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSCAP Security Regional Outlook 2012: Security Through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral 
Engagement, ed. Brian L. Job and Erin Williams, [http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO2012.pdf]. 
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APPENDIX TWO: Mapping the World’s Soft Power Landscape   
 
     Figure 12: Top Ten Countries by sub-index scores 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jonathan McClory, “The New Persuaders II: a 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power”, Institute for Government,  
1 December 2011, p.19.  
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